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ABSTRACT 
Healthcare organizations have implemented numerous safety initiatives to address errors 
due to the impact on the patient, families, healthcare provider and the organization as 
highlighted in the Institute of Medicine report. However, error identification, reporting and 
management remain a challenge. Nurses have been identified as the healthcare provider 
with the greatest potential for errors.  
Supportive work environments are needed to provide optimal care to the nurse who 
makes an error; which may be minor to severe repercussions. The patient is identified as 
the first victim and the nurse who makes the error as the second victim. How nurse errors 
are reported, managed and disclosed is dependent on the response of leaders and peers 
which may be in a shame and blame or just culture approach.  
The aim of the study was to assess error management in nursing amongst registered 
nurses working in a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia.  The objectives were to identify the 
occurrence of nursing related errors, determine the current process of reporting nursing 
errors, describe the management of nursing errors and explore the factors impacting on 
the management of nursing errors.   
The research methodology for this study was a descriptive, quantitative approach which is 
applicable when exploring the unknown. Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics 
Board, University of Stellenbosch and the Institutional Review Board, King Faisal 
Specialist Hospital and Research Centre (General Organization) -Jeddah (KFSH&RC-J).  
The population was registered nurses working in KFSH&RC-J and assigned to the job 
descriptions of Staff Nurse 1&2, Clinical Nurse Coordinators and Assistant/Head nurses. 
Sample was selected using proportional allocation for nationality and simple random 
selection for nursing specialty; 215 RNs from these three groups.   
Data was collected using a questionnaire developed by the researcher and analysis 
completed using SPSS and regression analysis to identify factors which influences the 
reporting and management of errors. Data was presented in the form of frequency tables 
and graphs using the EXCEL program to analyze the data. 
The main findings of the study;  there was significant difference in nurse leaders and 
professional nurses ability to identify nursing errors; questioning of the practice of peers, 
views of a non-punitive environment  and the ability to differentiate between error and 
negligence. The nurse executive was positively associated with the average positive 
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responses received. RNs of Middle Eastern nationality and the Adult nursing division were 
found to be slightly more negative in their perceptions about error reporting and 
management than other respondents.  
Improvements are needed in the processes of error reporting and management which 
include education; leadership development, underreporting of errors, feedback and 
communication, nurse manager support and disclosure of errors.  
Recommendations are the implementation of the Just Culture principles within the 
organization and leadership development to address error reporting and management. 
The need to develop a national database for error reporting in Saudi Arabia is 
recommended.   
Nursing errors occurred in one tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia and an on-line system is 
available to report errors. However, nurses do not report errors as they fear being blamed 
and shamed. The process of error management within the organization has not been 
clearly defined.  
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OPSOMMING  
Gesondheidsorganisasies het talle veiligheids inisiatiewe geïmplementeer om  foute aan 
te spreek weens die invloed wat dit het op die pasiënt, families, die 
gesondheidsverskaffer en die organisasie soos uitgelig in die Mediese Verslag van die 
Instituut. Nietemin, die identifisering van foute, verslaggewing en bestuur bly ’n uitdaging. 
Verpleegsters is geïdentifiseer as die gesondheidsverskaffers wat oor die grootste 
potensiaal beskik om foute te begaan. 
Ondersteunende werkomgewings  word benodig om optimale sorg aan die verpleegster 
te verskaf wat ’n fout van ’n mindere aard tot die met ernstige gevolge begaan. Die 
pasiënt word geïdentifiseer as die eerste slagoffer en die verpleegster wat die fout 
begaan as die tweede slagoffer. Die manier hoedat verpleegfoute gerapporteer, bestuur 
en openbaar gemaak word, is afhanklik van die reaksies van leiers en  portuurgroepe wat 
’n skaamte- en blameerbenadering of  “just culture”-benadering kan wees. 
Die doel van die studie was om die hantering van verpleegfoute tussen geregistreerde   
vepleegkundiges wat in n tersiêre hospital in Saudi werk te ondersoek.  Die doelwitte is 
om die voorkoms van verpleegverwante foute te identifiseer, die huidige proses van 
verslaggewing van verpleegfoute te bepaal, die bestuur van verpleegfoute te beskryf en 
die faktore te ondersoek wat ’n impak het op die bestuur van verpleegfoute. 
Die navorsingsmetodologie vir hierdie studie is ’n beskrywende, kwantitatiewe benadering 
wat van toepassing is wanneer die onbekende ondersoek word. Etiese goedkeuring is 
verkry van die Etiese Raad aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch en die Institusionele 
Beoordelingsraad, King Faisal Specialist Hospitaal en Navorsingssentrum (Algemene 
Organisasie) – Jeddah (KFSH & RC-J). 
Die teikengroep is geregistreerde verpleegsters wat werk in KFSH & RC-J aan wie die 
posbeskrywing van stafverpleegster 1 & 2 toegeken is, Kliniese Verpleegkoördineerders 
en Assistent/Hoofverpleegsters. Die steekproef is geselekteer deur gebruik te maak van 
proporsionele toekenning vir nasionaliteit en ’n eenvoudige ewekansige steekproef vir 
verpleegspesialiteit; 215 geregistreerde verpleegsters van hierdie drie groepe. 
Data is gekollekteer deur gebruik te maak van ’n vraelys wat deur die navorser ontwikkel 
is en die analise  is voltooi  deur gebruik te maak van SPSS en regressie-analise om 
faktore te identifiseer wat verslaggewing en bestuur van foute beïnvloed. Data is 
aangebied in die vorm van frekwensie-tabelle en grafieke deur gebruik te maak van die 
EXCEL-program om die data te analiseer. 
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Die vernaamste bevindinge van die studie is dat daar beduidende verskille tussen 
verpleegleiers en professionele verpleegsters se vermoë is om verpleegfoute te 
identifiseer; bevraagtekening van die praktyke van portuurgroepe; beskouinge van nie-
strafgerigte omgewing en die vermoë om te onderskei tussen foute en nalatigheid. Die 
verpleegeksekuteur is positief geassosieer met die gemiddelde positiewe response wat 
ontvang is. Geregistreerde verpleegsters van Midde-Oostelike nasionaliteit en die 
Volwasse Verpleegafdeling is gevind om effens meer negatief te wees in hulle persepsies 
van fouteverslaggewing en bestuur, as ander respondente. 
Verbeterings is nodig in die prosesse van verslaggewing van foute en bestuur daarvan 
wat opvoeding daarvan insluit; leierskapontwikkeling, onderverslaggewing van foute, 
terugvoer en kommunikasie, ondersteuning van verpleegbestuur en bekendmaking van 
foute. 
Aanbevelings is die implementering van die “Just”-kultuur beginsels binne die organisasie 
en leierskap ontwikkeling om die verslag van foute en bestuur aan te spreek. Die 
behoefte om ’n nasionale databasis te ontwikkel vir die verslag van foute in Saoedi-Arabië 
word aanbeveel.  
Verpleegfoute het in een tersiêre hospitaal in Saoedi-Arabië  plaasgevind en ’n aanlyn 
sisteem is beskikbaar gestel om foute te rapporteer. Nietemin, verpleegsters rapporteer 
nie foute nie, want hulle vrees om geblameer te word en beskaamd te staan. Hierdie 
proses van foutebestuur binne die organisasie is nog nie duidelik gedefinieer nie.  
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CHAPTER 1: FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Every nurse aims to provide safe patient care, with no harm to come to the patient, but as 
highlighted in the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report “To Err is Human”, every healthcare 
provider has the potential to make an error (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 2000:1). This 
report is more than 10 years old and has resulted in many changes being implemented to 
address errors.  Initiatives include the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) bundles and 
the 100k Lives and 5Million lives campaigns; Joint Commission International Accreditation 
(JCIA) patient safety goals; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, 2004) 
Culture of Safety assessment tools developed and implemented; the American Nurses 
Credentialing Centre’s Magnet Recognition Program® (ANCC, 2008) and the identification of 
the Just Culture concept for error reporting and management (Marx, 2001: 1-28).  
Little is known about the safety culture of healthcare organizations in Saudi Arabia and 
whether the nursing challenges for error prevention, reporting and management are the 
same as reported in other countries.  
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM  
Few studies which assessed the safety culture of the healthcare environment in Saudi Arabia 
were found on literature review and thus little is known about the safety culture of healthcare 
organizations in Saudi Arabia (Alahmadi, 2010:17). Thus, the value of this study was to add 
to the knowledge of safety measures by error reporting and management of registered 
nurses which would assist clinicians, middle managers and executives in improving the 
safety culture for better patient and nurse outcomes in Saudi Arabia.  
1.3 RATIONALE  
The profession of nursing is founded on the ethical principles of veracity, beneficence and 
autonomy (Burkhardt & Nathaniel, 2008:53-65). The role of the nurse is that of patient 
advocate, speaking on their behalf and preventing patient harm (Searle, 2006: vii & 204). 
However, these values are challenged when the registered nurse (RN) in her role of care 
provider makes an error which results in harm to the patient, family, systems and the 
profession (Benner, Sheets, Uris, Malloch, Schwed & Jamison, 2002: 509).   
Patients who are admitted to hospital place their trust in the healthcare provider to assist in 
their journey to wellbeing. Their expectation is that no harm but only good would be the result 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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of their hospital visit. Patients’ expectations are that healthcare providers will deliver the best 
quality of care available in accordance with their professional regulation and thereby held 
accountable for their acts and omissions (Al-Mandhari, Al-Shafaee, Al-Azri, Al-Zakwani, 
Khan, Al-Waily & Rizvi, 2008:1472).  
Through personal experience as a nurse manager (known as a head nurse), I noted that I did 
not have clear guidelines or defined policies for making decisions about nursing error 
management. I was employed as the head nurse of the antenatal/postpartum unit for 5 years 
from 2001 to 2007 at King Faisal Specialist Hospital & Research Centre (General 
Organisation)-Jeddah (KFSHRC-J). Other challenges I identified were how to support both 
the RN and the patient through an adverse event which may have severe consequences in 
different ways for both. RNs assigned to the direct care provider role in Saudi Arabia are 
given the title of Staff Nurse 1 or 2, dependent on meeting recruitment criteria of the 
organizations. 
The IOM report (Kohn et al., 2000:4-6) advocates that error management should contain the 
following elements which are translated into the “Just Culture” approach defined by Marx 
(2001:3):  
• Not to focus on individuals, but hold all nurses accountable for practice. This includes 
raising the standards and expectations of quality care delivery through development 
of organizations with a “culture of safety.” 
• Build safer care delivery systems, utilizing technology and resources to create the 
optimal professional environment for healthcare providers, in order to decrease 
opportunities to make errors. 
• Focus on learning from errors as reported through the initiation of mandatory and 
voluntary errors reporting. This would also include education to increase prevention of 
errors (Marx: 2001: 3-4). 
Results of studies in Saudi Arabia were found to be similar to other findings reported in 
literature. Alahmadi (2010:20-21) and Almutary & Lewis (2012:125) identified that a safety 
culture within Saudi Arabia is yet to be fully developed, with the need to eliminate blame, fear 
and silence regarding errors and leadership to view errors as opportunities for learning and 
not blame. However, many healthcare organizations are working towards introducing safety 
measures (Alahmadi, 2010: 20-21; Almutary & Lewis; 2012:125).  
Factors identified for improvement were feedback communication systems and technology 
support through a non-punitive reporting system (Mwachofi, Walston & Al-Omar, 2011:277-
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281; Almutary & Lewis, 2012:126). Thus, the challenge for Saudi Arabia is how to implement 
a “just culture” in the Middle Eastern healthcare setting (Marx, 2001:3).   
RNs perceive the Saudi Arabian professional environment as having a paternalistic approach 
to care delivery where orders are expected to be followed with minimal questioning and 
where  work contracts  can easily be terminated and where a culture of blame with the fear of 
reprisal when errors are made exist (Tumulty, 2001:287; Alahmadi, 2010: 20-21).  Spears 
(2005:223) and Lamb, Studdert, Bohmer, Berwick, & Brennan (2003:75) argue that error 
management and disclosure become the focus for the nurse and the nurse manager when 
nursing care results in unanticipated negative outcomes.   
Organisations are continuously challenged in creating safer, therapeutic healthcare 
environments (Spears, 2005:223; Alahmadi, 2010:20-21).  KFSH&RC-J is one such 
organisation which achieved Joint Commission International Accreditation (JCIA) for the third 
time in June 2008 and which is a member of the Intuition for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 
and has implemented a voluntary error computerized adverse event reporting system (Safety 
Reporting System). The Safety Reporting System (SRS) encourages reporting of all adverse 
events through a non-punitive approach and education is provided to all staff on the benefits 
of the system.   
The role of organisational leadership is important in the prevention and management of 
errors and “reducing errors will only occur if leadership accepts the ethical call of 
accountability to do no harm (Piper, 2012: 32). Lack of administrative feedback and not 
recognizing the need for education about safety culture reinforces the view that reporting is 
not useful (Elder, Brungs, Nagy, Kudel & Render, 2008: 162). 
I was assigned to the position of Magnet Recognition Program ® Coordinator at KFSH&RC-J 
in July 2007 and was charged with the responsibility of changing the professional work 
environment.  The goal was to build a shared decision making structure which included the 
concepts of partnership, accountability, ownership and equity which would increase 
empowerment amongst direct care nurses and nurse leaders within the organization. These 
goals were based on the expected patient, staff, organizational and consumer outcomes as 
identified by the American Nurses Credentialing Centre Magnet Recognition Program® 
(ANCC, 2008).  
As registered nurses at the bedside began to assume more accountability for practice and 
engage in decision making using the shared governance principles (Porter-O'Grady,1987), 
many nurses began to raise questions, e.g.  how do we manage errors, do we have an 
environment that encourages nurses to report errors made,  do managers and senior staff 
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members support clinical nurses through the experience of having made an error, do we 
have clear structures and processes available that make the process of error prevention, 
reporting and management a win-win outcome for both patients and staff, to what extent are 
the concepts of accountability, blame free, safety culture, non-punitive approach and just 
culture seen in the clinical setting? 
This led to identifying the need for this study to be conducted to answer the question about 
registered nurses’ perception of error management in a Middle Eastern hospital. 
1.3.1 Defining nursing errors 
The differentiation between medical errors and nursing errors in literature seems to be used 
interchangeably (Kohn et al., 2000: 8-9; Chard, 2010: 133-134). Researchers do not seem to 
agree on a standard use of each of the definitions for errors and medical errors are seen to 
include all errors made by healthcare providers (Herbert, Levin & Robertson, 2001: 509; 
Ioannidis & Lau: 2001: 326; Hobgood, Eaton & Weiner, 2005: 138). Medical errors are 
described by Herbert et al. (2001: 509) as “patients are harmed as a consequence of either 
what is done to them- errors of commission – or what is not done but should have been done 
to prevent an adverse event - error of omission” when distinguishing between negligent 
actions and honest mistakes. This  definition does not differ much when compared to 
Reason`s (1990:9) definition of an error as “taken as a generic term to encompass all those 
occasions in which a planned sequence of mental and physical activities fails to achieve its 
intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some 
chance agency”. 
When referring to nursing errors in the context of this research these are all errors of 
commission or omission which affect the patient. The nurse may be the healthcare provider 
performing the intervention that caused the error or be implicated in the omission of care.  
Herbert et al. (2001: 511) site Leape et al. (1991) that an adverse event is “an injury due to 
medical management that prolonged hospital stay or led to disability at discharge or both”. 
This is seen to include errors made as these can be near misses (or potential errors), errors 
with no harm and errors with harm. The researchers are of the opinion that there are 
inconsistencies in the definition of errors and a need for standardization of terminology. 
Hobgood et al. (2005:138) argue that “adverse events are not necessarily equivalent to 
errors” and there is a need to define medical errors. This is supported by the Pennsylvania 
Patient Safety Authority Annual Report (2008) which stated that facilities missed reporting 
serious events and incidents (near misses and no harm events) due to the inconsistencies of 
terminology interpretation.  
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Benner et al. (2002: 509-520) compiled a taxonomy of nursing errors in which she defined 
the most frequently occurring errors. These errors were defined as serious nursing errors 
that were reported to the State Board for investigation and disciplinary action. The errors 
were classified as serious but no definition of nursing errors was given. This taxonomy 
identified nursing errors into eight categories with a broad range of possible errors and 
causative factors. This key aspect of medical errors does cause a dilemma in reporting and 
management.  
The need for clear definitions was seen in 1996 when the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO) defined sentinel events as “an unexpected occurrence 
involving death or serious physical or psychological injury or the risk thereof. Serious injury 
specifically includes loss of limb or function. The event is called sentinel because it sends a 
signal or sounds a warning that requires immediate attention.” This was revised in 1997 to 
include “any process variation for which a recurrence would carry significant chance of 
serious outcome” and included types of events that needed to be reported by accredited 
facilities (Kobs, 1998:10).  
In 2004 the Patient Safety Authority (PSA), an independent state agency was established 
under Act 13 of 2002, the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error “Mcare” Act in  
Pennsylvania making this the only state in the United States of America with a mandate to 
report serious events and near misses. This authority defined a harm score which was 
reported to be used by more than 400 healthcare facilities in June 2004 and interested 
international facilities in 2008. This is the defined harm score used by the KFSH&RC-J with 
some modifications to the cultural differences.  
1.3.2 The outcome of errors in healthcare 
The outcome of an error made by a nurse that reached the patient with no harm or reached 
the patient with harm does result in consequences which may include disciplinary measures 
being applied (Benner et al., 2002: 521). Attention to the process of what nurses experience 
when they make a mistake and how they perceive, interpret and resolve errors is needed 
(Spears, 2005: 223; Crigger & Meek, 2007: 177). This can serve to “frame an understanding 
of these experiences in the environment of patient error” (Spears, 2005: 223).  
Chard (2010: 140) found that nurses had difficulty with differentiating between a “close call” 
(near miss) and an error which was based on a generalized definition of nursing errors, but 
were happy with the error management process they had experienced. The degree of error 
severity was not defined. The manager will have multiple challenges in managing the error 
as she has the patient to care for and the staff member to support as dealing with the error 
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(Spears, 2005:223). Several studies have found nurses unwilling to report errors, only 
reporting severe errors and living in fear of reprisal (Wilson, Bekker & Fylan, 2008: 364; 
Alahmadi, 2010:20-21; Almutary & Lewis, 2012: 125).  
However, in a study by Throckmorten & Ecthegaray (2007: 411), it was found that the 
majority of nurses were willing to report errors. The outcomes of medical errors for nurses 
may include disciplinary and legal actions (Benner et al., 2002:510; Lamb et al., 2003:80).  
The severity of disciplinary measures is dependent on the severity of patient outcome. If the 
error was classified as a sentinel event or the outcome was a morbidity or mortality, the 
outcome for the nurse may result in the most severe of disciplinary measures being taken 
(Lamb et al., 2003:80). The shift of focus from individuals to employee competence, 
environment and system assistance to decrease error risk has resulted in a change in 
healthcare provision (Marx, 2001:3; Benner et al., 2002: 510). Systems have been developed 
and introduced that take into account workflow, environment and staff needs to reduce the 
opportunity for errors (Longo, Hewett, Ge & Schubert, 2005: 2862).  
Publications by Marx (2001: 3 &17) and Murphy , Stee, McEvoy & Oshiro, (2007 :893) bring 
the concepts of “just culture” and “blame-free “ to the forefront of nursing error reporting and 
have kindled an interest in  healthcare providers’ perceptions and error management 
including disclosure to the public. However, organisations continue to be challenged in 
changing the healthcare environment to one of a safety culture (Kohn et al., 2001:10-14; 
Marx, 2001:1; Spears, 2005: 223, Mayer & Cronin, 2008:429).   
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Registered nurses who cause nursing errors do not disclose them due to fear that they would 
be held responsible or be blamed without a review into the causes of nursing errors. This 
fear leads to Registered Nurses not reporting nursing errors within the clinical environment.  
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTION  
The question which guided the research was: How are errors occurring in nursing amongst 
registered nurses working in a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia managed? 
The question which guided the research was: How are errors occurring in nursing amongst 
registered nurses working in a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia managed? 
Thus to quantify the management of errors made by registered nurses, the following 
questions were posed as sub questions? 
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1. What is the occurrence of nursing related errors within the organisation? 
2. Is there a process of reporting nursing errors within the organisation? 
3. What is the organisation approach of nursing error management? 
4. Which factors impact the management of nursing errors?  
1.6 RESEARCH AIM 
The aim of this study was to assess error management in nursing amongst registered nurses 
working in a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia.   
1.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study were to 
• identify the occurrence of nursing related errors  
• determine the current process of reporting nursing errors  
• describe the management of nursing errors  
• explore the factors impacting on the management of nursing errors.  
1.8 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The conceptual model broadly explains phenomena of interest, expresses assumptions and 
reflects a philosophical stance (Burns & Grove, 2007:167). A framework is a brief explanation 
of a theory or those portions of a theory to be tested in a quantitative study, with descriptive 
studies often examining multiple factors to understand a phenomenon not previously well 
studied (Burns & Grove, 2007:171). 
The conceptual framework guiding the study is based on the Just Culture Approach to errors 
proposed by Marx (2001). The just culture approach supports Reason`s (1990) theory of 
human error. Reason (2000: 768) advocates that the human error problem can be viewed in 
two ways: person approach (reducing unwanted variability in human behaviour) versus the 
system approach (humans are fallible and errors are to be expected, thus conditions need to 
be changed to reduce risk).  
Just culture has many definitions in literature, but the concept advocates a balanced 
approach to errors, support and accountability (Marx, 2001:3; Dekker, 2007:24; Mayer & 
Cronin, 2008:429; Reason 2012:62). Mayer & Cronin`s (2008:429) definition is “front-line 
personnel feel comfortable disclosing errors, including their own, while maintaining 
professional accountability. The Author recognizes many individual errors represent 
predictable interactions between human operators and the system in which they work and 
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Reason (2012: 62) states that just culture is not blame free but open and fair”; and thus a 
decision process is defined for error management (Marx; 2001: 13-18). 
Excellence in patient and nurse outcomes is increased when the concepts of just culture and 
a culture of safety work together in the healthcare organisation. When the approach to the 
management of medical errors is an individual approach, which is the traditional method, it is 
easier for leaders to assign blame, shame individuals and punish them for errors which could 
be prevented (Alahmadi, 2010: 20-21; Almutary & Lewis, 2012: 125). 
The systems approach which is advocated for all healthcare organisations as the ideal 
approach to adopt, recognizing that humans make errors and there is a need to identify risks 
and decrease these through better working conditions, non-punitive approach to errors, 
support and education of employees to learn from errors made and feedback mechanisms to 
employees on the errors reported (Reason, 2000: 769-770; Marx, 2001: 3-4). Thus to 
implement a Just Culture, an organisation would adopt the systems approach and this would 
be measured through the safety culture evident throughout an organisation.  
1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The methodology or design refers to the process and strategies used for gathering, analysing 
and interpreting the data obtained in a particular research investigation (Brink, Van der Walt 
& Van Rensburg, 2006:92).  Quantitative research approach is defined by Burns & Grove 
(2007: 24) as “a formal, objective, rigorous systematic approach for generating information 
about the world, conducted to describe new situations, events or concepts in the world.”   
Descriptive quantitative research is the exploration of phenomena in real life situations, 
providing an accurate account of characteristics of individuals, situations or groups, 
discovering new meaning, describing what exists or determining frequency of occurrence 
(Burns & Grove, 2007:24).   
1.9.1 Research design  
This research design is based on a quantitative approach with a descriptive design to explore 
and describe error management in nursing.  This is regarded as a suitable approach by 
Burns & Grove, (2007:24) when “exploring the unknown’.   
1.9.2 Study setting  
Due to the nature and sensitivity of the topic the study was conducted at one tertiary 
healthcare organisation in Saudi Arabia, KFSH&RC-J. This limits generalization to the 
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population of registered nurses working in Saudi Arabia, Nevertheless, information obtained 
will assist decision makers in policy development with regard to managing nursing errors.  
1.9.3 Population and sampling   
Population is defined as “all elements (individuals, objects or substances) that meet certain 
criteria for inclusion in a study” and a sample as “a subset of the population that is selected 
for a particular study” (Burns & Grove; 2007:40). Sampling is described as the process of 
selecting the group of subjects, events or behaviours and the sampling frame is the list 
compiled to identify all subjects who have an opportunity to be selected from the accessible 
population (Burns & Grove, 40,330) 
Table 1.1 below summarizes the planned sample for the study and chapter three will present 
changes which were introduced at data collection. 
Table  1.1:The target population of registered nurses (RNs) as of June 2010 
King Faisal Specialist  
Hospital & Research 
Center(Gen.Org)-Jeddah 
Staff Nurses 
1 & 2 
(SN1& 2) 
Clinical Nurse 
Coordinators  
(CNC) 
Unit Managers 
(HN& AHN) Totals 
1.    Critical Care Division 165 4 4 n  =173 
2.   Maternal Child Division 80 3 3 n  =86 
3.    Adult Division 190 7 3 n  =200 
4.    Pediatric Division 77 3 3 n  =83 
5.    Procedure Division 89 2 5 n  =96 
6.    Out Patient Division 54 0 4 n   =58 
Target Population =N 655 19 22 N =696 
Sample Size 25% of Target 
Population n =164 n= 5 n= 6 N  = 175 
The population N=696 as of 01 June 2010 Manpower Status Report (MSR) consisted of all 
RNs employed at KFSH&RC-J who met the inclusion criteria. The sample selection method 
was planned as 25% of the total population and simple random selection would provide 
distribution of nursing specialty and nationality among the selection. The sample was 
selected using a simple random method for nationality and nursing specialty by the Director, 
Research Department using a computerized table of RNs from the MSR one month before 
the study was commenced.  
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1.9.3.1 Inclusion criteria 
The inclusion criterion for the study was: 
• RNs  assigned to patient care units providing direct clinical care with job titles of Staff 
Nurse 1 & 2 and Clinical Nurse Coordinator  
• Nurse Managers who are registered nurses with a twenty four accountability for a 
patient care unit with job title of Assistant Head Nurse/ Head Nurse. 
1.9.3.2 Exclusion criteria 
• RNs  who were not assigned to patient care units and do not have direct patient 
contact, e.g. assigned in nurse education, coordinators, nursing supervisors, nursing 
informatics  and executive job descriptions, i.e. Chief of Nursing, Programme 
Directors, Quality Managers, Nurse Recruiters and Products Coordinator. 
• Eligible RNs on vacation during data collection period. 
• RNs who participated in the pilot study.  
• RNs that were in the probation period (first three months of recruitment) at the time of 
data collection.  
1.9.4 Instrumentation 
Instrumentation used in the study was a structured questionnaire with predominately closed-
ended questions and a five point Likert scale with an option of other where appropriate. Core 
concepts related to error management were generated and refined into this concept 
questionnaire which was based on an extensive literature review, expert advisor’s input and 
the clinical experience of the researcher in organisation processes. The questionnaire 
consisted of four sections as follows: Section 1: Biographical/Demographical data; Section 2: 
Types of Errors; Section 3: Had two sections 3.1 and 3.2 which were Likert Scale questions 
exploring error management and factors which affect errors and Section 4: Nurses` 
involvement with errors.  
1.9.5 Pilot study  
A pilot study is defined as “a smaller version of the proposed study and conducted to refine 
the methodology (Burns & Grove, 2007:38). The purpose of the pilot study was to ensure 
that the questionnaire would address the objectives defined in the proposed study. The pilot 
study was conducted with volunteer RNs n=18 (10%) who did not meet the inclusion criteria. 
The approach applied was test-retest of the questionnaire to assess the validity and 
reliability.  The responses of the pilot study and the participants were not included in the main 
study; however, a detailed report of the findings will be provided in chapter three, the 
methodology of the thesis. 
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1.9.6 Reliability and validity/trustworthiness 
Burns and Grove (2007:552), define reliability as the consistency with which an instrument 
measures what it is supposed to measure, while validity is the extent to which an instrument 
measures what it is supposed to measure.  The amount of random error in the instrument will 
be evaluated by reliability testing. Reliability testing of the questionnaire focuses on the 
stability, equivalence and homogeneity of the measurement. The questionnaire was sent to 
the supervisor and two experts in the field of error management to comment on face and 
content validity through their expert judgement. 
A pilot study was conducted to refine the methodology, including the instrument, i.e. the 
questionnaire. A statistician was consulted to assist with the design and testing of the 
questionnaire and guided the researcher throughout the process.  
1.9.7 Data collection   
A questionnaire with closed- and open-ended questions was sent out to the stratified, 
randomly selected participants over the selected data collection period.  The researcher 
informed all RNs before the time of the study and explained that the selection process was 
random and participation was voluntary. Each participant received an information leaflet, a 
questionnaire and a return envelope from the researcher.   
Completion and return of the questionnaire were viewed as permission obtained to 
participate in the study.  Participants were requested to place the completed questionnaires 
in a sealed, opaque envelope and return through the internal mail process directly to the 
researcher or her assistant (secretary) or through email. The assistant would receive soft 
copy submissions (via internal email) of the questionnaire which she printed to prevent 
identification of participants before submitting to the researcher. No identifiers were used to 
ensure confidentiality and anonymity of participants.   
1.9.8 Data analysis  
Data analysis is conducted to “reduce, organize and give meaning to the data” (Burns & 
Grove; 2007: 41). Data analysis was completed with the assistance of a statistician.  
Statistical summaries of the mean, standard deviations and frequency tables were completed 
by a statistician. Statistical techniques used to investigate relationships between variables 
were determined depending on the type of data collected.  The statistics used for analysis 
were frequency distribution, correlation statistics e.g. the Fisher two tailed exact test; t-test, 
Chi-Square and regression analysis to extrapolate correlations between multiple variables 
with a 95% confidentiality index.   
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1.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The researcher adhered to the ethical standards as defined in good clinical principles based 
on the Helsenki declaration and for nurse researchers as prescribed by the Democratic 
Nursing Organisation of South Africa's (DENOSA, 1998:2.2.1-2.3.4) ethical standards of 
research to protect the rights of all participants.  Written permission was obtained from the 
Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Health Science at the Stellenbosch University and from 
the Institutional Review Board, KFSHRC-J to conduct the study. 
Written consent was waived, as all participants received an information leaflet attached to the 
questionnaire explaining about the research, voluntary participant and that return of the 
completed questionnaire was taken as consent to participate in the study. Anonymity of 
participants was ensured by not using identities; hard copy questionnaire returns were 
submitted in a sealed envelope either in internal mail or directly to researcher / assistant 
(secretary). Questionnaires returned by email were printed by the researcher`s assistant and 
included with returns. Thus, assistant had limited access to returns of questionnaires only on 
receipt to avoid bias for the researcher. 
Participation was voluntary, anonymous and participants could withdraw from the study at 
any point with no consequences. The participants’ confidentiality and safety were further 
protected as only the researcher; assistant (secretary), statistician and research supervisor 
had access to the collected data which was stored in sealed boxes in a locked cabinet with 
controlled access. No rewards or financial gain were offered to the participants. Publication 
of the results would not be identified to specific participants. However, every person will have 
equal access to all information captured in this thesis.  
1.11 OPERATONAL DEFINTIONS 
Adverse event in this context:  
An adverse event is defined as any adverse change in health or a negative or bad result 
stemming from a diagnostic test, medical treatment or surgical intervention. An injury 
resulting from a medical intervention can cause an adverse event (American Society for 
Healthcare Risk Management, 2003:20). 
Clinical Nurse Coordinator (CNC):  
Clinical Nurse Coordinator is a registered nurse who is employed in a Grade 9 position and is 
accountable for the educational needs of patient and staff of a specific patient care area.  
This position is expected to assume the unit manager position and delegated authority during 
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vacation, sick time and as needed (KFSH&RC-J, Job Description, Clinical Nurse 
Coordinator, December 2006, Code 0146, Form 886-34).  
Direct Care Nurse  
This refers to the nurse who provides care directly to patients, excluding the nurse manager. 
Direct care activities can be reflected as partial or full time equivalents (ANCC, 2008: 60). 
Disclosure  
Disclosure is the provision of information to customers, clients, patients and families and is 
seen as a marker of professionalism and occurs at the individual and organisational level 
(Dekker, 2007:47). 
Error 
An error is defined by the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (2003) as a 
failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use of a wrong plan to achieve an 
aim.  The accumulation of errors results in accidents (American Society for Healthcare Risk 
Management, 2003:20). 
Just Culture  
According to Dekker (2007:24) a just culture means getting to an account of failure that can 
do two things at the same time which are to satisfy demands for accountability and contribute 
to learning and improvement.  
Manpower Status Report (MSR) 
Manpower Status Report (MSR) is the list of all hospital employees for KFSHRC-J which will 
include the assigned department and job description. 
Occurrence Variance Report (OVR)  
An occurrence is an event that occurs at KFSHRC - J or any of its premises which is not 
consistent with the routine patient care and operations and/or may adversely affect or 
threaten to affect the health or life of a patient, visitor or employee which may or may not 
result in injury and may or may not involve loss or damage to personal or hospital property.  
An Occurrence Variance Report (OVR) is an internal form used to document the details 
surrounding the occurrence (KFSH&RC-J, ACEO-J-QMPS -01-03). 
Registered Nurses (RNs) 
A registered nurse in KFSHRC–J, Saudi Arabia is a nurse who meets the qualifications to 
practise in the capacity of accountability and responsibility of caring for patients 
independently within a prescribed framework. This is determined by the institution according 
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to qualifications from country of origin, years of experience and meeting the stipulated criteria 
of the job description.  Registered nurses are employed in positions known as Staff nurse 1, 
2, Clinical Nurse Coordinators, Assistant Head Nurses, Head Nurses, special assignment 
positions and more senior job titles. To prevent confusion for the South African context of 
staff nurses, the SN 1 & 2 group of RNs will be referred to as Professional Nurses 
(KFSH&RC-J, Job Description: Staff Nurse 1, July 2006, Code 0146, Form 886-34).  
Culture of Safety  
A number of definitions of a culture of safety have been published. Mayer and Cronin 
(2008:429) define safety culture as “Leadership of an organisation promulgates an 
atmosphere in which the reporting of errors is welcomed so that others may benefit from 
knowledge of the situation and can develop strategies based on data”.  
Unit Manager  
A registered nurse is continuously accountable for the overall supervision of all registered 
nurses and other healthcare providers in an inpatient or outpatient area (ANCC, 2008:6).  A 
unit manager employed at KFSHRC-J holds a Grade 9 position, Assistant Head Nurse or a 
Grade 10 position, Head Nurse  
Tertiary Care  
This refers to highly specialized medical care usually over an extended period of time that 
involves advanced and complex procedures and treatments performed by medical specialists 
in state of the art facilities (Merriam Webster Dictionary).  
1.12 DURATION OF THE STUDY 
The Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Health Science at the Stellenbosch University 
approval for this research was obtained for one year from the date 06 April 2010. The 
Institutional Review Board, KFSHRC-J approval was obtained on 26 April 2010 for a period 
of one year with six monthly progress reports submitted. An extension on approval was 
granted till December 2012. The data collection was completed from 05 March to the 31 
March 2011. 
1.13 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 1: Overview of the Study 
Chapter 1 gave an overview of the research proposal and the reasons which led to this 
research being conducted. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Study 
Chapter 2 is a description of the existing literature about the management of errors in 
healthcare and effect on registered nurses.  
Chapter 3:  Research Methodology   
Chapter 3 is a description of the methodology used to conduct the research. 
Chapter 4:  Data analysis and interpretation 
Chapter 4 is a discussion on the outcome/s of the research including the interpretation and 
application of findings. Data is presented in figures and graphs. 
Chapter 5:  Discussion and Recommendations 
Chapter 5 is a detailed discussion of the research findings and reviews how the new 
knowledge gained from the study can be used and the significance for the organisation and 
Saudi Arabia.   
1.14 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study proved to be significant as no studies of this nature have been conducted in Saudi 
Arabia and would add value to understanding the management of nursing errors in a tertiary 
hospital. The study can be used as a guide to assist the nurse managers to manage nursing 
errors effectively. The study will be used to assist in staff development programmes in order 
to reduce litigation and increase their knowledge in the effective management of nursing 
errors. 
1.15 SUMMARY  
The IOM report acknowledges that errors have an adverse impact on healthcare providers, 
but these experiences can be changed for the benefit of all if the focus is placed on defining 
the solutions and better alternatives (Kohn et al., 2000:3-5).  The researcher has described 
the rationale for choosing the research topic, the identified problem statement; research 
question to be answered, the aim, the objectives and the methodology applied for this study. 
The aim of this chapter was to define the reasons for the study, provide the methodology and 
present the objectives accomplished.  
Chapter 2 will be a discussion of the literature reviewed to gain an understanding of the 
problem and support of the reasons for conducting the research from expert opinions.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter one defined the research approach to describing the process of reporting and 
management of errors made by registered nurses in a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia. This 
chapter will present the literature reviewed in an attempt to understand the scope of medical 
errors and how they are managed in healthcare facilities. The researcher is currently 
employed in a hospital in Saudi Arabia which places much emphasis on patient safety and 
the prevention of medical errors in which the researcher is actively involved.  
This stimulated an interest in defining the safety culture of the hospital whether it is “shame 
and blame” or a “non-punitive” environment “that adheres to the “just culture” concept (Marx, 
2001:1-3).  Against this background a detailed literature review was performed to serve as a 
theoretical background and motivation for the study.   
2.2 REVIEWING AND PRESENTING THE LITERATURE  
A systematic approach was used to search the literature.  Using core words as key concepts 
such as medical error prevention, “blame and shame”, nursing errors, error management, 
computerized error reporting, incident reports and root cause analysis, electronic data bases 
including OVID, PUBMED and Medscape were explored. Websites used as part of the 
current work situation, appropriate textbooks and international quality accreditation manuals 
such as Joint Commission International (JCI), National Database for Nursing Quality 
Indicators (NDNQI) and the Magnet Recognition Program (MRP) were included in the review. 
The MRP is a summary of proposed excellence standards for nursing care introduced in the 
United States of America (USA) by the American Nurses Credentialing Center (ANCC, 
2008). 
The literature review was completed from 2008 to 2011 and an updated search was 
completed in 2012 to ensure inclusion of current studies. Literature older than five years was 
used for the purpose of establishing a historical view of the change in medical error 
management. More than 200 articles were sourced, with exclusions and inclusions based on 
categorization according to the studies completed from most current on error management, 
error reporting and the Saudi Arabian healthcare system. The researcher was guided by the 
research questions, the objectives and previous studies which identified the need for more 
research or similar findings to the proposed research.  
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The findings from the literature review were very wide with multiple concepts; therefore the 
approach used to present the literature was to categorize the topics according to an outline 
which would best present a concise summary.  
2.3 FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE  
The findings from the literature are presented to give an overview of the RN role as patient 
advocate, her/his organisational responsibilities for patient safety and a supportive work 
environment which decreases risks to healthcare providers. The literature findings will be 
presented according to the following outline:  
2.3.1 The Registered Nurse`s Role as Patient Advocate  
2.3.2 The Challenge for Safe Healthcare  
2.3.3 Prevention and Awareness of Errors  
2.3.4 Healthcare in Saudi Arabia  
2.3.4.1 Healthcare Regulation 
2.3.4.2 Nursing in Saudi Arabia 
2.3.5 Organisation Culture   
2.3.5.1 The Role of Organisation Leaders  
2.3.6 Just Culture versus Shame and Blame Culture  
2.3.7 Systems and Processes  
2.3.7.1 Error Classification and Identification  
2.3.7.2 Error Reporting and Learning Culture  
2.3.7.3 The Use of Technology  
2.3.7.4 Work Environment Factors  
2.3.7.4.1 The Role of the Nurse Manager  
2.3.7.4.2 The Healthy Work Environment  
2.3.7.4.3 Professional Development  
2.3.8 Error Management and Disclosure  
2.3.9 Outcome of Errors  
2.3.4 Conceptual/Theoretical Framework  
2.5 Summary  
2.3.1 The registered nurse`s role as patient advocate  
A nurse is licensed and privileged to nurse by a nursing council once she has met the 
national curriculum of training and examination (National Council Licensing Examination, 
USA). At graduation, a nurse assumes responsibility and accountability for acts and 
omissions performed to provide patient care, demonstrated in taking an oath which states 
”you are prepared to be the protector of those who are helpless and who are vulnerable” 
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(Searle, 2006:viii). Medication administration is a nursing function that requires “scientific 
knowledge, technical skill and ritualistic practice” and highlights a nurse`s most important 
responsibility in the care of patients “to do good and avoid harm” (Wolf Serembus, Smetzer, 
Cohen, Cohen, 2007:93). Nursing is described by Lorenz (2007:118) as “the mechanism 
through which protection occurs and nursing intervention models are described as models of 
protection, with the end result being health.”  
The profession of nursing is founded on the ethical principles of veracity, beneficence and 
autonomy (Burckhardt & Nathaniel, 2008, 53-65). The role of the nurse as a patient advocate 
is one of the fundamental values of nursing as seen in the nurse pledge or oath at graduation 
(Searle, 2006: vii, 204). These values are challenged when the nurse is the healthcare 
provider who makes a medical error resulting in harm to the patient, family, systems and the 
profession (Benner et al., 2002: 509).   
Every nurse aims to provide safe patient care and no harm to the patient, but as highlighted 
in the Institute of Medicine report “To Err is Human” (Kohn et al., 2000:2) every healthcare 
provider has the potential to make an error. How medical errors are prevented, reported, 
managed and disclosed to patients have become the focus of healthcare institutions and 
regulating bodies like the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) and Joint Commission 
on Accreditation (JCI) of Healthcare Organisations (Lamb et al., 2003: 73). 
2.3.2 The challenge for safe healthcare  
The report “To Err is Human” has brought to light the severity of the result of errors by 
reporting between 44 000 to 98 000 preventable deaths that occur in healthcare in a year in 
the USA due to medical errors (Kohn et al., 2000:1). This report has led to errors in 
healthcare being a global focus and safety measures emphasized due to morbidity and 
mortality outcomes (Lorenz, 2007:118; Jeffs, Law & Baker, 2007:16). Emphasis has been 
placed on the need to introduce strategies to address medical errors, with a four tier 
approach:  
1. A national approach was identified which was to increase healthcare providers’ 
knowledge and safety awareness,  
2. Mandatory error reporting systems and  
3. Encouraging institutions to develop and participate in voluntary reporting systems to 
identify lessons learnt and problems that were identified and  
4. Lastly to raise the performance standards for safety and implement safety systems 
and practices at the care delivery level (Kohn et al., 2000: 6).  
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Healthcare organisations across the world are challenged to address patient outcomes at 
government level and need data which measure medical errors and their impacts on society;  
as well as healthcare providers to drive national and international policies, achieve 
accreditation, healthcare insurance payments and innovations to keep patients and families 
safe ( Jeffs et al., 2007:16). The move to a safety culture in healthcare is a priority, but many 
countries are challenged with socio-economic crises, political turmoil, global issues of natural 
disasters and brain drain due to competent professional migrating for more lucrative 
opportunities (Jeffs et al., 2007:16).   
2.3.3 Prevention and awareness of errors   
The IHI identified a national and international need to improve healthcare on a voluntary 
basis. This led to the introduction of the “100 Thousand Lives Campaign” which is reported to 
have saved 128 000 lives in America alone. This success has led to the introduction of the “5 
Million Lives Campaign” initiative with the aim of improving healthcare and decreasing risk for 
five million lives. It is not mandated for any institution to follow the guidelines but an invitation 
for voluntary participation through data submission is encouraged. The 5 Million campaign 
advocate universal application of best practices introduced as bundles for the identification of 
high alert medication, identification and use of pain medication (IHI, 2007). 
The introduction of the “International Patient Safety Goals” (JCI, 2007) is an initiative which 
identifies how to reduce risk for the following potentially error prone situations in healthcare: 
“identify patients correctly, improve effective communication, improve the safety of high alert 
medications, eliminate wrong site, wrong patient, wrong procedure surgery, reduce the risk of 
healthcare acquired infections and reduce the risk of patient harm resulting from falls”.  The 
reconciliation of medication on admission, transfer and discharge from hospital has been 
found to be effective but needs cooperation of clients and further improvements in 
implementation and evaluation as it is based on effective documentation and communication 
amongst healthcare providers (JCIA, 2007). 
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHQR) is a government based 
organisation which was implemented to advance quality and safety initiatives for healthcare 
delivery through funding, research, evidence based practice and work environment review. 
The aim is to advance healthcare quality and safety in private and government organisations. 
The AHRQ has developed tools to measure the safety cultures of healthcare organisations 
which are used to gauge the extent of improvements needed for organisations and the need 
to introduce the just culture principles (AHRQ, 2004). 
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In the Middle East, healthcare safety is being emphasized and measures introduced but 
have a long way to go when compared to the rest of the world with regard to reporting and 
management of nursing errors. The fear of reprisal when an error is made,  a culture of 
blame generally seen in the professional environment, a  paternalistic approach which can 
dictate the employment contract and a culture of following orders without question are 
challenges which need to be overcome (Alsafi, Bahroon, Tamim, Al-Jahdali, Alzahrani & 
Alsayyari, 2011: 146).  
This raises the question of how to implement a “non-punitive” or “just culture” in the Middle 
Eastern healthcare setting (Marx, 2001:3). When compared to South Africa, the United 
States of America and Europe, Saudi Arabia employs registered nurses, known as staff 
nurses from all parts of the world. These registered nurses all contribute different approaches 
to care delivery and have differences in perceptions of quality of care and patient safety 
(Almutairi, Glenn & McCarthy, 2012: 7). 
2.3.4 Healthcare in Saudi Arabia  
Healthcare in Saudi Arabia was structured under the Minister of Health (MOH) in 1950 and 
has seen much growth and development to provide primary, secondary and tertiary care    
(Al-Osimy, 1994:5-9). Healthcare is the accountability of the Minister of Health (MOH) who 
reports to the King as Saudi Arabia is governed by a monarch. There are both private and 
government structures which provide healthcare to the Saudi and expatriate communities. 
The Shari ‘a law forms the basis of the constitution and the civil and penal codes (Wikipedia, 
accessed 2012). The Shari ‘a  is the Islamic legal system based on the Holy Qur`an and has 
five objectives, namely protecting life, safeguarding the freedom to believe,  maintaining 
intellect, preserving human honour and dignity and protecting property (Lovering, 2008:30). 
Healthcare is available to Saudi nationals at the government expense. There are both 
government and private healthcare facilities accountable to the MOH for standards of care 
delivery. The MOH monitors compliance of healthcare delivery and has implemented 
structures and processes being developed to promote the use of international and national 
accrediting bodies such as JCIA, MRP (ANCC, 2008) and others for quality assurance, e.g. 
the Board of Trustees of the Central Board of Accreditation for Healthcare Institutions 
(CBAHI) which is responsible for defining the national standards of health accreditation in 
Saudi Arabia (MOH, accessed 2012).  
2.3.4.1 Healthcare regulation  
The Saudi Council for Healthcare Specialities (SCHS) was established in 1992; commenced 
registration of members in January 2007 and oversees licensing exams for all healthcare 
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professions at present.  Recognition of the role of the Saudi nurse through registration and 
licensure are partially met through the SCHS, which is responsible to register all healthcare 
professions (Tumulty, 2001: 289).  Expatriate nurses require both registration with SCHS and 
an additional registration with the country of origin, based on organisational requirements.   
There is no nursing council or a nurse practice act in Saudi Arabia which is different to 
countries like South Africa in which a nurse practice act, registration with defined 
accountabilities, responsibilities and autonomy are clearly identified to govern practice and 
safeguard the public. (Tumulty, 2001:286; South African Nursing Act, R33, and 2005:25). 
The South African public is assured of the commitment of the nursing profession through the 
South African Nursing Council (SANC) to register qualified nurses, hold peers accountable 
for acts and omissions, define the rights of nurses and encourage professional organisational 
membership for nurse support and guidance when faced with legal, ethical and practice 
dilemmas (Searle, 2006:82-93) 
Practice standards are thus defined by each healthcare organisation within Saudi Arabia.  
The MOH would be accountable to investigate adverse events reported to their office and 
healthcare organisations would support and provide legal counsel for employees (verified 
with Legal Department, KFSH&RC-J).  
The SANC acts to promote the status of the South African nursing profession which is a 
challenge for Saudi Arabia where the community views medicine as a better option in career 
choice. This view of nursing status is supported by the increased number of expatriate 
nurses employed to meet the healthcare needs of the Saudi population. However, Saudi 
nurses are pioneering ways to address these deficiencies and the recognition through salary 
adjustments and accomplishments of nursing within the healthcare setting (Tumulty, 2001: 
289; Almalki, Fitzgerald & Clark, 2011: 309). 
Professional societies and organisations need to be approved by the Ministry of Higher 
Education (MOHE) and as unions are not permitted by law, this is another unique aspect of 
employment and creates the need to define support for healthcare providers and their rights.   
The Saudi Nursing Association has been established in 2003 with the aim to advance the 
profession of nursing; however awareness is lacking (Almalki et al., 2011:307).  
2.3.4.2 Nursing in Saudi Arabia  
Nursing was not recognized within the healthcare structure until 1987 with the creation of the 
General Committee, MOH. Formal academic training as a nurse was offered in 1960 with the 
creation of segregated male and female academic institutions for pursuing a nursing career 
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(Al-Osimy, 1994:26). However, male nurse education in Saudi Arabia remains limited to the 
diploma level as it is segregated from female education institutions (Lovering, 2008:46).  
A weakness in the academic curriculum in addressing the didactic components of nursing 
and the need for bilingual competence in both English and Arabic are hurdles for the nursing 
profession to overcome (Al-Osimy, 1994:129-136). This has led to an increased focus on the 
Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) offered at the university as opposed to a nursing 
diploma. This has been the trend in South Africa and North America which offer bridging 
programs to become degree qualified registered nurses as advocated through SANC’s 
National Qualifications Framework and the Magnet Recognition Program (ANCC, 2008).  
The insufficient number of Saudi nurses to meet the healthcare needs of the country has led 
to a reliance on a large expatriate workforce from numerous countries to fill this need 
(Almutairi et al., 2012:2). This multicultural expatriate nursing workforce has numerous 
challenges which impact on patient safety, e.g. communication for those who do not speak 
Arabic, adjustments to cultural diversity, the need for cultural competence, different 
approaches to clinical practice which is negatively impacted by the differences in nationality  
and an unsafe clinical environment (Almalki et al., 2011:307, Almutairi et al., 2012:5-6). 
Thus, communication together with the multidisciplinary team are important in how 
communication occurs and the identification of strategies to decrease potential conflict from 
miscommunication and cultural aspects of communication, e.g. a physician who speaks to a 
patient in Arabic about their plan of care, but unless reminded may not translate the 
discussion for non-Arabic nurses. Thus, the risks for errors and lost productivity hours are 
increased (Van Rooyen, Telford-Smith & Strümpher, 2010: 6-7). 
2.3.5 Organisation culture   
Organisation culture is defined “as the accumulation of invisible, often unspoken ideas, 
values and approaches, seen in the way we do things around here” which is driven by 
executive leadership and seen in strategic priorities, e.g. patient safety, collaborative 
practice, the work environment and the outcomes demonstrated (Clark, 2006:258). The 
recommendations of the IOM were for healthcare organisations to implement safety systems 
which are the accountability of the chief executive nursing officer and executive boards of the 
organisation.  The safety systems would include “ a vision for safety practices, non-punitive 
systems for reporting and analyzing errors in the organisation, implement recognized safety 
principles, standardize and simplify systems which decrease the risks for errors and establish 
interdisciplinary training programs for end users”  (Kohn et al., 2000:13). 
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The culture of the organisation would influence leaderships` approach in reporting adverse 
events, near misses, analysis and management of medical errors and shape direct care 
providers’ behaviour when errors occur. A culture of blame leads to fear of a personal and 
professional nature with consequences of legal action which prevents the data being used in 
a positive manner to advocate a culture of learning (Jeffs et al., 2007:17). 
The cost of medical errors is another challenge for healthcare organisation as reported by 
Van Den Bos, Rustagi, Gray, Halford, Ziemkiewicz & Shreve (2011:599) who used insurance 
claims to estimate the cost of medical errors with patient harm. Van de Bos et al. (2011: 599-
601) estimated the annual cost for medical errors with harm to be 17.1 billion US dollars just 
for the year 2008. The findings indicated ten errors accounted for two thirds of the total cost 
with pressure ulcers, post-operative infections and backache post-surgery being at the top of 
this list. The cost of medical errors is not just in economic outcomes but includes morbidity 
and mortality for patients and the cost to the organisation in employee outcomes (Kohn et al., 
2000:1-2).  
2.3.5.1 The role of organisational leaders  
The role of administrators and unit managers drive the culture of change in the prevention of 
medical errors and have “immense power to influence cultural change (Jeffs et al., 2007:17).  
It is their responsibility to know why these errors occur and implement strategies for 
increased number of staff and client safety. This implies that errors must be reported and 
nurses must not try to hide errors for fear of punitive measures (Leape, Berwick, Clancy, 
Conway, Gluck, Guest, Lawrence, Morath, O`Leary, O`Neil, Pinakiewicz & Isacc, 2009: 424). 
A study involving nurses, physicians and pharmacists reported that they experienced non-
supportive responses and actions when reporting their medication errors to their supervisors, 
expressed as “blame and reprimand prevailed” (Wolf, 2000:283). In contrast, administrators 
cared for the clients, involved risk managers and other health care providers, reviewed 
policies and procedures and assumed the responsibility of correcting the medication error on 
behalf of the clients (Wolf, 2000:285). Cohen (2007:50) states that the” willingness to change 
clinical practice needs to start at the top”.  This is support by the IHI, 5 Million Lives 
campaign who added “Get Boards on Board “ as one of their international initiatives in 
preventing errors recognizing the important role that leadership plays in error management 
and prevention.   
Magnet Model (ANCC, 2008) advocates the empowerment of leaders to be transformational 
in approach to exemplary clinical practice; implementation of new knowledge into practice, 
empower direct care nurses, improve the work environment by providing the resources in 
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staffing, equipment, knowledge and vision to achieve excellent staff and patient outcomes. 
The component of the MRP model, transformational leaders advocates the identification of 
strategic initiatives which include end user input, visible accessible leaders and the 
partnership to accomplish change (Grant, Colello, Riehle & Dende, 2010: 330).  
2.3.6 Just culture versus shame and blame culture  
There has been a shift in the management of medical errors from a culture of “shame and 
blame” to a “non-punitive approach” over the past years (Mayo & Duncan, 2004:214; 
Potylycki, Kimmel, Ritter, Capuano, Gross, Reigel-Gross & Panik, 2006:370-371; JCI, 2007). 
Recently the “Just Culture” concept has been introduced into health care environments.  
The concepts found within a just culture are the organisation culture of transparency about 
errors and the management of errors which is not based on individuals but on systems. 
Errors are used as learning opportunities and not to punish the individuals who make an 
error or who report. However, there needs to be a balance to manage the behavioural 
choices of the nurse which is not tied to performance evaluations.  
Mayer & Cronin (2008: 428) site Marx (2008) who has developed a Just Culture Algorithm 
which can be applied when managers need to make decisions on the management of errors 
and Reason (1990) has also developed a decision tree to determine culpability and unsafe 
practice. However, the application of these tools is not effective if the nurse managers are 
not educated on the use thereof and the approach to error management is consequently 
individually based (Mayer & Cronin, 2008: 428).  
Alahmadi (2010: 20-21) in a study conducted in 13 hospitals in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
reported  areas of strength in these organisations that were identified as organisational 
learning, continuous improvement, team work within units, feedback and communication 
about errors. Areas for improvement for most hospitals were under-reporting of errors, non-
punitive response to errors, staffing and teamwork across hospital units. An important finding 
was that the majority of respondents thought that managers overlooked safety problems 
which continued to occur.  
2.3.7 Systems and processes  
The new concept of “just culture” proposed by Marx (2001:1-28) suggests a more realistic 
approach to medical errors, emphasizing changes in systems to support a decrease in errors 
and education of all healthcare providers in their responsibilities to their clients while knowing 
their rights as employees. Systems within the organisation need to be designed with the 
minimal risk for human error. This would include the work environment, data management 
systems, risk management and environmental influences (Marx, 2001:4, 16, 23).  
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Safety climate has been described to have the elements of “receptiveness to and adoption of 
technologies, uptake of lower tech best practices intended to enhance safety including sound 
communication and collaboration; a non-punitive and open approach to reporting and 
analyzing errors and near misses “(Clarke, 2006:260). Punitive cultures interfere with 
reporting of errors and corrective measures with silence seen as a deterrent to achieving 
short and long-term goals in patient safety. Managers are urged to encourage a climate of 
trust to encourage reporting and thus increase a safety culture (Chiang & Pepper, 2006:393). 
The shift of focus from individuals to employee competence, environment and system 
assistance to decrease error risk has resulted in a change in healthcare provision         
(Benner et al., 2002:510). Systems have been developed and introduced that take into 
account workflow, environment and staff needs to reduce the opportunity for errors. These 
systems include medication error reporting, electronic medical records, electronic physician 
order entry, reporting systems, bar-coding to decrease identification errors and checks and 
balances in workflow (Longo et al., 2005:2862). 
The IOM (Kohn et al., 2000:11) recommend the implementation of patient safety 
programmes and monitoring of improvements which are an executive accountability and 
continue to keep up to date with systems and processes aimed at decreasing the risk for the 
occurrence of errors. The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention (NCC MERP, 1998) proposed that medication errors may be related to 
professional practice; health care products; procedures; systems including prescribing; order 
communication; product labeling; packaging and nomenclature; compounding; dispending; 
distribution; administration; education; monitoring and use”. This is supported Mayer & 
Cronin (2008: 428)  who site Reason’s (1997) human theory and Marx’s (2008) just culture 
applications in the review with all the factors involved in errors as a system widely needed 
and  trusted, transparent with a safe systems design. 
Leape et al. (2009: 424) identified that though much progress has been made to address 
safety in healthcare, the missing components were “a culture of trust, reporting, transparency 
and discipline” which are challenging. Transparency is identified as a must, with the sharing 
of information to all levels of staff, patients and families and other organisations to learn from 
them while support is defined as the cumulative efforts of the people, systems and tools 
needed by the patients and care giver for safe quality care deliver “ (Leape et al., 2009:425- 
426).  
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2.3.7.1 Error classification and identification  
The RN at the frontline of healthcare, needs to have the ability to identify that an error has 
occurred and needs to be reported, which is the first step in the error management process 
(Hobgood et al., 2005:138). However, there is no consensus in the definitions of errors as 
described in chapter one. Murphy et al., (2007:890) state that a “standard and uniformly 
applied definition of medical errors does not exist” and describe “near misses as being 
characterized by potential error and not actual injury to patients”.  This differs from Crigger`s 
(2004: 570) definition but all have common elements of what acts or omissions should be 
present. Nursing errors were defined based on taxonomy by Benner et al. (2002:512) and 
discussed in research but no definite definition is given.  
This raises the question of how to address nursing errors when studies have not agreed on a 
definition and the need to educate nurses to gain competence to identify errors when they 
occur may be affected by this gap (Jeffs et al., 2007:27). Errors in healthcare cover a wide 
range of needs for patients, nurses and the organisation. Thus error type, whether it reached 
the patient or not, if the outcome was classified as a sentinel are important to understand the 
needs of the organisation in terms of improvements; disclosure practices and reporting 
(Hobgood et al., 2005:138). KFSH&RC-J has adopted the Pennsylvania Patient Safety 
Authority (2004) Harm Score Classification for medical errors with adaptations for the unique 
patient cultural needs of Saudi Arabia.  
The aim of error classification is to assist employees in the identification and classification of 
errors, which serve as a guide in management options to nursing units, i.e. sentinel events, 
will be reported and reviewed within a seventy two hour time frame within KFSH&RC-J. 
Hobgood et al. (2005:144) concluded that mastering an error classification, though needed 
would be a challenge for experts and healthcare individuals in error management.   
2.3.7.2 Error reporting and learning culture   
Mayer & Cronin (2008: 429) defined a reporting culture as “fuels learning because staff feels 
safe from retribution and report information about safety concerns even if it involved human 
error”.  Marx (2001:26) identified that a reporting culture is dependent on a learning culture, 
with a true establishment of a reporting culture when staff report their own violations in 
practice.  
The first step in error prevention is being able to identify that an error has occurred and then 
to report the error to promote learning which would prevent a recurrence of the same error. 
The just culture approach to error reporting is a reporting culture which is dependent on a 
learning culture. The organisation develops reporting mechanisms which promote error 
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reporting with no retribution, thus healthcare providers who report errors will not be punished, 
i.e. a non-punitive approach to error reporting (Marx, 2001:3; Mayer & Cronin, 2008:429; 
Leape et al., 2009:425). 
Reporting of errors is dependent on “the nurse`s ability to recognize that an error has 
occurred, belief that the errors warrants reporting, belief that the nurse has made an error 
and the willingness to overcome the embarrassment and fear of retaliation for having 
committed a medication administration error” (Mayo & Duncan, 2004:210). This barrier to 
error identification negatively impacts the improvements needed to be implemented as 
organisations may not be aware of the problem with errors. In effect, to improve error 
reporting through error identification, nurses need to be educated on the identification of 
errors and use of uniform definitions “variation management” which would assist in this skill 
(Kohn et al., 2000:7; Leape et al., 2009: 426).  
Nurses are the healthcare providers who spend the most time with patients and are thus able 
to impact the reduction of errors. The importance of this role was recognized by the IOM 
(2004), “Keeping Patients Safe: Transforming the Work Environment of Nurses” which 
collaborated to identify a national strategy to address the nursing work environment through 
identified strategies for improvement with a focus on nurses. These strategies were “the 
basic components of all organisations organisational management, practices, workforce 
deployment practices, work design, and organisational culture” (IOM, 2003: 3).  
Nurses in direct contact with patients act as a ” safety net “ and thus are in the ideal position 
to prevent, discover and correct errors as proposed by Rogers, Dean, Hwang & Scott 
(2008:117). Rogers et al. (2008:118) identified that nurses were able to capture and correct 
medication and procedural errors well, but needed improvement in documentation of errors. 
Rogers et al. (2008: 121) concluded that there is a need for more research into “identifying 
factors that enhance nurses’ efficiency to prevent, intercept and correct healthcare errors”.  
The aim of error reporting is to assist in identifying systems that need to change, to be 
developed or improved in order to prevent the repeated occurrence of the same errors in the 
future (Kohn et al, 2000:4; Marx, 2001:3; Mick et al., 2007:499). 
Once nurses are able to identify errors, they can then proceed to report the error. Levels of 
error reporting may be organisational which will include policies and procedures, state or 
provincial legal stipulations, national and international guidelines and standards (JCI, 2007). 
The IHI has recommended that organisations develop or implement a voluntary institutional 
error reporting system to encourage error reporting in order to use the data for development 
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of outcome based measures to improve patient safety (Cohen, 2007:52).  KFSHRC-J has a 
voluntary institutional wide on-line error reporting system for all medical errors since 2002.  
This recommendation is in support of the IOM strategy for improvement “identifying and 
learning from errors by developing a nationwide public mandatory reporting system and 
encouraging healthcare organisations and practitioners to develop and participate in 
voluntary reporting systems” (Kohn et al., 2000:9). Mandatory reporting is focused on 
reporting severe error outcomes to national or government bodies, i.e. death or serious 
harm. (Kohn et al., 2000: 9) 
Error reporting would include “near miss/almost events” and adverse events with harm to the 
patient. Reporting of near misses is included for most institutions as part of the reporting 
requirements, but it is argued that the emphasis has been on errors which have occurred but 
not on the potential gain from near misses (Jeffs et al., 2007: 17). Near misses measure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the safety systems to identify risks, reporting trends, 
awareness of direct care providers, opportunities for improvement and an opportunity to 
celebrate successes. Thus, recommendations are to continue to report errors but to review 
the benefits which can be gained from near miss reporting and analysis                           
(Kohn et al., 2000:4; Marx, 2001:3; Leape et al., 2009: 425).  
However, studies have found that staff are willing to report adverse events as these cannot 
be concealed (Marx: 2001:4); will not report a near miss that has not resulted in harm to the 
patient and reporting is dependent on the approach and reaction of executives, managers 
and peers to the error, i.e. individual or system focused (Marx, 2001:25-26; Moody et al., 
2006:204; Leape et al., 2009:425). 
One of the responsibilities of the nursing role is medication administration which has been 
identified as one of the most preventable of errors (Elnour, Ellahham & Al Qassas, 2008: 
178). Various initiatives have been implemented where medication error reporting has been 
promoted to encourage acknowledgement of errors and the challenge of moving to a culture 
of safety (Clarke, 2006:260). This is supported by Moody, et al. (2006: 204) who reported 
that “lower direct care nursing hours correlate with higher numbers of nurses` reported 
medication errors and positive nurse leadership correlates to nurses` increased willingness 
to report errors”.  
However, error reporting remains a challenge and this may be influenced by many factors. A 
study by Throckmorten & Ecthegaray (2007:410) found that the majority of nurses were 
willing to report errors which ranged from near miss to severe outcomes, contrary to the 
general belief of nurse managers. Nurses’ willingness to report is thought to be due to the 
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shift in error reporting with the focus being on systems and processes, rather than on 
individuals.  
Alsafi et al., (2011:146) studying physician`s views on medical errors at a tertiary hospital in 
Saudi Arabia found that physicians who were not willing to report their colleagues observed 
medical errors but would view a severe patient outcome as an incentive to report. They 
reported an attitude of error concealment to avoid punishment.  
The physicians agreed that there were ethical obligations in error reporting and believed that 
reporting served a valuable purpose. Confidentially, protection from the consequences of 
reporting, organisational transparency, patient involvement and a non-punitive culture were 
reported as measures to improve error reporting in Saudi Arabia (Alsafi et al., 2011:147). 
2.3.7.3 The use of technology  
Technology acceleration and a more aware and informed  public make it imperative for 
healthcare organisations to be more focused on keeping clients safe, good patient outcomes 
and less tolerance of mistakes (Clarke, 2006:256). Technology created for point of care 
management and assisting in safer care delivery has changed the environment and the way 
in which nursing care is provided, i.e. introduction of nursing informatics which is the use of 
technology in patient care delivery and data management systems which support compliance 
monitoring for healthcare outcomes are readily available (Simpson, 2004:20).  
Equipment is sophisticated, enabling nurses to provide care more efficiently while enabling 
staff to decrease the amount of time spent on non-nursing activities. However, this 
equipment may lack standardization and together with fatigue and workload increase the 
risks for errors as seen in pediatric intensive care units (Montgomery 2007:15). 
Technological advancement has seen the development of computerized order entry, on-line 
computerized data collection systems and processes which allow for easier access, reporting 
and generation of quality reports (Longo et al., 2005: 2862; Elnour, et al., 2008:179).  
This does not exclude manual reporting systems, but systems that are user friendly, easily 
accessible and time saving were found to play a role in reporting of errors (Mick, Wood & 
Massey; 2007:500). Rask, Hawley, Davis, Naylor & Thorpe (2006:120) found that the 
implementation of technology contributed to the success of an error reduction strategy. This 
advancement sees the increased need for nurses to gain competence and skills in a variety 
of technical and computerized applications for patient care delivery.  
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2.3.7.4 Work environment factors  
The work environment is defined according to components which need to be present, based 
on Essentials of Magnetism (Kelly, McHugh & Aiken, 2011: 432) and IOM’s (2004) report, 
Keeping Patients Safe: Transforming the work environment for Nurses. Factors which are 
reviewed to determine a supportive work environment are based on Reason’s theory of 
human error (1990). A study comparing Magnet to Non-Magnet hospitals reaffirmed that 
Magnet hospitals have better work environments than non-magnet hospitals. The 
characteristics seen were better nurse staffing ratios which in turn lead to less burnout or 
dissatisfaction and more highly educated at the BSN level (Kelly et al., 2011:432).  
2.3.7.4.1 The Role of the Nurse Manager  
Nurse Managers who are midlevel managers are recognized as pivotal to the care delivery 
provided to patients and the work environment for direct care nurses. They are the link 
between organisational priorities and outcomes to the point of care challenges faced by the 
front line providers. Thus, they would be responsible to advocate on behalf of the front line 
nurses but also provide feedback on the risks which organisational leaders need to address 
(Abualrub & Alghamdi, 2012: 668-670).  
Alahmadi (2010:20) concluded that leadership is critical to the effectiveness of patient safety 
initiatives when respondents thought that managers overlooked reported risks. This is one of 
the key roles of the unit manager to identify risks with increased error occurrence and utilize 
a systems approach to address risks, potential and actual medical errors. Without this 
support, direct care providers lack the direction to act and the ability to make informed 
decisions which could impact on medical errors.  
Nurse leaders are encouraged to adopt four measures to act in changing the culture from 
blame and under reporting to an open sustainable reporting and learning culture. These four 
measures are to 
1. Create  safe spaces to learn from errors and near misses,  
2. Role model safety behaviors,  
3. Create reciprocal accountability which involves legislation and  
4. Registration for practice and design reporting and analysis tools for end user abilities       
( Jeffs et al., 2007:27).  
The MRP (2008) urges nurse managers to be transformational in approach, i.e. competent in 
their field of expertise, able to transform the environment to support direct care nurses and 
empower them through structures that give them a voice. The aim of transformation leaders 
is to encourage autonomous practice and accountability at the bedside which leads to for 
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demonstrated empirical outcomes for the patient, the employees and the organisation (Kelly 
et al., 2011: 432). A study by Abualrub & Alghamdi (2012:676) showed that the effective 
nurse manager is the transformational leader, but a shortcoming is the identification of 
effective strategies to develop these characteristics. 
2.3.7.4.2 The healthy work environment 
Tang, Shei, Yu, Weil & Chen (2007:447-457) identified the intensive care units, operating 
rooms and emergency departments as the high error risk units, with the most severe 
outcomes for patients. Factors identified as contributing to increased risk were extensive 
workload, new staff not aware of policies, systems failure, prescription errors and patient’s 
condition. Intensive care units have been found to have a higher incident of errors, reported 
at 89.3 medical errors in 1 000 patient days, with an estimated 3.3% contributing to patient 
deaths. (Alshrafi, 2011:146). This was supported by Al-Jeraisy et al. (2011:299) who found 
that one third of medication errors occurred in a pediatric intensive care unit as opposed to a 
general pediatrics unit in Saudi Arabia.  
Other studies support the conclusion of high workload and complex care environment which 
play a major role in error occurrence (Moody et al., 2006:203; Potylycki et al, 2006:373). The 
Magnet Recognition Program (2008) is of the opinion that higher staff patient ratios increase 
the safety factor, but this continues be an area for discussion. Healthy work environments 
are defined by Kramer & Schmalenberg (2008:56-57) as “productive, able to give quality 
care, satisfying and able to meet personal needs” and this can only be confirmed by direct 
care nurses.   
Kramer & Schmalenberg (2008:57) found that though the attributes identified by nurses on 
units differed, one common factor was the leadership support received from their unit 
manager. In assessing clinical units with healthy work environment, they found the 
ambulatory, oncology, neonatal intensive care units to be the healthiest work environment. 
The units which needed the most improvement were the operating and post anesthesia and 
cardiovascular telemetry nursing units (Schmalenberg & Kramer, 2008:76).  
Factors which contributed to a healthy work environment were perceptions of nursing quality. 
The 12 hour nursing work shift rated as best for quality care delivery, competent colleagues, 
interdisciplinary relationships and manager support. Education was not found to be 
significant in this study, though nurses with specialty certification rated quality and job 
satisfaction higher (Schmalenberg & Kramer, 2008:76).  
The IOM (Kohn et al., 2000:14) focus for the healthcare providers have been increasing 
communication between disciplines to understand the impact of the environment working in 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
 
 
and provide education in error reduction. Pharmacy expertise, especially the presence of a 
clinical pharmacist in high risk areas like critical care and staff education were identified as 
key components of multidisciplinary collaboration and communication which resulted in 
increased errors reporting and errors prevention (Elnour et al., 2008:180-181).  
These approaches are supported by Mick et al. (2007: 500) in regard to education of 
healthcare providers in identifying safety issues and focus on problem solving, while Murphy 
et al. (2007:891) proposed “ a model for confidential error  communication “ with regard to 
encouraging error reporting and educating others from mistakes made.  
2.3.7.4.3 Professional development  
In an editorial review, Ootim (2002:29) states that novice nurses need assistance in acquiring 
the skills to decrease risks of medication errors, but senior staff are often neglected in their 
need for education and skill updates. Ootim (2002: 29) concludes that the causes of errors in 
nursing are complex and difficult to understand, but nurses` needs are to be considered 
within the environment of caring for both nurses and clients. Marx (2001: 25-26) and IOM 
(2000:11-12) advocates the introduction of educational programmes on medical errors which 
are advocated in research as seen above and should include education of the organisational 
approach to errors, the management of errors and disclosure and how to learn from errors. 
This would include reporting errors made by peers (Marx, 2001:25).  
However, reporting colleagues` observed errors does present an ethical dilemma for 
physicians who do not view peer accountability their responsibility (Murphy et al., 2007:892; 
Alshrafi, 2011:146) and there are currently no mandatory ethical guidelines for error 
disclosure for nurses or physicians with hospital executive leaders (Longo et al., 2007: 892). 
Education and learning from errors that have occurred was found to be lacking in studies by 
Murphy et al. (2007: 890-896) and Antonow et al. (2000: 42-48).   
Continuing medical education (CME) which has been a model for physicians to maintain 
expertise and competence in the specialty field is now being advocated in nursing as seen in 
the Magnet Recognition Program (ANCC, 2008), the South African Nursing Council’s 
decision to change to this requirement for registration and the many universities offering 
certification and specialization in nursing. This is expanded to the introduction of the 
advanced practice role at the bedside of the patient which is encouraged, as this allows 
masters prepared experts with research and evidence based practice knowledge to be 
readily available to direct care nurses (ANCC, 2008).  
Studies on nursing education and the effect on quality of care and patient safety have 
reported mixed results. Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, Lake & Cheney (2008:228) and Kelly et al., 
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(2011:432) reported that three areas for work environment improvement were staffing ratios, 
an increased number of BSN or higher education qualification of RNs and an improved care 
delivery environment to the excellence standard of Magnet accredited hospitals. As reported 
above Schmalenberg & Kramer (2008) found no significance between education and quality 
of care.  
2.3.8 Error management and disclosure  
Patients` expectations are that healthcare providers will deliver the best quality of care 
available and in accordance with their professional regulation must be held accountable for 
their acts and omissions (Al-Mandhari et al., 2008:1472). When these expectations result in 
unanticipated negative outcomes, how the error is managed and disclosed become the focus 
of the nurse and the manager (Lamb et al., 2003:75; Spears, 2005:223). Traditionally the 
individual nurse making the error would be held responsible or culpable in a shame and 
blame approach in error management without a review into contributory factors like fatigue, 
shortage of staff, work environment and staff experience (Benner et al., 2002:510; Spears, 
2005:223). The manager will have multiple challenges in managing the error as she/he has 
the patient, her/his staff member and the healthcare team to prioritize and support      
(Spears, 2005:223).  
Just culture advocates a balanced approach to error management, identifies the contributing 
system factors and accountability of healthcare professionals for behaviour. The four levels 
of human behaviour in error management are human error, negligent conduct, reckless 
conduct and knowing violations. An algorithm is available to assist managers to apply these 
definitions in practice when errors are investigated (to decrease recurrence) and staff 
members counselled (Marx, 2001:5).   
Mayer & Cronin (2008: 428-429) are of the opinion that disciplinary measures are only 
applicable when recurrent errors continue after nurses have received post counselling and at 
risk  are identified. Thus, disciplinary measures are dependent on how much the work 
environment supports a learning culture which improves a reporting culture, which are both 
dependent on the nurse manager and the organisation executives’ approach to errors. Lack 
of administrative feedback and not recognizing the need for education about safety culture 
reinforces the view that reporting is not useful (Elder et al., 2008:162).  
The just culture approach to error management is to complete a review of errors in an effort 
to identify contributing factors which could be latent or active. The outcomes of medical 
errors for nurses may include disciplinary and legal actions (Benner et al., 2002:510; Lamb et 
al., 2003:80). The severity of disciplinary measures is dependent on the severity of patient 
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outcome. If the error was classified as a sentinel event or the outcome was a morbidity or 
mortality the outcome for the nurse may result in the most severe of disciplinary measures 
being taken (Lamb et al., 2003:80).    
Reporting of nursing errors in healthcare has received much attention in an effort to change 
nurses` perceptions of errors and disciplinary measures (Mick et al., 2007:499, 502; Murphy 
et al., 2007:890,892). They concluded that  “it is critical that leaders understand human and 
systems factors in error and develop approaches that provide rewards, recognition and 
feedback to support nurses who often serve as the final checkpoint to reduce errors that can 
harm or kill patients” (Mick et al., 2007:502).  
Most hospitals in Saudi Arabia are USA philosophy driven as seen by the number accredited 
through the JCIA site (JACHO, 2001). However, there are many structural governing 
requirements that are still in the infancy stages. The Saudi Commission of Human Rights 
(NSHR, 2004) is only three years old and professional societies, in comparison with other 
countries have been a recent introduction nationally.  The cultural aspects of Saudi Arabia 
are also unique in the method in which medical errors are viewed and managed. The 
tradition of blood money (diya) which is an acceptable option of payment to the patient or 
family in the event of an error, saving face in which accountability for acts and omissions is 
not viewed as acceptable by healthcare providers and the law and religion as part of decision 
making makes it a unique environment for managing errors (Shaik, 2009)  
Disclosure of errors is not mandated as part of the Shariah law nor the medical professional 
society. Each institution follows hospital approved policies and procedures. In a review with 
KFSHRC-J’s quality department, there is an adverse policy which includes sentinel events 
but there is neither a defined non-punitive approach nor how disciplinary measures are 
applied consistently throughout the organisation. Education on medical error management 
and risk assessment are not part of the education programme for direct care nurse, nor 
nurse managers.  
Disclosure is the provision of information to customers, clients, patients and families and is 
seen as a marker of professionalism and occurs at the individual and organisational level 
(Dekker, 2007:47) Medication errors are now very public as highlighted in the Dana-Faber 
Cancer Institute incident of an error. Chemotherapy errors and public disclosure is mandated 
in some states of USA. Discloser of errors is the moral and ethical obligation of the 
healthcare providers with severe errors being exposed in the course of management even 
without disclosure (Hebert et al., 2001: 509-511).  
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Disclosure of errors is the accountability of each health care provider, the nurse to the 
physician if further treatment of a patient is needed, to report for system review and to inform 
the supervisor and peers for support and education purposes. But this presents a challenge 
when the organisation does not have a clear approach for error management and the 
emphasis on disclosure. The dispute of whose accountability it is to inform patients has been 
identified as that of physicians who have been reported to be reluctant to inform patients, 
which places nurses in ethical dilemmas (Herbert et al., 2001:510-511).  
Loss of trust in the health care provider and organisation are of particular focus for clients 
who depend on nurses to advocate for them and not expose them to harm (IOM, 2000:2). 
Aggrieved patients’ response to this perception of deception would be to bring legal action 
against health care provider and/or the organisation (Hebert et al., 2001:511; Murphy et al., 
2007: 892). Health care providers’ response to errors is to hide, as the expectation is that 
errors are punished with the risk of malpractice suits, loss of license, contracts and benefits 
and self-esteem, so why would they disclose.  
Disclosing errors may present opportunities for improvement but may also result in 
malpractice lawsuits and adverse outcomes for the health care providers in loss of their jobs, 
reputation and trust. An ethical dilemma exists for physicians when full disclosure is weighed 
in the balance of mandatory reporting to government organisations, malpractice suits and 
consequences for the health care provider therefore presenting a conflict of interest      
(Hebert et al., 2001: 511; Murphy et al., 2007: 892). 
Medical errors were not reported in one Saudi Arabian hospital due to the fear of 
punishment, with punishment as defined by Alshrafi (2011:146) as disciplinary actions which 
could be salary deductions or termination of contracts taken by hospital administration. 
Disclosure of system errors are more important than individual errors as root cause analysis 
results may expose factors which present the opportunity to improve organisational systems 
to become more resilient and fault tolerant Murphy et al. (2007: 891). Murphy et al. 
(2007:895) conclude that the role of professional societies is to arbitrate the ethical dilemma 
between legal personal protection and the dissemination of error risk through a forum but 
none existent at present in Western Health Care and Saudi Arabia.  
Health care organisations accredited through Joint Commission International are mandated 
to have a policy which addresses adverse events and disclose outcomes of care delivery to 
patients and families. Saudi Arabia has 39 hospitals which are JCI accredited and would 
fulfill this requirement (JCIA, 2011).  In contrast, Alshrafi (2011:146) sites the Canadian 
Medical Association Code of ethics as not addressing disclosure of errors explicitly. The 
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standard for disclosure is not clearly defined or balanced within the legal environment of 
malpractice and the education of how this should be done.  
2.3.9 Outcomes of errors 
Errors can have severe outcomes for clients, employees and the organisation. Sirriyeh, 
Lawton, Gardner & Armitage (2010:116) report that there is a linear relationship between the 
severity of error and the emotional response of the nurse who made the error. Wu 
(2000:726) coined the term “the second victim” in response to the outcomes for health care 
provider’s involvement and treatment when they have made an error.  
The second victim is defined as “are healthcare providers who are involved in an 
unanticipated adverse patient vent, in a medical error and/or a patient related injury and 
become victimized in the sense that the provider is traumatised by the event. Frequently, 
these individuals feel personally responsible for the patient outcomes. May feel as though 
they failed the patient, second guessing their clinical skills and knowledge base” (Scott, 
Hirschinger, Cox, McCoig, Brandt & Hall, 2009:326). 
Scot et al., (2009:326-329) defined six stages of error recovery which “are chaos and 
accident response, intrusive reflection, restoring personal integrity which involved identifying 
a trusted individual and seeking support; enduring the inquisition which may affect job 
security, licensure and litigation; obtaining emotional first aid which may be difficult if no 
trusting relationship and moving on which may be surviving, dropping out or moving on to 
new nursing unit” Second victims reported both support and no support by peers, nurse 
managers and executives which affected their ability to cope and move forward (Scot et al., 
2009: 328-329).  
Denham (2007:115-116) identified five rights of the second victim which form the acronym 
trust. These rights are “treatment that is just, respect, understanding and compassion, 
supportive care and transparency and the opportunity to contribute to learning”.  
Supportive care is not being abandoned by the nurse manager and nurse leaders, but care 
and support are provided. This includes organisations establishing viable programmes which 
are clearly defined for these healthcare providers who are at the sharp end of care delivery       
(Denham: 2007:114).  
In summary, studies on error reporting, disclosure and management have advocated 
organisations to establish a safety culture which is supported by executive leadership to set 
the vision and implement actions plans for assessment and improvements in health care 
delivery. The important components of this vision would include the Just Culture approach to 
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medical errors. This would translate as individuals who are to be educated in safe health 
care practices, encouraged to report errors using a non-punitive approach and receive 
support from peers and nurse leaders when errors are made. The system of the organisation 
would be constantly reviewed to decrease errors and identify the contributing factors when 
errors are made (Mayer & Cronin, 2008: 429-430).  
2.4 CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework designed below, figure 2.1 is based on the just culture principles 
which were identified by Marx (2001). The framework demonstrates the accountabilities of 
each level of care provider within the healthcare organisation and the need to partner 
together to achieve excellent patient outcomes and decrease errors in healthcare.  
 
Figure  2.1: The Conceptual Framework designed by researcher based on Marx (2001) - 
F. Haines 
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2.4.1 Organisational leadership accountability 
The first level of responsibility is the organisational leadership who is accountable to set the 
mission and vision, and place a value on safety within the culture of the work environment, 
therefore placed at the top of the conceptual framework. The ideal is all employees are 
responsible for safety and are expected to contribute to this from their perspective. This 
encourages buy-in to the concepts and places trust in leadership to transform the 
environment for both patient and employees (Botwinick, Bisognano & Haraden, 2006:1). 
Executives need to role model expected behaviours and link with the middle managers and 
direct care employees. This is accomplished through walking rounds where executives speak 
to staff to gain their opinions and feedback. Feedback and communication methods are 
important. This places the accountability on staff to raise their concerns directly to executives 
and promotes open communication between two levels which would normally not be possible 
(Botwinick et al., 2006: 8, 16). Thus, direct care staff and managers have a voice, feel that 
they are heard, and can commit to the mission, vision and values of the organisation. This 
inspires motivation and thus more satisfied staff (Reason, 2012: 60).  
Reporters to accreditation bodies or to mandatory reporting quality improvement initiatives 
can thus be held accountable for safety which in turn continue to foster the trust of the public 
and community in their commitment to safe care delivery and reporting of adverse events. 
Partners with external quality health care initiatives and external mentors should be coached 
in improvement methodology and foster the commitment to use evidence based best 
practices to change the organisational culture (Botwinick et al., 2006:10). 
Set policies define clear expectations of the safety culture, which include education and 
training, near miss and error reporting, communication and feedback processes, advocate a 
learning culture which includes transparency, recognition and reward; disclosure policy and 
the approach to second victim support and care. Thus, executive leadership needs to use 
data to define the gaps and address these through improvements (Botwinick et al., 2006: 5-
6). The study explored factors of the organisation to determine the level of organisation 
commitment to decrease errors and establish how errors were managed.  
2.4.2 Nurse manager accountability 
This new concept of “just culture” proposed by Marx (2001:1-28) suggests a more realistic 
approach to medical errors, emphasizing changes in systems to support a decrease in errors 
and education of all health care providers in their responsibilities to their clients while 
knowing their rights as employees. The systems of a health care organisation are meant to 
decrease error risks and provide safe efficient care to the patient and family. Nevertheless, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
 
also allow the employee to provide this care in an environment that fosters learning and 
accountability for actions and/or omissions (Marx, 2001: 25-26; Mayer & Cronin: 2008: 428).    
The nurse manager is at the blunt end of care delivery in terms of safety and error risks, and 
is the link between the direct care provider and the organisation executives. This presents 
the opportunity to advocate for improvements and resources which affect patient and 
employee safety (Denham, 2007:114). However, nurse managers cannot effectively speak 
on behalf of the direct care nurse unless there is a partnership to work together to decrease 
risks and errors in health care. Assessment of risk is best evaluated by the end user and 
thus, the direct care employees at the sharp end of risks and error occurrence can provide 
valuable feedback for system improvements (Volgelmeier, Scott-Cawiezell & Miller, 2010: 
289).  
Thus, nurse managers encourage near miss and error reporting to evaluate the systems and 
processes of the nursing unit and advocate for improvements using this data as the 
benchmark. Therefore, direct care nurses are empowered to speak up on behalf of self and 
peers, be involved in decision making which affects their practice, quality, professional 
development and management of unit resources (ANCC, 2008).  For this reason, the direct 
care nurse and nurse managers are placed on the same level in the framework above; 
because, even though their job functions differ they are partners in the approach to decrease 
error risks in the work environment and dependent on each fulfilling this role to each achieve 
effective outcomes.  
The manager is dependent on feedback from direct care nurses to identify and address 
areas for improvements and problem solving with the direct care nurses on implementation 
plans. Volgelmeier et al. (2010: 289) identify this dependence as shared commitment, as just 
culture promotes shared accountability between the leaders and staff. In just culture, the 
nurse leaders are accountable for a supportive environment, to manage staff behaviours and 
address organisational concerns raised by staff for improvement. In return, staff provides 
feedback on experiences and observed practice or safety concerns which are error prone for 
improvement purposes, thus managers have a better understanding of the challenges faced 
at the point of care.  (Volgelmeoer et al., 2010:289).   
The most important component of error management is the recurrence of errors. Therefore if 
not reported, this cannot be addressed from a system perspective, while each human error 
which occurs due to system faults continues to receive discipline (Reason: 2012: 60).  
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Thus, this study explored nurse managers’ perceptions on error reporting and management 
in nursing units within the organisation to determine if there is a difference between the 
perceptions of nurse managers and direct care nurses.  
2.4.3 The direct care nurse accountability 
Just culture identifies the direct care nurses’ accountability to identify and report risks, 
therefore there is a need to foster a reporting culture which means that staff need to be 
educated in the expectation of near miss and error reporting and feedback will be used to 
improve systems and processes (Marx, 2001: 25-26). However, this reporting carries with it 
accountability to peers and to patients. Reason (2012: 62) states that no health care facility 
can expect to be blame free, but there needs to be a balance in the learning from errors and 
apply the open and fair approach i.e. just culture approach.   
Direct care nurses are accountable to report a near miss and errors, nurse managers are 
accountable to investigate and define whether the error was an honest mistake (human 
error) or negligence, reckless conduct or intentional rule violations (Marx, 2001: 5-7).                 
Marx (2001: 5-7) has provided specific outcomes which guide managers in the management 
of human behaviour.  
When a human error is committed which is defined as “doing other than what should be 
done”, the response is to console the nurse and work with her/him to make better choices but 
also review system factors which may have contributed to the error and address these. At- 
risk behaviour is the choice made which increases the risk which is believed to be justified by 
the nurse, but is not. The response to this would be to coach the nurse, with a closer review 
into the behaviour choices, group dynamics and system factors.  At - risk behaviour is not 
seen as disciplined as this will cause reporting to discontinue (Marx, 2001: 13-19). 
Reckless behaviour is a choice of consciously choosing to disregard a known risk and this 
warrants discipline. However, Mayer & Cronin (2008:429) advocate discipline for recurrent 
at-risk behaviour. The important component of the approach to error is just, i.e. matching the 
defined behaviour accordingly and moving away from severe patient outcomes leading to 
severe disciplinary action being applied.   
The second component is fair, i.e. the approach is uniformly applied to all health care 
providers throughout the organisation (Marx, 2001:3-4; Reason, 2012:62).                      
Leape et al. (2009: 425) identified the need for transparency which is defined as openly 
speaking about errors with peers and colleagues which encourages the learning culture and 
decreases the risk of error recurrence. This fosters trust, support and an environment of 
learning, where errors are recognized as risks for all health care providers.  
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Thus, this study explored the perceptions of direct care nurses to error reporting and the 
approach to error management within the organisation.  
2.5 SUMMARY  
It has been more than ten years since errors in health care were publically exposed and 
many proposed measures for change in healthcare advocated to manage errors. However, 
as seen in the literature progress in error reporting, disclosure and management continue to 
be challenges for safe health care delivery. The just culture approach to error reporting and 
management as opposed to the traditional approach of shame and blame promotes a 
change for health care organisations. The aim of a just culture approach is to improve 
systems and support nurses through behavioural management, and thus prevent repeated 
occurrences of errors. Important gaps in the approach to error management have been 
identified, e.g. disclosure practices.  
This chapter has presented an overview of medical errors, the recommended prevention and 
management strategies and the factors which influence the outcomes of errors. The 
overview included the unique challenges faced in Saudi Arabia to provide safe health care in 
a multicultural environment.  
In chapter three the methodology used to approach this study in detail will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION    
Chapter two  provided a  detailed review of the literature which described the types of 
nursing errors, reporting and management of errors, as well as the  roles of health care 
providers in the prevention and management of errors. This chapter will present the research 
methodology applied to descibe the process of nursing error management of RNs within a 
tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia.  
3.2 STUDY SETTING  
The nature and sensitivity of the  topic of the study resulted in participation being limited to 
one tertiary health care organisation in Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Specialist Hospital & 
Research Centre (General Organisation)-Jeddah (KFSH&RC –J). 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
Burns and Grove (2007:38) define research design as the blue print for the conduct of a 
study that maximizes control over factors that could interfere with the desired outcome of the 
study. The purpose of the type of design directs the reseacher in a logical process through 
the population and sample selection, instrument for measurement, data collection plans and 
analysis of results to answer the research question (Brink et al., 2006:92).  
The research design applied was a quantitative, descriptive approach to explore and 
describe error mananagement in nursing amongst RNs  working in a tertiary hospital in Saudi 
Arabia. Quantitative designs are experimental, non-experimental or non-traditional aimed at 
maximizing the validity of research findings (Brink et al., 2006:93). 
3.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLING  
As the population was RNs employed at a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia who all had 
access to email, discussions were held with two research statisticians on whether to include 
the whole population.  A power analysis was conducted to determine the adequacy of the 
sample size needed to be representative of the population. A power analysis has the 
capacity to detect differences or relationships that exist in the population (Burns & Grove, 
2007:340).  
The formula applied to arrive at a representative sample of the population of eligible RNs 
was: one group test for a proportion (normal approximation) adjusted for finite population. A 
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one group test with 0.050 two sided significance level will have 80% power to detect the 
difference between the null hypothesis proportion 𝜋𝑛, of 0.500 and the alternative proportion, 
𝜋ᴀ, of 0.600 when the sample size adjusted for a finite population of size N=800 is n= 157. A 
representative sample was determined to be N=200 of the total RN population as the sample 
was adjusted for anticipated no returns of the questionnaire.  This was a change based on 
the initial decision to use 25% of the total population of the three groups of RNs, i.e. Staff 
Nurses 1 & 2 (Professional Nurses in the South African context, therefore use of this term), 
Clinical Nurse Coordinators and Assistant/Head Nurses. 
Another change was the adjustment for nationality and nursing specialty, with the application 
of 25% proportional allocation which increased the sample to n=176 for professional nurses. 
Proportion allocation was completed as Filipino and Indian RNs were more than 50% of the 
population; with other nationalities ranging from 10% to 20%. It was deemed important to use 
proportional allocation that regardless of percentage of nationality and specialty, all members 
of the eligible population had equal opportunity to be chosen in the random sample selection. 
The selection was completed by the Director, Research Director, KFSHRC-J and the 
researcher. 
The sampling frame was reviewed in January 2011 and updates made based on changes of 
MSR lines. Thus, the following was the sampling frame used for data collection from 05 
March to 31 March 2011. The professional nurse population of N=696 was as of March 2011 
MSR; data collection was conducted from 05 March to 31 March 2011 as illustrated in table 
3.1. 
Simple random selection was conducted to identify the professional nurses’ sample using a 
computerized table. Stratification was conducted based on nursing specialty and nationality 
for this sample. The stratification and random selection were determined using current 
classification of divisional councils Nursing Affairs to address nursing practice concerns, i.e. 
Adult Division, Ambulatory Division, Critical Care Division, Maternal/Child Division, 
Paediatrics Division and Procedures Areas Division. Nationality classification was based on 
the country of origin zoning system used by KFSH&RC-J Human Resources Department for 
recruitment of RNs, i.e. Saudi Arabian (Saudi), Western (USA, Canada, Europe, New 
Zealand & Australia), Middle Eastern (Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt), Philippians, Indians, 
Malaysian, Singaporean and South African.  
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Table  3.1: Professional Nurses (Staff Nurse 1 &2) Sampling Frame, March 2011 
 
Nursing 
Division Saudi Western 
Middle 
Eastern 
South 
African Indian Malaysian Filipino Total  
Critical Care 
Division 
n=  4 n= 7 n= 21 n= 14 n= 23 n= 9 n= 51 N= 129 
Mat/Child                         
Division 
n= 6 n= 4 n= 2 n= 15 n= 15 n= 3 n= 45 N= 90 
Adult                         
Division 
n= 21 n= 20 n= 17 n= 20 n= 34 n= 4 n= 92 N= 208 
Paediatrics 
Division 
n= 7 n= 0 n= 10 n= 8 n= 8 n= 2 n= 54 N= 89 
Procedure 
Areas 
Division 
n= 4 n= 9 n= 5 n= 14 n= 15 n= 17 n= 38 N= 102 
Ambulatory 
Division 
n= 6 n= 5 n= 0 n= 3 n= 4 n= 2 n= 58 N= 78 
Total 
Population 
(N) 
N= 48 N= 45 N= 55 N= 74 N= 99 N= 37 N= 338 N=696 
Sample (n) 
25% 
n=12 n=12 n=14 n=19 n=25 n= 9 n=85 N= 176 
Clinical Nurse Coordinator (CNC) and Assistant/Head Nurses (Nurse Managers) population 
was smaller compared to the professional nurses population, i.e. N=20 – N=25. Thus, the 
decision was made to send questionnaires to all participants except for pilot study 
exclusions, which were two South African nurse managers familiar with the study and one 
Middle Eastern nurse manager who was in the process of resigning. The sample for CNCs 
and nurse managers are illustrated in table 3.2 below. 
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Table  3.2: CNCs’ and Nurse Managers’ Sampling Frame, March 2011 
Job Title  Saudi Western 
Middle 
Eastern 
South 
African Indian Malaysian Filipino Total  
CNC 
Population 
(N) 
N=4 N=3 N=10 N=2 N=1 N=0 N=1 N=19 
CNC 
Sample (N) 
n=4 n=3 n=10 n=2 n=1 n=0 n=1 n=19 
Nurse 
Manager 
Population 
(N) 
N=1 N=3 N=8 N=10 N=2 N=0 N=1  N=23 
Nurse 
Manager 
Sample (N) 
n=1 n=3 n=7 n=8 n=2 n=0 n=1  N=20 
3.4.1 Inclusion criteria 
The inclusion criterion for the study was: 
• RNs  assigned to patient care units providing direct clinical care with job titles of Staff 
Nurse 1 & 2 (Professional Nurses) and Clinical Nurse Coordinator  
• Nurse Managers who are registered nurses with a twenty four accountability for a 
patient care unit with job title of Assistant Head Nurse/ Head Nurse. 
3.4.2 Exclusion criteria 
The exclusion criterion for the study was: 
• RNs  who were not assigned to patient care units and do not have direct patient 
contact, e.g. assigned in nurse education, coordinators, nursing supervisors, nursing 
informatics  and executive job descriptions, i.e. Chief of Nursing, Programme 
Directors, Quality Manager, Nurse Recruiter and Products Coordinator 
• Eligible RNs on vacation during data collection period 
• RNs who participated in the pilot study  
• RNs that were in the probation period (first three months of recruitment) at the time of 
data collection.  
3.5 DATA COLLECTION TOOL /INSTRUMENTATION  
Instrumentation was a questionnaire consisting of open - and closed -ended questions which 
were based on extensive literature review, previous research, input from experts and the 
researcher`s clinical experience.. The questionnaire was used seeing that error management 
is a sensitive topic with the aim of the study to describe the management of nursing errors 
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amongst RNs, thus a questionnaire was deemed to be the appropriate tool. However, as a 
questionnaire is defined as a self-reporting instrument, this does place limitations on the 
study (Burns & Grove, 2007: 382). The questionnaire was structured using open - and close - 
ended questions which were divided into the following four main sections:  
3.5.1   Section A: Biographical Data  
This section informed participants of the use of the biographical data to assist in the analysis 
and reinforced confidentiality. The questions sought to gain information on the participants` 
age, gender, nationality, language, years of experience, level of nursing education, primary 
work area, and retention on nursing unit and the hospital. 
3.5.2   Section 2: Types of Errors and Feedback Processes 
Section two questions presented the Harm Score Classification used by the organisation and 
requested participants to indicate the type of errors made by nurses on their units, their 
opinions of near misses and reporting same, examples of errors which had occurred on the 
nursing unit, if all the errors that have occurred on the nursing units had been reported and if 
not, to give reasons and resources staff available to them on the nursing units and within the 
organisation.  Some of the questions listed the options available and included the choice of 
adding to the list. 
3.5.3   Section 3: Error Reporting and Management  
Section three included two Likert scales; one was section 3.1 which requested participants to 
complete fifty questions based on their agreement or disagreement. These questions were 
exploring the management of nursing errors amongst RNs on a variety of variables which are 
presented according to categories in chapter four. The second Likert scale was section 3.2 
which was a total of thirteen (13) questions which explored factors affecting error 
management and the participants’ agreement or disagreement with same.  
3.5.4   Section 4: The Outcomes of Errors 
Section four had a total of nine questions which asked participants to give their feedback on 
errors involved with, in which capacity, the examples of errors involved with, the classification 
of these errors, if the errors were managed fairly, if the nurse received fair treatment, the 
outcome of the error, what nurses expressed as their feelings after error management and to 
add any comments which they have with regard to error management.  
The questionnaire was sent to all RNs by email requesting their participation in the study. 
This was followed by a visit from the researcher to provide hard copies of questionnaires as 
needed; envelopes for returned questionnaires and to answer any questions the participants 
had. An email reminder to participate was sent weekly and nurse managers were reminded 
at the weekly meeting of requested participation.  
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3.6 PILOT STUDY   
A pilot study is defined as a smaller version of the study used to refine the methodology and 
data analysis (Burns & Grove, 2007:38). A pilot study was conducted using the draft 
questionnaire with 10% (n=20) of the study sample size. Method for pilot study was test-
retest and excluded participants and results from the actual study.   
The first pilot study was conducted in June 2010 and the data was reported to not be of 
much benefit by the statistician. Feedback received on the questionnaire was incorporated 
into the final questionnaire. The format and content of the questionnaire was changed based 
on feedback from the pilot study. Questions asked of the respondents was to critique the 
content for understanding as English was not the first language of all RNs employed at 
KFSH&RC-J and relevance of the questions, i.e. applicable to their job descriptions. The 
questionnaire was reviewed and re-structured based on this feedback.  
A change made to the questionnaire was to decrease the number of open-ended questions 
and include these in the Likert scale structured format. Retest was completed in September 
2010 under similar conditions as the planned data collection methodology. The results of the 
pilot study were used to finalize the questionnaire and data collection plan for the study.  The 
data obtained in the pilot study has been excluded from the final analysis.  
3.7 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY/TRUSTWORTHINESS   
Reliability is concerned with the measurement technique and accounts for characteristics 
such as dependability, consistency accuracy and comparability.  Validity is the determination 
of how well the instrument measures the concept or variable being examined (Burns & 
Grove, 2007: 365). 
To test reliability and validity, a pilot study was completed under similar conditions as the 
study to test the instrument and revisions were made based on results and feedback. 
Experts in nursing, risk and quality management were consulted to assist with content 
validation of the individual questions.  A statistician was consulted with the questionnaire 
design and has guided the researcher through this process.  
The pilot study results were analysed through preparation of the data and a review of similar 
available instruments in literature, i.e. Safety Culture Questionnaire of the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, 2004).  To allow aggregation of the different 
survey questions, the “average positive response” on the questions of section 3.1 was 
calculated for each respondent and for each question. Using a 5-point Likert Scale the 
scores were distinguished and counted as follows: Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), 
Neutral (3), Agree (4) and Strongly Agree (5). Negative worded questions were reversed in 
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their scoring. Table 3.3 below presents a summary of the reliability tests completed by the 
statistician.  
Cronbach Alpha is a statistical procedure applied when pencil and paper scales are used for 
data collection and determines the alpha coefficient value. The Cronbach Alpha is 
unacceptable if below 0.70; 0.7 is marginally acceptable and a range of 0.8-0.89 is 
sufficiently reliable for the study (Burns & Grove, 2007:404). Internal consistency reliabilities 
were examined for sections 3.1: Error Reporting and Management on a whole, its 
subsections, as well as 3.2: Factors affecting Error Management of the questionnaire.  
Since items were worded in both positive and negative directions, negatively worded items 
were first reverse coded so that a higher score would indicate a more positive response in all 
cases. Because most of the subsections of section 3.1 were calculated with Cronbach’s 
Alpha < 0.7, further analysis was based on the complete section or on the individual 
questions. This did not affect the reliability of the tests as a whole which met the criteria of a 
power analysis greater than 8 as seen in table 3.3 below. 
Table  3.3: Summary of Cronbach Alpha Tests 
Sections of the Questionnaire Cronbach’s Alpha 
Section 3.1: Error Reporting and Management  0.8425 
Error reporting (Q3.1.1, Q3.1.5, Q3.1.7, Q3.1.14, 3.1.20) 0.5950 
Feedback and communication (Q3.1.11, Q3.1.21, Q3.1.23, Q3.1.25 
reversed) 
0.3286 
Non-punitive: Q3.1.8, Q3.1.12, Q3.1.16 reversed, Q3.1.17 reversed, 
Q3.1.18, Q3.1.19, Q3.1.26, Q3.1.46 
0.7541 
Organisation Systems and Processes: Q3.1.4, Q3.1.13, Q3.1.27, 
Q3.1.28, Q3.1.36, Q3.1.40 reversed, Q3.1.43, Q3.1.45 reversed, 
Q3.1.50 
0.4085 
Error disclosure: Q3.1.33, Q3.1. 34 reversed, Q3.1.35, Q3.1.37, 
Q3.1.39 
0.3373 
Error outcome: Q3.1.24r, Q3.1.29 reversed, Q3.1.30 reversed, 
Q3.1.31reversed, Q3.1.32, Q3.1.42reversed, Q3.1.47, Q3.1.48) 
0.4992 
Work Environment: Q3.1.3, Q3.1.9, Q3.1.10, Q3.1. 41, Q3.1.44, 
Q3.1.50 
0.3262 
Education: Q3.1.2r, Q3.1.6, Q3.1.15, Q3.1.22, Q3.1.38 0.4975 
Section 3.2: Factors affecting Error Management  0.7199 
 
Validity of the questionnaire was determined through assessing the content validity of the 
instrument. Content validity measures the adequacy of the questionnaire to measure the 
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concepts important to the study (Burns & Grove, 2007:382). This was accomplished through 
literature review, expert review by the supervisor and two experts in the field of error 
management and completion of a pilot study. The questionnaire was reviewed by a Risk 
Management Specialist and the Deputy Director, Quality Management Department, 
KFSH&RC-J in 2010 
The questionnaire was adapted from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ, 2004) Safety Culture questionnaire and additional questions added which needed to 
be included for exploration of management of errors by RNs. The questionnaire was 
assessed by a statistician and changes were made based on feedback received.  
3.8 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
A data plan was presented in chapter one which outlines the steps to follow. As the pilot 
study and finalizing questionnaire needed to be completed before data collection, this was 
delayed and data collection was conducted 05 to 31 March 2011. A sample framework, the 
Manpower Status Report (MSR) was used for simple random selection. An email was sent to 
all respondents requesting participation in the study, which included the questionnaire 
accompanied by a letter of introduction which explained the reasons for the research, 
voluntary participation, submission process, consent to participate and confidentiality of the 
returns.  Returns were to be sent to the researcher or her assistant (secretary) by the internal 
mail mechanism or on-line email as preferred.  
This was followed by a visit by the researcher to the nursing units to deliver hard copies of 
the questionnaire as needed; return envelopes and answer participants’ questions. A 
reminder of research participation was sent out by email on a weekly basis to participants 
and Assistant/Head nurses were reminded of their requested participation in the nurse 
management weekly meeting.  
Questionnaire returns were N=131(61%) from the distributed numbers of N=215           
(n=176 Professional Nurses; n=20 Nurse Managers; n=19 Clinical Nurse Coordinators) with 
N=84 (39%) no response.  The non-response rate could not be explored for reasons as 
returns were confidential. However, the sensitive nature of the topic being explored may be a 
contributing factor as this was a self-reporting questionnaire and the participants may not 
have felt comfortable in disclosing data (Almutary & Lewis; 2012:119). 
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3.9 DATA ANALYSIS  
Analysis  techniques conducted with quantitative exploratory research designs aimed at 
describing a phenomena  included descriptive and inferential  analysis which are used to 
form conclusions, implications for nursing, explore significance of the findings, generalization 
which may be applied and suggest further research (Burns & Grove, 2007: 42). The data was 
summarized, cleaned and analysed by the researcher with the assistance of a statistician 
using the Statistical Program for Social Studies (SPSS) computer program and the EXCEL 
program. The data was tabulated and will be presented by frequencies, graphic presentation 
and cross tabulation.  
As the study included three groups of RNs’ responses on error management, statistical 
associations were completed between different variables using inferenital statistics. The 
definitions of each of the tests completed are presented below:  
Alpha(α) known as the level of statistical significance or the cut-off point is the probability 
level at which the results of statistical analysis are judged to indicate a statistical difference 
between the groups (Burns & Grove, 2007: 407).  
Chi-Square test  of independance is used to analyze nominal data to determine significant 
differences between observed frequencies within the data and frequencies that are expected, 
thus determining  whether two variables are independent or related and only significant 
results are reported (Burns & Grove, 2007: 420, 532). 
Correlational analysis provides two pieces of information about the data, the nature of the 
relationship  which may be positive or negative between two variables and the magnitude (or 
strength) of the relationship, with normally symmetrical outcomes (Burns & Grove,  2007: 
423). 
Fisher Exact two-sided test is a two-tailed test of significance, an analysis techinique used for 
non-directional hypothesis when the researcher assumes that an extreme score can occur  in 
either tail of the normal curve (Burns & Grove, 2007:558).  
Frequency distribution is a statistical procedure that lists all possible measures of a variable 
and tallies each datum on the listing. There are two types of frequency distribution, grouped 
(data presented in tables for continuos variables) and ungrouped (table developed to present 
all numerical values obtained for discrete data)   (Burns & Grove, 2007: 413, 541).  
Two sided t-test is a parametric analysis techinique used to determine significant differences 
between measures of two samples (Burns & Grove, 2007: 558). 
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Regression Analysis is defined as a statistical procedure that utilizes  the value of one or 
more known varibles to predict the value of one variable. A scatterplot diagram  of the raw 
data values is used to determine the regression line which best fits the method of least 
squares. This statistical analysis may use multiple variables and the outcomes is  known as 
the regression coefficient   (Burns & Grove, 2007: 426-427) 
3.10 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researchers described the methodology used in the approach to this 
study. The different steps in the methodology design were described and how each was 
completed. The following chapter will describe the procedures used in data analyses and 
interpretation of the data collected.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION    
The  previous chapters presented the research methodology used to conduct the study.  This 
chapter will present the data collected, an analysis and interpretation of the data based on 
the objectives of the study and include a discussion of the findings based on previous 
research.  
4.2 PRESENTING THE STUDY FINDINGS  
The data was tabulated using the computer program Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) by a statistician working with the researcher. The data is presented in the form of 
frequency tables and graphs using the EXCEL program to analyze the data. The level of 
significance for Chi-Square, Fisher’s exact test and Regression Analysis was set at α = 0.05. 
Alpha (α) known as the level of statistical significance or the cut-off point is the probability 
level at which the results of statistical analysis are judged to indicate a statistical difference 
between the groups (Burns & Grove, 2007: 407).  
The data is presented using the study objectives as the outline of the questionnaire and their 
link to each of the study objectives.The term Professional Nurse which is the registered 
nurse title used in the South African context will be used for Staff Nurse 1 & 2. The term 
Nurse Leaders will be used  for the Clinical Nurse Coordinator (CNC) and Assistant/Head 
Nurses unless specifically indicated by these job titles. As  CNCs are viewed by professional 
nurses as nurse managers due to the delegation of nurse manager duties when on vacation, 
the results for these two groups will be combined unless a need to report all three groups is 
identified.   
Data for the Likert scale will be presented in the three categories of  Disagree, Neutral and  
Agree.  Where reasons are provided as part of an answer to the questions, these would be 
collated into categories identified from the data. Section three of the questionnaire used the 
Likert scale to gain RNs feedback towards error reporting and management.  
The Likert Scale questions were grouped into categories and will be reported according to 
these identified aspects of nursing errors in health care. The questions were grouped into the 
following categories:  
• Error Reporting  
• Direct Care  Feedback and Communication Process  
• Non-Punitive Approach  
• Organisational Systems and Processes  
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• Unit Environment Factors  
• Educational Preparation 
• Patient and Nurse Disclosure of Errors  
• Patient and Nurse Error Outcomes  
These categories will be discussed as they pertain to each of the objectives of the study. The 
objectives for the study were to  
• identify the nursing related errors occurring  
• determine the current process of reporting nursing errors  
• describe the management of nursing errors  
• explore the factors impacting on the management of nursing errors.  
4.2.1 Questionnaire returns  
Question 1.12: Please indicate your nursing job title in the hospital (N=131)  
The population was RNs who held the titles of Staff Nurse 1 & 2 (Professional Nurses), 
Clinical Nurse Coordinators and Assistant/Head Nurses. The sampling frame for Professional 
Nurses (Staff Nurses1 & 2) was N=696 (25%), Clinical Nurse Coordinators was N=19 (100%) 
and Assistant/Head Nurses was N= 23 (n=87%).  
Respondents were N=131/215 (60.93%), with Professional Nurses n=112/176 (63.64%), 
Clinical Nurse Coordinators were n=10/19 (52.63%) and Assistant/Head Nurses were n=9/20 
(45%) as depicted in table 4.1 below. The number of returns for the Assistant/Head Nurses 
which was below 50% is a limitation of the study, but does not prevent the completion of data 
analysis. Creating the Nurse Leaders group of Clinical Nurse Coordinator and 
Assistant/Head Nurse increased returns to N=19 (48.72%). The response of 60.93% is 
acceptable for reliable data results as more than half of the respondents have shared their 
perceptions on error management (Burns & Grove, 2007: 382).  
Table  4.1: Percentage of Returns 
Sampling Frame  Returns/response        Percentage  
Assistant/Head Nurses n= 9 /20       45% 
Clinical Nurse Coordinators. n= 10 /19     53.63% 
Staff Nurses 1&2 n=112 /176    63.64% 
Total Returns N=131/215  60.93% 
4.2.2 Demographical/biographical data 
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the demographical/biographical data which included the 
questions of age, gender, nationality, language, years of experience, level of nursing 
education, primary work area, and retention on nursing unit and the hospital. Chi-Square 
test, t-tests and regression analysis were completed to test for correlations between the 
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demographical data and the various questions of exploring RNs’ perceptions of error 
management.  
Table  4.2: Summary of Demographical/Biographical Data 
 
Demographics Professional Nurses Nurse Leaders  
Age Count Frequency Count Frequency 
< 25 years n=2 0.02 n=0 0.00 
25-35 years n=38 0.34 n=6 0.32 
36-45 years n=38 0.34 n=7 0.37 
46-55 years n=22 0.20 n=5 0.26 
55-65 years n=10 0.09 n=1 0.05 
> 65 years n=1 0.01 n=0 0.00 
Gender Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Female n=102 0.92 n=13 0.68 
Male n=9 0.08 n=6 0.32 
Nationality Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Saudi n=7 0.06 n=0 0.00 
Western n=11 0.10 n=3 0.16 
Middle Eastern n=7 0.06 n=9 0.47 
South African n=17 0.15 n=5 0.26 
Indian n=9 0.08 n=0 0.00 
Malaysian n=7 0.06 n=0 0.00 
Filipino n=52 0.47 n=2 0.11 
First language Count Frequency Count Frequency 
English n=16 0.14 n=6 0.32 
Arabic n=14 0.13 n=9 0.47 
Other n=81 0.73 n=4 0.21 
Education Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Basic Nursing Diploma n=22 0.20 n=4 0.21 
Basic Nursing Degree n=73 0.66 n=9 0.47 
Post Basic Specialization n=14 0.13 n=6 0.32 
Master's Degree, Nursing n=2 0.02 n=0 0.00 
Doctorate in Nursing n=0 0.00 n=0 0.00 
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Demographics Professional Nurses Nurse Leaders  
Primary work area Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Adult Division n=32 0.29 n=1 0.05 
Mat/Child Division n=15 0.14 n=5 0.26 
Critical Care Division n=19 0.17 n=5 0.26 
Procedure Areas Division n=23 0.21 n=2 0.11 
Pediatrics Division n=10 0.09 n=4 0.21 
Ambulatory Care Division n=12 0.11 n=2 0.11 
Working in area of 
experience Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Yes n=103 0.93 n=14 0.74 
No n=8 0.07 n=5 0.26 
Working in current unit Count Frequency Count Frequency 
< 1 year n=9 0.08 n=2 0.11 
1 - 5 years n=51 0.46 n=7 0.37 
> 5 years n=52 0.46 n=10 0.53 
Working in hospital Count Frequency Count Frequency 
< 1 year n=8 0.07 n=1 0.05 
1 - 5 years n=51 0.46 n=5 0.26 
> 5 years n=52 0.47 n=13 0.68 
Experience as RN Years   Years   
Median 15   16   
Mean 14.8   17.6   
Standard deviation 8.96   8.68   
 
Question 1.1: Age (N= 130) 
Received N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not complete the 
question. Table 4.2 above demonstrates that the majority of RNs were within the 36-45 year 
age range, with both nurse leaders and professional nurses’ mean age 40.3 – 40.5 years, 
with no significance between the two groups of RNs, p=0.93 (t-test). Promotion was reported 
by 15.79% (n=3) within the 25-35 year age range and only 5% (n=1) nurse leader was found 
in the 55-65 year age range.  
Younger nurse leaders in the organisation were mentored into these roles and the 
organisation has a succession plan offering positions for promotion as a career development 
opportunity. Employees aged sixty years and above were accepted based on an exception 
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and retirement age of sixty five years old. The age of RNs was not significantly correlated 
with the average positive response of questions in section 3.1 and section 3.2, p=0.153 
(regression analysis).  
Mwachofi et al., (2009:277) in a study completed in Saudi Arabia reported a significance of 
age on RNs’ overall perception of hospital quality which included reporting medication errors, 
with older nurses less likely to have positive perceptions. In contrast a study in Taiwan found 
that the nurse demographics, i.e.  “age, educational background, working experience, 
experience of having made a medication errors and failure to report” were not associated 
with barriers to reporting errors (Chiang & Pepper, 2006: 397). 
Question 1.2: Gender (N = 130) 
Received N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not complete the 
question. Table 4.2 above demonstrates that the majority of respondents were female 86% 
(n=112) but there was a significant difference in the gender of nurse leaders; p=0.003 (Chi-
square test) despite the frequency of male nurse leaders 32% (n=6) being lower than female 
nurse leaders 68% (n=13).  
Van Rooyen et al., (2010: 5-7) identified gender discrimination, interaction and segregation 
which included the limitations of male nurses providing care to female patients as challenges 
for South African nurses` adaptation to the healthcare environment of Saudi Arabia. Male 
nurse leaders may be challenged within this culturally restricted environment when 
addressing performance of RNs in error reporting and management, while female nurses 
may be hampered in their communication with males as they may fear discrimination 
(Tumulty, 2001: 288).  
RN population of males was N=11/39 nurse leaders (p=0.791) and N=43/696 professional 
nurses (p=0.668), with no bias in the selection of the sample in respect to gender as seen in 
p- values of the chi-square test. In correlation to reporting and management of nursing 
errors; there was no significant difference of gender as a factor, p=-0.086 (regression 
analysis).  
Question1.3: Nationality (N =129) 
Received N=129 returns, with n=2 professional nurses excluded as they did not complete the 
question. Saudi Arabia is dependent on an expatriate workforce with only 29% of the total 
nursing workforce being Saudi nationals (Almalki et al., 2011: 304). The use of an expatriate 
workforce was seen in the majority of RNs 95% (n=122) response; with 5% (n=7) of 
professional nurses of Saudi nationality, see table 4.2 above. 
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Table 4.2 above presents the nationality frequency distribution for both groups of RNs. The 
majority of professional nurses 47% (n=52) were of Filipino nationality and the remaining 
nationalities ranged from 6% (n=7) - 15% (n=17). The majority of nurse leaders 47% (n=9) 
were of Middle Eastern nationality, with South African 26% (n=5); Western 16% (n=3) and 
Filipino 11% (n=2). There were n=0 respondents for Saudi, Indian and Malaysian nurse 
leaders which may have added richness to the study. There was no nationality bias within 
the sample as proportional allocation was completed with professional nurses sample 
selection and all nurse leaders were selected as participants except for exclusions.  
Regression analysis results suggested that an average positive response of sections 3.1 
(error reporting and management) and 3.2 (factors impacting on errors) correlated with 
Middle Eastern nationality, p=0.044. This result indicated that these respondents were on 
average slightly more negative in their perceptions than the other respondents.  In contrast, 
Almutairi et al. (2012: 5-6) found the Middle Eastern nurses were more positive in their 
perception of clinical safety culture and report a significant difference in the perceptions of 
safety across the different nationalities in the multicultural work environment of Saudi Arabia.  
A study completed in five hospitals in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia does mention the diversity of the 
work force, the recruitment strategy changes of the western world to a more diverse 
nationality pool but does not discuss the impact on nursing errors (Mwachofi et al., 
2009:279).  
Question 1.4: Language (N =131)  
Received N=131 returns. Table 4.2 presents the frequency of first language spoken with 
Arabic (n=23) and English (n=22) within the same range; 17% and “other” 66% (n=86) the 
majority. Nurse leaders 47% (n=9) spoke Arabic while professional nurses 73% (n=82) spoke 
a different first language to Arabic and English which were the official languages of 
communication for the organisation. There was no significant difference between the two 
groups of RNs; p=0.6133 (Chi-square test) or a correlation to nursing error management in 
regression analysis results; p=0.744.  
This divergence of first language response suggests that the question of language may 
impact on communication factors in nursing errors. The different accents, interpretations and 
the need to inform nurses who are non-Arabic speaking of discussions and decisions made 
for patient care delivery are identified risks in the healthcare setting (Van Rooyen et al., 
2010: 6). The work environment and communication are highlighted as factors which impact 
nursing errors and patient safety (Alahmadi, 2010: 21; Almutairi et al. 2012: 6; Sammer & 
James; 2012: 5). The language barrier was identified as a factor in objective four, table 4.9 in 
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which 39% (n=48) of RNs agreed to this gap in communicating error disclosure to patients, 
which is supported by Van Rooyen et al., (2010: 6).  Language as a factor was negatively 
associated with positive score on patient safety, p=0.02 (regression analysis).  
Question 1.5: Nursing Education (N =130) 
Received N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she not complete the 
question. The majority of RNs (63%) held a Bachelor Degree in Nursing (BSN) qualification; 
professional nurses 66% (n=73) and nurse leaders 47% (n=9). RNs with highest qualification 
as a Diploma in Nursing 20% (n=26), Master’s Degree 2% (n=2) professional nurses only, 
Post Basic Specialization 15% (n=20) and no doctoral degrees at this level of nursing. Nurse 
leaders 32% (n=6) held additional postgraduate diploma qualifications. There was no 
significance between the two groups of RNs; p=0.1449 (chi-square test) nor on regression 
analysis with error reporting, error management and factors.  
RNs (100%) of Saudi (n=11) and Filipino (n=53)  nationality  held BSN qualifications as this 
is the only level of basic nursing education offered in the Philippines and KFSHRC-J only 
recruits BSN graduates to fill RNs positions of Saudi nationality. Diploma qualifications were 
seen in the Western, South African, Malaysian and Indian nationalities, as per table 4.2 
above.  
The impact of nursing education on nursing errors and safety culture has mixed results in 
previous studies, see chapter 2: Aiken et al. (2008); Schmalenberg & Kramer (2008) and 
Kelly et al. (2011).  
Question 1.6: Experience as a Registered Nurse (N = 130)  
Received N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not complete the 
question. RNs’ median number of years of experience ranged 15-16 years for both 
professional nurses and nurse leaders, with a slightly lower mean 14.8 – 17.6 years. There is 
no significant difference in the mean years of experience between the two groups of RNs; 
p=0.219 (t-test) nor on regression analysis.  
Chiang and Pepper (2006:397) found no correlation between nurses’ experience and barriers 
to reporting medication administration errors, reasoning that Taiwan has younger nurse 
population and thus less experienced when compared to international cohorts. However, 
Mayo and Duncan (2004: 215) report a weak correlation between number of errors reported 
and years of experience, thus improvements in error reporting are a priority for all nurses. 
Throckmorten and Etchegaray (2007: 408-409) found that nurses with less experience were 
less likely to report errors resulting in minor injuries. 
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Question 1.7: Nursing Specialty (N=130)  
The Nursing Affairs Department, KFSH&RC-J has a shared governance council structure 
defined within the Professional Practice Model (PPM) which has divided each of the care 
delivery units into divisions. Shared Governance is a concept which has been defined by 
Porter O`Grady (1987: 282) as a structure which empowers nurses at the direct care level to 
participate in decision making and encourages the principles of ownership, equity, 
partnership and accountability.  
The nursing divisions were based on the type of patient populations served and practice 
standards applicable within the division to encourage autonomous nursing practice at the 
direct care nurse level. These six divisions were Adult, Ambulatory, Critical Care, 
Maternal/Child, Pediatrics and Procedure Areas as summarized in table 4.2 above. Received 
N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not complete the question. 
The Adult Nursing Division had the highest number of professional nurse respondents 29% 
(n=32), followed by the Procedures Nursing Division 21% (n=23) with all other nursing 
divisions ranging from 9% (n=10) – 17% (n=19). Nurse leaders had equal distribution 26% 
(n=5) for Maternal/Child and Critical Care Nursing Division, while other nursing divisions 
ranged from 5% (n=1) – 21% (n=4).  The majority of RNs 89% (n=113) were employed within 
their nursing trained specialty and promotion 4% (n= 5), professional development 5% (n=6), 
transfer requests 2% (n=2) and no post available 2% (n=2) were reasons for not being 
assigned to their division of nursing specialty.  
Regression analysis results suggested that an average positive response of section 3.1: 
error reporting and management; and 3.2 exploring factors correlated with Adult Nursing 
Division, p=0.036. This result indicates that the RNs in Adult Nursing Division were on 
average slightly more negative in comparison with the others respondents. This may be due 
to the majority of professional nurses being assigned to this nursing division, thus more 
experience with errors at the point of care or the work environment have increased risks 
when compared to other nursing divisions.  
Intensive care units have been found to have a higher incidence of errors, reported at 89.3 
medical errors in 1 000 patient days, with an estimated 3.3% contributing to patient deaths 
(Alshrafi, 2011:146). This was supported by Al-Jeraisy et al. (2011: 298) who found that one 
third of medication errors occurred in a pediatric intensive care unit as opposed to a general 
pediatrics unit in Saudi Arabia. Other studies support the conclusion of high workload and 
complex care environment which play a major role in error occurrence (Moody et al., 
2006:203; Potylycki et al., 2006:373).  
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Question 1.10: How long have you worked in your current unit and Question 1.11: How 
long have you worked in this hospital (N = 130)  
Received N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not complete the 
question. Table 4.2 above shows that 47% (n=50) of professional nurses have been 
employed in the hospital and on their particular units for more than five years. Nurse leaders 
68% (n=13) have been employed in the hospital for more than five years and employed in 
their units 53% (n=10). This is partially in agreement with Almalki et al. (2011:309) who report 
that experienced expatriate nurses’ turnover once have obtained skills and abilities to work in 
developed countries.  
Nurse retention is seen to contribute to the prevention of errors as nurses have gained 
familiarity with systems and processes but have also been seen to promote an attitude of 
knowing the system thus the increased risk taking and reliance on memory. Ootim (2002: 29) 
states that novice nurses need assistance in acquiring the skills to decrease risks of 
medication errors, but senior staff are often neglected in their need for education and skill 
updates. New graduates and experienced new professional nurses in the orientation period 
were excluded from the study.  
Thus RNs who reported less than one year employment would be the new nurses to the 
organisation, with at least three months experience for Saudi nationals and two or more 
years of experience for expatriate RNs. There was no significant difference between nursing 
experience or retention with the reporting and management of errors (sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
4.2.3 Objective to identify the nursing related errors occurring  
Objective one was to identify the nursing related errors occurring within the organisation. The 
approach taken to capture this data was to use the harm score currently utilized within the 
organisation and identify the most frequent type of errors that have occurred based on 
feedback from the Quality Management Department, KFSH&RC-J. Thus, the use of two 
experts from this department to review the questionnaire was deemed appropriate.  
The harm score, based on Pennsylvania University Score (2004) was listed and respondents 
were requested to identify the type of errors encountered during their employment at 
KFSHRC-J which would range from 2000 (establishment of the organisation) to 2011. This 
section will report on types of errors based on the harm score, near miss classification and 
reporting, examples of errors, reasons for errors reported or not reported and resources 
available to registered nurses at the unit level.  
The harm score classification of errors is defined as follows:  
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1. No Error: Circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error, but no 
errors has occurred, e.g. two look alike medications are stored together and noted by 
the charge nurse on rounds.  
2. Error, No Harm/Did not reaches the patient: An error occurred but the error did not 
reach the patient, e.g. physician prescribed the incorrect dose of a medication which 
was noted by the registered nurse on her review of the prescription and corrected 
with the physician.  
3. Error, No Harm/ Reached the patient: An error has occurred and reached patient with 
no harm which was assessed by monitoring, e.g. registered nurse administered 
pethidene 50 mg intravenously instead of the prescribed intramuscular. The patient 
received the correct medication through the wrong route and needed to be monitored 
to ensure that there was no harm from this error.  
4. Error, Harm/ Not a Sentinel Event :  An error occurred that may have contributed to or 
resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required intervention, permanent harm 
with prolonged hospitalization, e.g. patient had an instrument left in after surgery even 
though the surgical count was completed  
5. Error, Sentinel Event: An unexpected occurrence involving death, serious physical or 
psychological injury or the risk thereof, and any event that might cause 
embarrassment or risk to the hospital with potential legal ramifications and/or media 
inquiries or coverage.  The phrase “or the risk thereof” includes any process variation 
for which a recurrence would carry a significant chance of a serious adverse 
outcome.  Such events are called “sentinel” because they signal the need for 
immediate investigation and response. Serious injury include an unanticipated death 
or major permanent loss of limb or function, not related to the natural cause of the 
patient’s illness or underlying condition;  infant abduction or discharge to the wrong 
family;  patient suicide in hospital; rape of a patient, staff or visitor;  significant 
hemolytic transfusion reaction involving administration of blood or blood products 
having major blood group incompatibilities; surgery on the wrong patient or body part 
and  significant medication errors 
6. Error: Death: Errors which are classified as a sentinel but the outcome was death of 
the patient  
Question 2.1: Indicate the type of error (s) made by nurses in your unit (Indicate all 
that apply) (N=131) 
Received N=131 returns and table 4.3 presents the frequency of reported experience in error 
classified according to the harm score which included the majority of both groups of RNs; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 
 
82% (n=92) - 95% (n=18).  There was no significant difference between the number of errors 
and the two groups of RNs as seen in table 4.3 below; p=0.304 (Fisher`s exact test).  
Table  4.3: Frequency of Errors 
Error Classification Errors (n) No Errors (n) Total 
Professional  Nurses n=92 (82%) n=20 (18%) N=112 
Nurse Leaders n=18 (95%) n=1(5%) N=19 
Fisher`s exact test  0.304 
 
Table 4.4 below demonstrates the most frequently reported classification of errors by job title.  
The nurse leader response of no error experienced was assigned in the Ambulatory Nursing 
Division. This is an acceptable response as Out-patient in contrast to In-patient nursing units 
may not experience as many errors.  
Professional nurses experience with no errors ranged from Ambulatory 4.8% (n=5), 
Paediatrics 2% (n=2), Adult 5.3% (n=6), Maternal/Child 0.8% (n=1), Procedures 5.3% (n=6) 
and Critical Care 2% (n=2) divisions of nursing, with a range of retention in nursing units from 
less than one year to more than five years. The question did not request respondents to 
indicate a time frame for when the error was experienced. This may be a limitation.  
RNs classified a total of n=128 errors experienced on the nursing units. Professional nurses 
35% (n=39) and nurse leaders 42% (n=8) both had the highest response to classification 3: 
Error/s, No Harm, Reach the patient and classification. This was followed by classification 2: 
Error/s, No Harm, Do not reach the patient for professional nurses 30% (n=33). Nurse 
leaders next classification 5: Error/s Harm: Not a sentinel event 37% (n=7). The results are in 
contrast to previous studies which have reported nurses more willing to report errors which 
have severe adverse outcomes for the patient (Marx, 2001: 4; Alahmadi, 2010: 19).   
Nurse leader’s responses may be a demonstration of the accountability of their job title 
responsibilities and the investigative process of the organisation. Classification 6: Error/s, 
Death was reported in the Critical Care nursing division 2% (n=2) by professional nurses of 
Middle Eastern and South African nationality with more than five years of experience in the 
organisation and possessing post basic specialization, but none in the nurse leaders group.  
Critical Care nursing units are identified as high risk units which require more vigilance on the 
part of nursing and the need to allocate more resources, e.g. clinical pharmacists to these 
divisions. Kaushal, Bates, Abramson, Soukup & Goldmann (2008:1260) concluded that more 
serious medication errors occurred on the paediatric ICU compared to general medical and 
surgical paediatric units. The addition of a fulltime clinical pharmacist to the ICU substantially 
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decreased the serious medication errors in the ICUs but a part time pharmacist in the 
general paediatrics units was not as effective (Kaushal et al., 2008:1260).  
Table  4.4: Job Title and Error Classification frequency 
 
 
Error(s) Classification 
Professional 
Nurses 
N=112 
Professional 
Nurses 
(Frequency) 
Nurse 
Leaders  
N=19 
Nurse 
Leaders 
(Frequency) 
No Error n=20 0.17 n=1 0.05 
Error/s , No Harm, Do not reach 
the patient n=33 0.29 n=3 0.16 
Error/s , No Harm, Reach the 
patient n=39 0.35 n=8 0.42 
Error/s , Harm, Not a Sentinel 
Event n=11 0.10 n=0 0.00 
Error/s , Harm, Classified a 
Sentinel Event n=7 0.06 n=7 0.37 
Error/s, Death n=2 0.02 n=0 0.00 
Total Errors  N=92  N=36  
Fisher's exact test:  0.036  
 
Table 4.4 above demonstrates a significant difference between the frequency of professional 
nurses’ and nurse leaders’ classification of errors, p=0.03 (Fisher`s exact test). The p-value 
means that there is a significant difference in the number of different errors classified. Thus, 
either the two groups report different errors, or the two groups classify the same errors 
differently. Thus one can conclude that the majority of RNs employed in the organisation 
were aware of the classifications of errors; that all types of errors had occurred on the 
nursing units and therefore these RNs were able to share valuable experiences on the 
reporting and management of errors.  
Question 2.2:  Is a near miss an error? (N=130) and Question 2.3: Does a near miss 
require reporting? (N=130)  
As discussed in chapter two, potential errors have been defined by numerous terms in 
literature, i.e. near miss, close call (Chard, 2010:143). For KFSH&RC-J, the list provided with 
the questionnaire classifies no error, but does not indicate if this is a near miss, which may 
have been helpful to respondents.    
Received N=130 returns with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not answer the 
question. The majority of RNs in both groups agree that a near miss is an error, nurse 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
 
leaders 74% (n=14) and professional nurses 78% (n=87) in agreement with a near miss 
being an error as seen in figure 4.1 below. There was no significant difference that nurse 
leaders and professional nurses interpret a near miss as an error differently, p=0.738 
(Fisher’s exact test).  
However, a near miss is not classified as an error as seen in the Pennsylvania classification 
of no errors (2004) and other studies (Murphy et al., 2007:890). Chard (2010:136,143) 
reports similar confusion for nurses in identification of a near miss (or close call) and a need 
for universal definitions in errors. RNs 14% (n=16) professional nurses and 16% (n=3) nurse 
leaders correctly identified these errors which demonstrates the need for education of both 
groups of RNs in error identification.   
The majority of RNs 80% (n=89) and nurse leaders 89% (n=17) correctly identified that a 
near miss needs to be reported, thus demonstrating the recognition of the importance this 
data plays in error prevention. There was no significant difference between the two groups of 
RNS on their perception of near miss reporting, p=0.703 (Fisher’s exact test).  
 
 
 
 
Figure  4.1: Near Miss identification and reporting  
Reporting of a near miss is in agreement with the advocated process to use near misses to 
improve error prevention and evaluate organisation systems (Kohn et al., 2000: 4).  RNs 9% 
(n=10) did not know about near miss identification, and 16% (n=24) did not know about near 
miss reporting.   The results raise the question of reinforcement of the approach to a near 
miss, the flow of information and communication between nurse leaders and professional 
nurses` knowledge of the processes of near miss management in the organisation as 11% 
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(n=2) of nurse leaders either do not know that near miss is not an error but needs to be 
reported.  
Question 2.4: Give Examples of the type of errors that have occurred in your unit 
(Indicate all that apply) (N=129) 
Received N=129 returns, with n=2 professional nurse exclusions due to discrepancies in the 
link between no error (question 2.1) and error examples (question 2.4.)  Examples of errors 
which have occurred on nursing units are summarized below in table 4.5. RNs identified 
N=197 examples of errors which had occurred on nursing units in which they worked with a 
divergent response of highest occurring examples; professional nurses identifying medication 
errors as the most frequently occurring 20% (n=40) and nurse managers identifying incorrect 
identification, 6% (n=12).  
Table  4.5: Examples of Errors on Nursing Units  
 
Error Examples  
Professional 
Nurses 
N=110 
Professional 
Nurses 
(Frequency) 
Nurse 
Leaders  
N=19 
Nurse 
Leaders 
(Frequency) 
2.4.1.Incorrect Identification, e.g. 
medication given to the incorrect 
patient  
n=28 0.28 n=12 0.67 
2.4.2. Cultural implications, e.g. 
shaved the religious man`s (matawa) 
beard by accident  
n=7 0.07 n=0 0.00 
2.4.3. Narcotic, e.g. Narcotic missing 
at count 
n=20 0.20 n=7 0.39 
2.4.4. Procedural, e.g. time out 
procedure not completed which led to 
an error  
n=9 0.09 n=1 0.06 
2.4.5. Medication, e.g. wrong 
medication given to patient 
n=40 0.40 n=8 0.44 
2.4.6. Communication, e.g. telephone 
order written in the wrong patient file, 
resulted in wrong orders carried out       
n=15 
 
0.15 
 
n=0 
 
0.00 
 
2.4.7. Error of commission, e.g. due to 
incorrect identification, wrong patient 
received the preparation for surgery 
n=2 
 
0.02 
 
n=0 
 
0.00 
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2.4.8. Error of omission, e.g. failure to 
report critical laboratory results 
n=17 0.17 
 
n=3 
 
0.17 
 
2.4.9. Other ((Please indicate): n=24 0.24 n=4 0.22 
Total Examples of Errors  N= 162   N=35  
Fisher's exact test: 0.225 
 
However, medication 17 % (n=8), narcotics 39% (n=7) and critical lab results (omission 
errors) 44% (n=3) were identified by nurse leaders as most occurring examples. This is in 
agreement with previous studies which report medication as the most frequently reported 
nursing error (Kohn et al., 2000: 2; Mayo & Duncan, 2004: 209; Chiang & Pepper, 2006: 
393).  
Nurses are direct caregivers administering at least 50 medications per shift, and with 
“medication errors reported to account for 10% to 18% of total hospital injuries”, which places 
nurses at the highest risk for medication errors (Mayo & Duncan, 2004:209). Nurses are 
reported to intercept 86% of errors in the ordering, transcription and administration stages of 
medication treatment process (Chiang & Pepper, 2006:393). Medication administration plays 
such an important measure on client outcomes that in some countries registered nurses are 
mandated upon employment to complete competence testing through written examination in 
areas of medication and critical thinking (King Faisal Specialist Hospital & Research Center, 
2000; National Council Licensing Examination, USA). 
Professional nurses identified cultural, procedural, commission and communication examples 
of errors. However, nurse leaders did not identify these examples or had a very low 
response, 6% (n=1), see table 4.5. The results demonstrate that nurse leaders may not be 
aware of all errors which occur in the units; however the most common example is that of 
medication or the serious adverse events risks with narcotics as their focus. In contrast the 
professional nurses are aware of most errors in their units, but there may be a gap in the 
reporting of these errors as nurse leaders may not be informed.   
Nurse leaders` lack of knowledge of the number of reported errors is supported by Alahmadi 
(2010:20) who reported a lack of manager accountability to address safety concerns. Under 
reporting of errors was identified for improvement and has been identified in other studies to 
be a factor which is linked to leadership response to errors (Mick et al, 2007: 502; Chard, 
2010:142-143). 
The examples of errors identified as “other” 12% (n=24); RNs identified no examples of 
errors; pharmacy dispensing errors;  documentation errors in the computerized systems for 
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medication and nursing documentation; laboratory specimen labelling and non-compliance 
with internal policies and procedures, e.g. broken narcotic ampule, wrong baby roomed in 
with mom, accidental removal of central venous catheter or endotracheal tube. 
The nursing divisions reported medication errors which included narcotics as the most 
frequently occurring error examples in the nursing units assigned, with the Adult Nursing 
Division 23% (n=49) and Critical Care Division 32% (n=68) the most errors reported. The 
Ambulatory Division reported the least errors 7% (n=14). The correlation discussed in 
question 1.7 of the Adult Division of Nursing being slightly more negative in response to error 
reporting and management may be due to more experience with errors occurring in this 
division.  
There was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs examples of types of 
errors which occurred in the nursing units, p= 0.225 (Fisher`s exact test). The above RNs’ 
perceptions are confirmed in question 4.3 which explored the examples of errors in which 
RNs were identified as being involved in.  
Question 2.5: Do you think that all errors that had occurred on your unit were reported 
(N= 130)  
Received N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not complete the 
question. Figure 4.2 below presents an almost equal distribution for agree for professional 
nurses 48% (n=52) and nurse leaders 47% (n=9) that all errors occurring in the nursing units 
in which they worked were reported. However, the majority of RNs 53% (n=67) disagreed or 
did not know if all errors occurring in the nursing units in which they worked were reported.  
 
Figure  4.2: All Errors reported 
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The addition, of the reasons given for not reporting was a shame and blame culture, fear of 
the outcome for the nurse and the reaction of the team which added weight to this response. 
Studies have identified under reporting of errors as a problem, which is dependent on the 
approach to error reporting and management. Two contrasting studies, by Throckmorten and 
Ecthegaray (2007: 411) found that the majority of nurses were willing to report errors of all 
classifications, from a near miss to the most severe of outcomes. Ultimately, the work 
environment and approach if punitive did affect error reporting. Chiang and Pepper        
(2006: 395) identified barriers to medication error reporting and fear, was the main factor 
followed by leadership attitude to errors especially feedback and recognition.  
There was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs’ perceptions of all errors 
being reported, p=0.901(Fisher`s exact test). However, this does support the research 
problem of fear and blame being a factor negatively influencing reporting nursing errors 
within the clinical environment. This is confirmed by the low response rates to non-punitive 
approach in error reporting, see table 4.9. 
Question 2.6: Indicate resources staff available to you, give reason/s why (N=130)  
Received N=130 returns, with n=1 professional nurse excluded as she did not complete the 
question. Professional nurses identified charge nurses 82% (n=90), unit colleagues 75% 
(n=83), clinical nurse coordinator 62% (n=68) and nurse manager 61% (n=67) as the 
resource staff most available, table 4.6 below. This demonstrated a supportive environment 
as professional nurses identified both peers and direct supervisors who would be available to 
precept new staff, provide education on systems and processes and encourage RNs to 
report errors with an understanding of the challenges in care delivery.  
Nurse leaders identified the direct supervisor, the programme director 74% (n=14) as the 
most supportive as a resource with second resource being nursing quality 63% (n=12) 
responsible to monitor, support and provide feedback on the process of error reporting and 
management. This was appropriate as the nurse leaders would liaise with this department for 
investigative processes. Colleagues on another unit, which are peers were identified as next 
frequently occurring, 53% (n=10). Studies have reported nurse manager and executive 
responses to errors as a major factor in achieving success in error reporting and 
management (Chiang & Pepper, 2006:395; Mick et al., 2007:502; Throckmorten & 
Ecthegaray, 2007: 411; Chard, 2010:142-143). 
The intensity of emotional responses of RNs to errors was found to be related to severity of 
the error, the team response and manager reactions. This would include the support 
provided to report errors and to allow “second victims”, i.e. healthcare providers who make 
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errors to reach reconciliation with their actions. This process is identified in six phases and 
includes peer and nurse leader support, see chapter two (Scott et al., 2009:326-330).  There 
was a highly significant difference between the two groups of RNs responses to resource 
staff available, p < 0.0001, (Chi-square test).   
Table  4.6: Resource Staff Available 
 
Resources Staff Available   
Professional 
Nurses 
N=111 
Professional 
Nurses 
(Frequency) 
Nurse 
Leaders  
N=19 
Nurse 
Leaders 
(Frequency) 
Unit Colleagues n=83 0.75 n=6 0.32 
Charge Nurse n=90 0.82 n=5 0.26 
Clinical Nurse Coordinator n=68 0.62 n=5 0.26 
Assistant/Head Nurse n=67 0.61 n=9 0.47 
Program Director n=12 0.11 n=14 0.74 
Nursing Quality n=11 0.10 n=12 0.63 
Colleagues on another unit n=20 0.18 n=10 0.53 
Assistant Chief of Nursing n=7 0.06 n=5 0.26 
Chief of Nursing n=7 0.06 n=4 0.21 
Others (Please indicate): Pharmacy, 
Quality Management Department 
n=10 
 
0.09 
 
n=5 
 
0.26 
 
Chi-square test p < 0.0001 
 
The two executives within Nursing Affairs Department, Assistant 16% (n=12) and Chief of 
Nursing Affairs 14% (n=10) had almost equal distribution of response from both groups of 
RNs.  The Chief of Nursing, the highest level of nursing accountability in the organisation 
was also positively associated with the average positive response in regression analysis 
results, p=0.03.  
Marx (2001: 25) charges healthcare executives “to review the disciplinary policy whether 
these are supportive or detrimental to the safety system initiatives and advocate a balanced 
approach to learning from errors versus punishment”. Mayer and Cronin (2008: 428-430) 
identify that organisational leaders set the tone for a culture of safety which promotes 
learning cultures, reporting cultures and ultimately a just culture. The role of executive 
leadership positively influencing the safety culture  at the direct care level has been reported 
as lacking in  previous studies (Spears, 2005: 223; Al-Mandhari et al., 2008: 1473; 
Anooshem, Ahmadi, Faghiadeh & Vaismoradi, 2008: 289; Wilson et al., 2008: 366).  
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4.2.4 Objective to determine the current process of reporting nursing errors  
This objective of the research study was to determine the current process of reporting 
nursing errors and included communication and feedback processes on errors reported. 
Determining these processes was achieved through a review of the error process flowchart 
of KFSH&RC-J with the risk manager. The questions asked of participants were aimed at 
ascertaining whether they were aware of the defined processes, were able to apply this 
process, if there were any barriers in reporting, communicating feedback and how the 
environment impacted on reporting.  
4.2.4.1 Error reporting  
The Likert scale questions for error reporting are summarized below in table 4.7. 
Professional nurses only, ranging from n=2 - n=3 were excluded from the results as they did 
not complete the questions.  
The agreement with error reporting and the benefits of reporting for nurse leaders and 
professional nurses was seen in question 3.1.1, question 3.1.5, question 3.1.7, question 
3.1.14 and question 3.1.20 to be the views of 49.61% (n=63) - 88.18% (n=112), with the 
highest percentage reported for error reporting helping to decrease the risks in the 
workplace. Question 3.1.5: Nurses in the unit always report errors as they occur 50% (n=64) 
had the lowest agreement of the five questions for error reporting. The reported 
disagreement was 20% (n=26) and neutral 30% (n=38), which is more than half of RNs 51% 
(n=64). This perception is supported in question 2.5 above.   
Table  4.7: Rationale for Error Reporting 
Likert Scale  3.1.1= 
Nurses are 
able to 
identify 
when an 
error has 
occurred 
that 
requires 
reporting 
(N= 129) 
3.1.5= The 
nurses in 
the unit 
always 
report 
errors as 
they occur  
(N=128) 
3.1.7= The 
reporting of 
errors 
benefits the 
patient and 
his/her 
family 
(N=128) 
3.1.14= It is 
easy to 
report 
errors in our 
hospital  
(N=128) 
3.1.20= 
Error 
reporting 
helps to 
decrease 
the risks in 
the 
workplace 
(N=128) 
Disagree n=7 n=26 n=7 n=11 n=4 
Neutral n=9 n=38 n=19 n=19 n=9 
Agree n=113 n=64 n=102 n=98 n=115 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
87.6% 
 
50.0% 
 
79.7% 
 
76.6% 
 
89.9% 
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Although RNs are able to identify errors, are aware of the benefits to the work environment 
and the patient to reporting errors and the process is reported as relatively easy to report, not 
all errors which occur in units are reported as they occur. Professional nurses disagreed or 
did not know 12% (n=13) of RNs being able to identify errors which need reporting (Q3.1.1), 
however 16% (n=3) nurse leaders disagreed or did not know. This gap for nurse leaders is of 
concern in the process for error reporting which is an expectation of their job accountability.  
RNs always reporting errors as they occur (Q3.1.5) had an equal distribution for agree and 
disagree for nurse leaders’ response, 37% (n=7) however, 26% (n=5) remained neutral. Both 
groups of RNs had a high neutral response, 26% (n= 5) – 30% (n=33), which questions the 
sharing of their honest opinions about always reporting errors; with 17% (n=19) professional 
nurses in disagreement.  Benefits of error reporting to the patient (Q3.1.7) were not 
recognized by 16% (n=3) - 21% (n= 23) of nurse leaders and professional nurses, which 
identified the need for education in the aspects of patient care monitoring patient which is a 
RN responsibility (Benner et al., 2002: 509).  
The effectiveness and efficiency of the system and reporting processes need to include end-
user feedback and question 3.1.14 identified gaps which need to be addressed. Professional 
nurses 27% (n=29) rate the systems and processes not easy to use or may not know. 
However 5% (n=1) nurse leader did not know. Risk management is a key driver of work 
environment safety and the aim of error reporting is a proactive management approach with 
the goal to prevent errors rather than management. Risk is defined as “the notion that an 
individual, family or group, school or neighbourhood, or organisation is likely to experience a 
negative outcome” (Lorenz, 2007:116).   Risk assessment is a key responsibility of a nurse 
leader, thus 21% (n=4) disagree and neutral responses for question 3.1.14 are not 
acceptable for this job position.  
There was no significant difference found on Fisher’s exact test completed on all five 
questions between the two groups of RNs perceptions of error reporting.  
4.2.4.2 Direct care feedback and communication process 
An important component of the error reporting process is feedback to the end-user as to the 
root cause analysis to identify and reduce risks and the outcomes for patient and nurse. Lack 
of administrative feedback and not recognizing the need for education about safety culture 
reinforces the view that reporting is not useful (Chiang & Pepper, 2006:395; Elder et al., 
2008:162).  The Likert scale questions to gain the perceptions of feedback and 
communication processes on errors are summarized below in table 4.8.  
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Feedback about errors being discussed in the unit as part of the commitment to improve the 
environment and safety (Q3.1.21) had the highest positive percentage 74.2% (n=95)  and the 
lowest 42.5% (n=54) was that error reports are kept in nurses confidential files during the 
investigative process (Q3.1.25). Question 3.1.11 and question 3.1.25 in which perceptions 
were gained on the use of error reports and the assumption that these reports will be used to 
blame individual nurses both demonstrate distribution of RNs responses to reports never 
kept in confidential files 48% (n=62) and only during the investigative process 43% (n= 54 ).  
Table  4.8: Feedback and Communication 
Likert Scale  
 
 
Q3.1.11= Error 
reports are 
never kept in 
the nurse’s 
confidential file 
(N=128) 
 
 
 
Q3.1.21= Feedback 
about errors is 
discussed in the unit 
as part of the 
commitment to 
improving the 
environment of 
safety for patients 
and staff  (N=128) 
 
Q3.1.23= 
Nurses are 
informed about 
the number of 
errors which 
occur in their 
units (N=127) 
 
Q3.1.25 =Error 
reports are 
kept in the 
nurse’s 
confidential 
file during the 
investigation 
of an error 
(N=127) 
 
Disagree n=34 n=11 n=33 n=30 
Neutral n=32 n=22 n=27 n=43 
Agree n=62 n=95 n=67 n=54 
Average 
Positive 
response  48.4% 74.2% 52.8% 42.5% 
Fisher`s 
exact 
test  0.022   0.021 
 
Thus 24% (n=30) - 27% (n=34) of RNs perceive this a practice of nurse leaders, while 25% 
(n=32) - 34% (n=43) of RNs may not have felt comfortable providing their perceptions. Nurse 
leaders 37% (n=7) - 68% (n=13) agreed to this practice and 11% (n=2) remained neutral.  
Thus, some leaders may not be aware of the process of where the documents should be 
stored. However, 50% (n=54) - 62% (n=67) professional nurses disagree or do not provide 
their perception. Both question 3.1.11 and question 3.1.25 were found to have significant 
differences between the two groups of RNs, p=0.022 (Fisher`s exact test) and 
p=0.021(Fisher`s exact test) respectively. Thus, there is a need to explore the practice of 
error documentation, as these two groups of RNs do not confirm the practices or are 
reluctant to share the true practice of nurse managers due to fear.  
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Errors are encouraged to be discussed within the nursing units to be used as  learning 
opportunities, encourage disclosure and increase preventative measures; question 3.1.21 
explored these aspects with the majority of RNs 74% (n=95) in agreement, and 26% (n=33) 
in disagreement. However in contrast, RNs report that they are only informed of 53% (n=67) 
of errors which occur in the unit (Q3.1.23.), with 47% (n=60) of RNs either disagreeing or not 
aware of these reports. Of these 42% (n=8) nurse leaders agreed with perception or were 
unwilling to comment. 
The divergence of these perceptions does identify a need to review the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the error reporting process which demonstrates a lack of clarity for expectations 
on feedback and communication.  
4.2.5 Objective to describe the management of nursing errors 
This objective was to describe the management of nursing errors. The objective was 
accomplished using the Likert scale questions to gain RNs responses towards nursing error 
management. Respondents were asked to provide their disagreement or agreement with 
statements with the structures, processes which are advocated to be present and the 
management of error outcomes. 
The Likert Scale questions were grouped into categories and will be reported according to 
these identified aspects of errors in healthcare which are:  
4.2.5.1. The Non-Punitive Approach  
4.2.5.2. Organisational Systems and Processes  
4.2.5.3. Unit Environment Factors  
4.2.5.4. Educational Preparation 
4.2.5.5. Patient and Nurse Disclosure of Errors  
4.2.5.6. Patient and Nurse Error Outcomes  
Each of these categories will be discussed separately with a summarized presentation of the 
variables which compose the RNs responses. 
4.2.5.1 The non-punitive approach  
Marx (2001:4) identifies a non-punitive work environment as the elimination of punitive error 
reporting systems which make it safe for employees to report errors as they occur “which is 
aimed at improving the reporting culture of an organisation to identify the extent of errors 
occurrence and implement improvements to manage these”.  Marx (2001:3) recognizes that 
there are consequences for errors and thus cannot advocate a “no blame” approach as 
health care providers need to be held accountable in a balanced approach of learning and 
discipline. 
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The Likert scale questions which addressed the non-punitive approach are summarized 
below in table 4.9.  Exclusions were limited to professional nurses who did not complete the 
questions, with a range n=3 - n=5. Eight questions explored the non-punitive approach for 
error reporting and management, with the average positive response rated very low ranging 
from 31.7% (n=40) - 51.6% (n=66). This identifies a need to address the concept of non-
punitive and just culture principles within the organisation and supports the research problem 
that approximately 50% of RNs are afraid to report errors as they fear being blamed for the 
outcomes.  
Question 3.1.8 explored the concept of no blame, with 51% of RNs aware of a no blame 
policy and 22% (n=28) - 27% (n= 35) of RNs in disagreement or were not clear on the 
concept. There is a need for clarity on the definition of “no blame” as Marx (2001:3) 
advocates a balanced approach to error management. Error reporting is the process in which 
no blame can be applied; however the consequences of errors when found to be 
compounded by multiple factors may require the individual behaviour components addressed 
through counselling. An equal distribution of nurse leaders agreed and disagreed 42% (n=8), 
16% (n=3) remaining neutral, however 53% (n=57) of professional nurses were aware of a 
no blame policy which makes error reporting easier; with 48% (n=52) in disagreement or 
unaware thereof.  
The majority of RNs felt comfortable questioning practice applications when needed 52%       
(n= 66).  The divergent response is seen in the disagreement of nurse leaders 74% (n= 7) 
both for disagree and neutral who are of the opinion that RNs are afraid to ask questions 
when something does not seem right (Q3.2.12), with a significant difference between the two 
groups of RNs, p=0.04 (Fisher`s exact test).  
The expectation for RNs is to function as independent and dependent practitioners, with 
clearly defined autonomy, responsibilities and authority to accomplish these functions, which 
Benner et al. (2002:510) defines as “practice responsibility.” However, KFSH&RC-J has a 
very diverse workforce as seen in table 4.2, with demographical results above. Saudi Arabia 
is challenged without a nursing practice act which places unique responsibilities for nurse 
leaders in their role of unit manager to ensure that nursing standards and autonomous 
practice are of one standard.  
Non-punitive policies are clearly defined in our hospital, which means that no-one will know 
about the error being reported. Question 3.1.19 had an average positive response of 33.6% 
(n=43) which is low; thus 58% (n=11) nurse leaders and 67% (n=74) professional nurses 
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identify that the concept of non-punitive is either not known, not clearly defined or the 
understanding that no-one will know about the error does not apply. 
There was a significant difference between these two groups of RNs as seen in p=0.035 
(Fisher`s exact test). More professional nurses disagreed with this question than nurse 
leaders, which reinforces the lack of a non-punitive environment for error reporting, and 
supports the research question of fear and blame.  
RNs had the lowest average positive response, 31.7% (n=40) for question 3.1.46; Nursing 
errors are not held against the nurse who made the error. Professional nurses 70% (n=75) 
and 58% (n=11) nurse leaders were in agreement or did not share perceptions that individual 
nurses do experience blame and shame when errors are made.  
Table  4.9: Rationale for Non-Punitive Approach  
 
Likert Scale 
 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
Average 
Positive 
Response  
3.1.8=The hospital has a no blame policy, which 
makes it easy for nurses to report errors 
(N=128) 
n=65 n=35 n=28 50.8 
3.1.12=Nurses are unafraid to ask questions 
when something does not seem right (N=128) 
n=66 n=30 n=32 51.6 
3.1.16 =The nurse who makes an error will NOT 
report it, because he/she is afraid of the 
outcome (N=128) 
n=39 n=32 n=57 44.5 
3.1.17=Nurses will NOT report errors made by 
colleagues, as they are afraid that they will be 
blamed (N=128) 
n=32 n=42 n=54 42.2 
3.1.18=There is a non-punitive policy for error 
reporting in the hospital (N=128) 
n=52 n=51 n=25 40.6 
3.1.19=Non-punitive is clearly defined in our 
hospital, which means that no-one will know 
about the error being reported (N=128) 
n=43 n=45 n=40 33.6 
3.1.26=The non-punitive policy for our hospital 
is known to all staff in my unit (N=127) 
n=51 n=47 n=29 40.2 
3.1.46=Nursing errors are not held against the 
nurse who made the error (N=126) 
n=40 n=44 n=42 31.7 
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Question 4.8: After the error was reported and managed, the nurse involved expressed 
that she felt… (N=117), correlated to Nurses Experience 
Section four explored nurses’ feelings when involved with an error and the management of 
this error. Figure 4.3 below presents the frequency responses of RNs by nursing specialty, 
question 4.8.7 and question 4.8.9. 
RNs responding from their experience with errors, 32% (n=12) affirmed feeling unsupported 
and blamed for the error (question 4.8.7: not supported and blamed) fairly distributed for all 
nursing divisions except Ambulatory n=0 and Paediatrics 14% (n=3).  Question 4.8.9 (not 
treated fairly) was affirmed by 13 % (n=8) during the error management process; with n=0 
responses from Ambulatory and Paediatric Divisions. 
There was no significant difference between question 4.8.7 (p=0.573); question 4.8.9 
(p=0.851) and the two groups of RNs. This supports the research question that although the 
majority of RNs (68%) felt supported during the error reporting and management process, 
there are RNs who fear being blamed and treatment unfairly in the management of errors. 
This is supported by Denham (2007:114) who identified the concept of TRUST, the five rights 
of the second victim which include fair and just treatment as the first right.  
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Figure  4.3: Error Involvement by Nursing Speciality 
Figure 4.4 below presents the RNs` experience with errors by nationality. Saudi RNs, 13% 
(n=2) felt equally unsupported, blamed and not treated fairly with the highest positive 
response rate; closely followed by Middle Eastern RNs, 11% (n=2). Not supported and 
blamed (Q 4.8.7) was rated higher by Western 8% (n=2), Middle Eastern 11% (n=2) and 
Indian 6% (n=1) than being treated fairly (Q 4.8.9).  
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Figure  4.4: Nurses Experience per Nationality 
The higher rating by the Saudi nationals may be attributed to not being bound by an 
expatriate contract, which is seen as being in jeopardy if error outcomes are severe 
(Almutary & Lewis, 2012:125). However, other RNs may not have felt secure in sharing their 
honest experience as this was a self-reporting questionnaire and 3% (n=7) professional 
nurses and 11% (n=5) nurse leaders considered this outcome applicable (Burns & Grove, 
2007: 382). 
4.2.5.2 Organisational systems and processes   
The Just Culture approach to error management needs to be a balance between the 
individual performance and support, while implementing systems and process which identify 
and decrease risks, decrease the potential for errors and monitor improvements to prevent 
future occurrences (Reason 2000: 60; Marx, 2001: 3-4; Mayer & Cronin, 2008: 427).  
The Likert scale questions which focused on the organisational systems and processes are 
summarized below in table 4.10. A total of nine questions explored RNs’ responses on 
systems and processes established for the reporting and management of errors. Exclusions 
for professional nurses ranged from n=3 - n=5, with question 3.1.43 only excluding n=1 nurse 
leader as these RNs did not complete the questions.  
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Table  4.10: Rationale for Organisation Systems and Processes 
Likert Scale Agree Neutral Disagree 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
3.1.4 = There is a defined process in the hospital 
for error reporting and management ( N= 128) 
n=113 n=13 n=2 70.3% 
3.1.13 =The same process is applied throughout 
the hospital for reporting errors (N=128) 
n=90 n=29 n=9 88.3% 
3.1.27 =There is a process on how errors are to 
be investigated and this is known to all nursing 
staff (N=127) 
n=77 n=25 n=25 60.6% 
3.1.28 = An identified process exists that informs 
all nurses on how the disciplinary measures are 
applied when nursing errors are made (N=127) 
n=80 n=25 n=22 63.0% 
3.1.36 = All errors that occur are investigated by 
a multidisciplinary team (126) 
n=74 n=34 n=18 58.7% 
3.1.40 = Nurses who make errors are treated 
differently from other health care providers who 
make errors ( N=126) 
n=26 n=31 n=69 54.8% 
3.1.43 = When errors are investigated, the focus 
is the system of the hospital (N=125) 
n=61 n=44 n=20 48.8% 
3.1.45 =Investigations of errors are focused on 
the individual who made the error (126) 
n=46 n=29 n=51 40.5% 
3.1.49 = The hospital is working hard to prevent 
errors from happening (N=126) 
n=96 n=25 n=5 76.2% 
 
RNs highly agreed 70.3% (n=113) with a defined process for error reporting and 
management (Q3.1.4) which is unilaterally applied throughout the organisation for reporting 
of errors (Q3.1.13), 88.3% (n=90). Professional nurses had no disagreement with an 
effective error reporting and management system but did have 12% (n=13) who did not share 
their responses. However, nurse leaders were very clear in their agreement with 89% (n=17) 
and 11% (n=2) in disagreement. Nurse leaders’ evaluation would be based on a systems 
approach as these RNs would be more versed with the organisational systems due to job 
functions but professional nurses’ opinion would be based on their individual experience with 
errors.  
In contrast, only 54% (n=69) of RNs agreed with question 3.1.40 (Nurses who make errors 
are treated differently from other health care providers who make errors, reversed). Only 
18% (n=20) of professional nurses and 32% (n=6) of nurse leaders agreed that RNs were 
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treated the same as other healthcare providers when errors are made, which supports the 
research question of shame and blame preventing RNs from reporting. However, RNs may 
hold this perception due to the increased risk for errors for this group of healthcare providers 
being in contact with patients on a twenty four basis (IOM, 2004). 
Therefore, the commitment of the organisation to decrease risks for errors in the workplace is 
important in implementing systems and process. The hospital is working hard to prevent 
errors from happening (Q3.1. 49) scored high 76.2% agreement from both groups of RNs 
(n=96) which indicates that there are initiatives either in place or being introduced to address 
error prevention, e.g. the organisation is JCI accredited, is a member of IHI and on the 
journey to Magnet Excellence (ANCC, 2008).  
The positive response decreases for the investigative processes (Q3.1. 40.) 54.8% (n=26) 
and (Q3.1.28) 63% (n=80). Investigative processes of error reporting and management were 
known by RNs (Q3.1.27) 60.6% (n=77), with 20 % (n=25) remaining neutral or disagreed.  
Professional nurses and nurse leaders 37% (n=7) - 40% (n=43) identified a lack of 
understanding and/ or knowledge of the investigative processes. However, whether all errors 
are investigated by a multidisciplinary team (Q 3.1.36) saw 58.7% (n=74) of RNs in 
agreement, 41% (n=52) in disagreement or did not know.   
This confirms the lack of understanding of the investigative processes as multidisciplinary 
teams are convened as needed and are based on the application of the harm score 
classification. Multidisciplinary teams are utilized to gain an understanding from an 
organisational perspective of all links within the culture of safety and the risks involved 
(Benner et al., 2002: 511; Al Jeraisy et al., 2011: 298).  
A component of the organisational system and processes is to address RNs performance, 
thus question 3.1.28 (An identified process exists that informs all nurses on how the 
disciplinary measures are applied when nursing errors are made) average positive response 
of 63% (n=80), with 17% (n=22) in disagreement and 20% (n=25) of RNs unclear on the 
process.  
Professional nurses who did not understand the disciplinary process application were lower 
35% (n=38) than nurse leaders 47% (n=9). Thus, a challenging aspect of managing RN 
performance for nurse leaders is the application of disciplinary measures identified by 
approximately half of nurse leaders.     
The lowest positive responses 48% (n=61) was the differentiation of a system approach 
(Q3.1.43) versus individual approach (Q3.1.45, reversed) 40.5% (n=51).  Professional nurses 
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53% (n=57) and nurse leaders 37% (n=7) disagreed or were unclear of the approach to error 
management being system focused, while 60% (n=75) of RNs (66% professional nurses and 
47 % of nurse leaders) were of the opinion or unclear that error investigations are focused on 
the individual RN than the system.  
None of the above results had significant differences between both groups of RNs responses 
on organisational systems and processes based on Fisher`s exact test completed. RNs 
perceive the organisation to have an effective error reporting system, they may lack 
understanding of the investigative processes but perceive that the organisation is structured 
with systems and processes which do not support a balanced approach to errors, i.e. there 
are components of both the system and individual approaches to error management which 
need to be clearly defined.  Thus, there is a need to review the approach to error reporting 
and management of the organisation.  
4.2.5.3 Work environment factors  
The nursing work environment has been identified as an important component to help 
improve the decreasing of errors, as seen in the IOM (2004) report, “Keeping Patients Safe: 
Transforming the Work Environment of Nurses”. This report has identified the need “to create 
a balance between production efficiency and reliability (safety), creating and sustaining trust; 
managing change and  end users involvement in decision making related to work design 
practices to create a learning organisation” (IOM, 2004: 3-4).  
The six Likert questions used to gain the responses of how nurse managers and professional 
nurses view their nursing work environment are summarized below in table 4.11.  
Exclusions of professional nurses ranged from n=3 - n=6; with n=1 nurse leader for question 
3.1.9 excluded as these RNs did not complete the questions.  
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Table  4.11: Rationale for Work Environment  
Likert Scale Agree Neutral Disagree 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
3.1.3 =Nurses who report errors are supported by 
senior nursing staff in our unit (N=128) 
n=86 n=28 n=14 67.2% 
3.1.9 =Nurses are encouraged by their unit 
colleagues to report errors (N=127) 
n=87 n=25 n=15 68.5% 
3.1.10 =Nurses in the unit feel free to report 
negative behaviour of nursing colleagues (N=128) 
n=55 n=42 n=31 43.0% 
3.1.41=When an error is made, the nurse first meets 
with the manager to discuss the circumstances 
leading to the error (N=125) 
n=97 n=15 n=13 77.6% 
3.1.44 =It is easy to support the patient and the 
nurse when an error had been made (N=126) 
n=34 n=52 n=40 27.0% 
3.1.50 =I work in a unit where it is difficult to make 
errors (126) 
n=29 n=38 n=59 23.0% 
 
Positive average responses were highest 77.6% (n= 97) for question 3.1.41 (When an error 
is made, the nurse first meets with the manager to discuss the circumstances leading to the 
error); 68% (n=87) for question 3.1.9 (Nurses are encouraged by their unit colleagues to 
report errors) and 67.2% (n=86) for question 3.1.3 (Nurses who report errors are supported 
by senior nursing staff on our unit).  This confirms that the nurse leaders are informed of 
errors; aware of the errors which are reported on the nursing units in which they work; the 
investigative process is completed by nurse leaders and RNs received support from both 
colleagues and direct supervisors when errors are reported, see question 2.6 above. 
However, in contrast question 3.1.9 with question 3.1.10 (Nurses on the unit feel free to 
report negative behaviour of nursing colleagues) only 43% (n=55) responded in agreement.  
There was a divergent response from the two groups of RNs; nurse leaders agreed 32% 
(n=6); disagreed 47% (n=9) and neutral 21 % (n=4), while professional nurses agreed 45% 
(n=49); disagreed 20% (n=22) and neutral 35% (n=38). Thus, the high neutral response, 
greater than disagree confirms the hesitance of providing feedback.    
RNs may be encouraged to report errors, but the freedom to report negative behaviour of a 
peer is not routinely applied in nursing practice. There was significant difference in the two 
groups of RNs to question 3.1.10; p=0.049 (Fisher`s exact test). Studies have shown that 
error reporting, coping with error involvement and recovery from the occurrence is strongly 
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linked to the support received from peers (Mayo & Duncan, 2004: 214; Chiang & Pepper, 
2006: 396-397). 
The average positive response 27% (n= 34) for question 3.1.44 (It is easy to support the 
patient and the nurse when an error had been made) was very low. Thus, RNs identified that 
it is not easy to support the patient and the nurse, disagree 32% (n=40) with the neutral 
response the highest at 42% (n=52).  This was identified most by professional nurses who 
had the highest response 43% (n=46) neutral and 33% (n=35) disagree as this may be a 
choice in their job accountability. However, nurse leaders are expected to fulfil both functions 
of patient and nurse support, the response of 26% disagree (n=5), 32% (n= 6) neutral and 
42% (n= 8) agree demonstrate that for less than half of the nurse leaders this is easy to 
achieve, but for the majority of nurse leaders 58%, this is a challenge.  
The average positive response 23 % (n= 29) for question 3.1.50 (I work in a unit where it is 
difficult to make errors) demonstrates that 47% (n=59) of RNs identify there is need for 
improvement in the nursing units in which they work; while 30% (n=38) were unsure of 
assessing for potential errors. There was a divergent response from the two groups of RNs 
with nurse leaders 63% (n=12) and 44% (n= 47) of professional nurses identifying their units 
in need of improvements, while 16% - 33% (n=3 - n=47) of RNs remained neutral and 21% 
(n=4) - 23% (n=25) agreed.  
Kramer & Schmalenberg (2008:56-57) state that only direct care nurses can confirm if the 
work environment is supportive or not and this is described in chapter two.  
4.2.5.4 Education  
Mayer and Cronin (2008: 429) define a learning culture as “active improvement efforts are 
directed at system redesign”  while Marx (2001: 25-26) states that “the learning culture in 
which employees know that sharing their violations will educate others of the risks and 
prevent future error occurrences will promote self-reporting of violations, thus accomplishing 
a reporting culture”. Benner et al. (2002: 510) identified that “experiential learning” should 
occur when medication errors were reviewed and discussed so as to identify a taxonomy of 
nursing errors with the aim of “developing strategies for nursing education and practice 
environment”.  
The five Likert scale questions which explored RNs’ responses of error reporting and 
management focused on education preparation, are summarized below in table 4.12.  
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The average positive response was highest 89.9% (Q3.1.2) which was negatively worded, 
thus 90% (n=116) in disagreement indicated that RNs do need to know about error 
classification, 89% (n=98) professional nurses and 95% (n=18) nurse leaders.  
Professional nurses only 5% (n=7) were in agreement; 5% neutral (n=6).  Thus, both groups 
of RNs identified the need for education with regard to the harm scoring and error 
classification. The nurse leader with a neutral response raises a concern as patient safety 
and guiding staff in identifying professional developmental needs is part of the job description 
of a nurse leader.   
Nurse leaders’ job descriptions hold them accountable for the quality of nursing practice on a 
twenty hour basis, being ultimately responsible for all care delivery in their assigned 
department. Professional nurses are accountable for the delivery of safe patient care based 
on their assignment and direct reporting, e.g. new staff member, preceptor, charge nurse and 
peer-to-peer tasks. Thus, professional nurses have an accountability to attend education 
opportunities provided, maintain competence, adhere to policies of the organisation while 
nurse leaders ensure that these opportunities are provided and address non-compliant 
behaviour and performance, see chapter two:  Role of the Nurse Manager. 
Table  4.12: Rationale for Education Preparation  
Likert 
Scale Disagree Agree Neutral 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
3.1.2=Nurses do not need to know about 
error classification (N=129) 
n=116 n=7 n =6 89.9% 
3.1.6= Error classification is the 
responsibility of nursing quality staff 
members (N=128) 
n = 26 n = 69 n =33 53.95 
3.1.15=Nurses have received education 
about the error reporting and management 
processes (N=128) 
n=15 n=93 n=20 72.7% 
3.1.22=Nurses know the difference 
between an error and negligence (117) 
n=13 n=82 n=22 72.4% 
3.1.38= Errors that occur are used as 
learning opportunities to prevent the error 
from happening again (N=126) 
n=5 n=105 n=16 83.3% 
 
When comparing question 3.1.2 with question 3.1.6, the high response to needing education 
error classification is reversed as a responsibility of another department with 54% (n=69) in 
agreement, 26% (n=33) neutral and 20% (n=26) in disagreement. This may be due to the 
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process of the department of Nursing Practice, Quality and Research coordinating the review 
of errors made and Quality Management Department assigning the harm score through the 
SRS. Thus professional nurses and nurse leaders identify the need for their own professional 
development in this concept, but recognize the need to involve experts to assist in unit level 
improvements (Wu & Steckelberg, 2012:267).   
Agreement with having received education about the error reporting and management 
processes (Q3.1.15) 73% (n=93) of RNs in agreement with 72% (n=83) professional nurses 
and 79% (n=15) nurse leaders. However, 16% (n=20) of RNs remained neutral; 12% (n=16) 
professional nurses and 21% (n=4) nurse leaders. Professional nurses only disagreed with 
this question, 14% (n=15).  Nurse leaders confirmed that they have received education on 
error reporting and management but it would be of interest to explore the reasons for neutral 
responses. Thus, 26% of direct care providers who are at the “sharp end “of healthcare 
delivery need education on error reporting and management (Denham, 2007: 114).  
This is in contrast to question 3.1.22 in which 72% (n= 92) of RNs reported being able to 
know the difference between an error and negligence, with a divergent response between 
professional nurses 77% (n=83) and nurse leaders 47% (n=9).  
Nurse leaders in disagreement 32% (n=6) and  21% (n=4) neutral, which raises a concern in 
that nurse leaders may recognize the need for education, but this may not be shared with 
staff nurses or nurse leaders which may be lacking in this regard. Professional nurses’ 
disagreement 6% (n=7) and neutral 17% (n=18) which may mean that 23% of professional 
nurses are realistic in their approach to identifying the difference in errors and negligence. 
However, professional nurses’ responses identify that there are gaps which need to be 
addressed through a robust education plan to classify, report and manage different errors.  
There was significant difference between nurses knowing the difference between an error 
and negligence in professional nurses and nurse leaders positions; p= 0.003 (Fisher's exact 
test).  There is a clear difference between the two groups on whether they think nurses know 
the difference between an error and negligence. Apparently, 77% of the professional nurses 
themselves agree, but only 48% of the nurse leaders agree. Negligence is defined in chapter 
two. 
Marx (2001: 3)  advocated that errors as they occur are used as learning experiences to 
prevent recurrence (Q3.1.38); with the majority of RNs in agreement 83% (n=105). However 
4% (n=5) - 13% (n=16) of RNs remained neutral or were in disagreement. None of the nurse 
leaders were in disagreement n=0, however 5% (n=5) - 14% (n=15) disagreed or remained 
neutral. These results demonstrated that nurse leaders perceive their approach to errors as a 
learning experience, but 19% of professional nurses may not agree. Studies advocate that 
using errors in a positive manner and as an educational opportunity, rather than a shame 
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and blame approach may improve professional nurses’ compliance with reporting and 
disclosure of all errors instead of the severe outcomes errors only (Mayo & Duncan, 2004: 
214; Chiang & Pepper, 2006: 397; Denham, 2007:116; Throckmorten & Ecthegaray, 2007: 
411).  
4.2.5.5 Patient and nurse disclosure of errors  
Disclosure is defined as “the provision of information to customers, clients, patients and 
families and is seen as a marker of professionalism and occurs at the individual and 
organisational level” (Dekker, 2007:47). The responses` of RNs towards the disclosure of 
errors was approached by determining questions based on the outcomes for the professional 
nurse and nurse leaders when an error was made and the disclosure approach observed in 
practice. 
The five Likert scale questions which explored RNs’ responses of patient and nurse 
disclosure of errors are presented below in table 4.13. Exclusions were professional nurses, 
with a range of n=5 to n=6 as not complete the questions. There were no significant 
differences between these questions and the two groups of RNs as seen by the Fisher exact 
tests completed.   
Table  4.13: Rationale for Patient and Nurse Error Disclosure 
Likert Scale Agree Neutral Disagree 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
3.1.33=Nurses receive education on how to 
disclose errors to patient, which includes taking 
responsibility for actions and apologizing to 
patients (N=126) 
n=46 n=34 n=46 36.5% 
3.1.34=Nurses may apologize to the patient and 
family for errors, as they are afraid of the 
consequences of their actions (N=126) 
n=29 n=53 n=44 34.9% 
3.1.35=The nurse who made the error 
discusses the outcome with his/her colleagues 
(N=126) 
n=44 n=37 n=45 34.9% 
3.1.37=The patient and family are always 
informed when an error has been made 
(N=126) 
n=29 n=43 n=54 23.0% 
3.1.39=It is the physician`s role to inform the 
patient and family when an error has occurred 
(N=125) 
n=67 n=32 n=26 53.6% 
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The average positive responses for the questions on disclosure were very low, ranging from 
53.6% for question 3.1.39 (It is the physician`s role to inform the patient and family when an 
error has occurred) to the lowest 23% for question 3.1.37 (The patient and family are always 
informed when an error has been made). Question 3.1.39 (It is the physician`s role to inform 
the patient and family when an error has occurred) saw both groups of RNs in agreement 
51% (n=13) - 68% (n=54) as highest, disagreement was 20% (n=5) - 26% (n=21).  
The results demonstrate that RNs are not clear on the process of error disclosure which may 
be seen as a combined responsibility with physicians.  
Question 3.1.37 (The patient and family are always informed when an error has been made) 
results of both groups of RNs agree that there is a lack of information given to the patients 
when an error is made, agree 16% (n=3) - 24% (n=29) with nurse leaders the lowest 
responders. However, equal number of nurse leaders 42% (n=8) disagreed and remained 
neutral, which may be a reluctance to disclose sensitive information of the organisation.  
Question 3.1.34 (Nurses may apologize to the patient and family for errors, as they are afraid 
of the consequences of their actions) was reversed scored and 34.9% (n=44) RNs agreed 
that apologies may be driven by fear of consequences. However, 42% (n=53) were neutral 
as the highest response, with 23% (n=29) disagreed. The two groups of RNs responses were 
divergent, with professional nurses highest response 46% neutral (n=49) and agreement 
33% (n=35); while nurse leaders 47% (n=9) in agreement and 37% (n=6) in disagreement. 
The responses of RNs demonstrate that fear of outcomes may be a driving factor in 
disclosure as seen in question 3.1.37 patients and families are not always informed of the 
errors which occur, but as most RNs did not share their perceptions cannot draw adequate 
conclusions.  
Question 3.1.33 (Nurses receive education on how to disclose errors to patient, which 
includes taking responsibility for actions and apologizing to patients) had a low agreement 
response 36.5% (n=46) which identifies another component for the education plan identified 
as a gap in the organisation.  Both professional nurses 36% (n=39) and nurse leaders 37% 
(n=7) were ambivalent in identifying this need with equal distribution for agree, disagree and 
neutral with this question. Neutral response was 27% (n=29) professional nurses and 26% 
(n=5) nurse leaders, which demonstrate that RNs are lacking in knowledge of the disclosure 
practices of the organisation.  
Question 3.1.35 (The nurse who made the error discusses the outcome with his/her 
colleagues), RNs in agreement was very low 34.9% (n=44), disagreement was 36% (n=45) 
and neutral 29% (n=37). Both professional nurses 36% (n=38) - 36% (n=39) and nurse 
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leaders 32% (n=6) were ambivalent in nurse error disclosure with equal distribution for both 
agree and disagree with this question, with neutral range of 28% (n=30) - 37% (n=7).  
There are confidentiality restrictions for the nurse leaders to disclose error outcomes which 
apply to professional nurses` performance, however an approach of using errors to prevent 
further occurrence is encouraged.  
Disclosure of errors in nursing is an area which needs to be addressed from both the 
perspectives of professional nurses and the nurse leaders’ awareness and accountability as 
results show none of the RNs were confident of the defined practices of error disclosure 
within the organisation.  
4.2.5.6 Patient and nurse outcome of errors  
Patients experience a variety of outcomes as a result of errors, some with no harm and 
others with severe outcomes, including death. Literature has identified the healthcare 
provider who makes the errors as the second victim, who lives with the consequences of the 
error made (Wu, 2000:726; Scott et al., 2009:325). Sirriyeh et al. (2010: 51) stated that a 
systematic review identified the “barriers to healthcare providers receiving support were 
negative attitudes in culture of organisation, threat of professional loss and lack on 
institutional support”.   
The approach taken to gain the responses of RNs about patient and nurse outcomes was to 
complete Likert scale questions followed by question 4.1 - question 4.8 which requested RNs 
who have been involved with errors to describe their experiences. The eight Likert scale 
questions which explored RNs and patient outcomes with errors are summarized below in 
table 4.14. Exclusions ranged from n=4 - n=5 of professional nurses only who did not 
complete the questions. There was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs 
and all questions based on the Fisher`s exact test completed. 
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Table  4.14: Rationale for Patient and Nurse Outcomes 
Likert Scale Agree Neutral Disagree 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
3.1.24=If a patient is injured because of a nursing 
error, the nurse who made the error is sent home 
(N=127) 
n=28 n=41 n=58  
45.7% 
3.1.29=If a nurse makes an error while caring for an 
important person(VIP patient), the nurse will be/ is 
sent home (N=127) 
n=22 n=41 n=64  
50.4% 
3.1.30=Nurses who make errors are always 
disciplined (N=127) 
n=46 n=46 n=35 27.6% 
3.1.31=The manager receives disciplinary action for 
errors made by nurses in the unit as patient safety is 
his/her responsibility (N=127) 
n=53 n=31 n=43 33.9% 
3.1.32=It  is acceptable to hold the nurse 
accountable for her actions and give disciplinary 
action when an error is made (N=127) 
n=72 n=34 n=21 56.7% 
3.1.42 = If a patient dies because of a nursing error, 
the nurse who made the error is sent home  (N=126) 
n=58 n=45 n=23  
18.3% 
3.1.47=The outcome to the patient, whether it is 
good or bad does NOT affect the outcome of the 
disciplinary action received by the nurse (N=126) 
ns=24 n=48 n=54  
19.0% 
3.1.48=It is an easy process to define the disciplinary 
measures applicable to nursing errors (N=126) 
n=43 n=40 n=43 34.1% 
 
The highest positive response 56.7% (n=72) was question 3.1.32 (It is acceptable to hold the 
nurse accountable for her actions and give disciplinary action when an error is made) with 
the lowest score 19% (n=24) was question 3.1.47 (The outcome to the patient, whether it is 
good or bad does NOT affect the outcome of the disciplinary action received by the nurse).  
Question 3.1.32 saw nurse leaders and professional nurses agreeing 55% (n=59) - 68% 
(n=13) with the accountability and performance management for nursing actions, but was 
lower for professional nurses. However, 16% (n=3) -17% (n=18) of both groups disagreed 
with this question and 21 % (n=3) - 27% (n=31) of both groups remained ambivalent.  
This identifies 43% of RNs with no clear definitions of accountabilities in error management 
and disciplinary applications for nursing care delivery at the bed side and leadership level.  
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Question 3.1.47 saw both groups of RNs in disagreement as the highest response was 43% 
(n=44) - 53% (n=10), however professional nurses had an almost equal result for neutral 
38% (n= 43).  
Nurse leaders agree and neutral responses were almost the same 21% (n=4) - 26% (n=5). 
The conclusion from the results is that the patient outcome from an error influences the level 
/ severity of the disciplinary action applied, but the level of influence cannot be concluded as 
38% (n=48%) of RNs did not provide their perceptions.  
Question 3.1.24 (If a patient is injured because of a nursing error, the nurse who made the 
error is sent home) which explored one of the most severe outcomes for a nurse in Saudi 
Arabia with error outcomes, saw an average positive response 45.7% (n=58 as was reversed 
scored). Thus 42% (n=45) - 68% (n=13) of professional nurse and nurse leaders are of the 
opinion that a nurse will not be sent home if a patient is injured. However, 16% (n=3) - 23% 
(n=20) of both groups of RNs think that the nurse will be sent home and 16% (n=3) - 35% 
(n=38) of RNs did not provide their perceptions by remaining neutral.  
Higher scores for agreement and neutral were seen in the professional nurse group, but 
there was no significance between the two groups of RNs based on the Fisher`s exact test 
completed.  
Question 3.1.29 (If a nurse makes and error while caring for an important person (VIP 
patient), the nurse will be/ is sent home) had an agreement of 50.4% (n=64) disagreement as 
reversed scored). The agreement of 50% (n=51) - 68% (n=13) of both groups of RNs shows 
a lower response for professional nurses who feel that a nurse will not be sent home if an 
error is made involving a VIP. However, 32% (n=41) of RNs remained neutral and 17% (n= 
22) of RNs agreed. The high neutral may be due to some RNs who may not have experience 
with caring for a VIP; however the 11% (n=2) agreement of nurse leaders is of concern. The 
question identifies unique circumstances which need to be considered in the nursing work 
environment which can influences care delivery and the increased risk for errors.  
Question 3.1.30 (Nurses who make errors are always disciplined) was reversed scored and 
agreement 27.6% (n=35, disagreement) with 24% (n=26) - 28% (n= 9) for both groups of 
RNs. Professional nurses 38% (n=41) and nurses leaders 26% (n=5) both had equal 
distribution for agree and neutral scores. Thus 36% of RNs hold the opinion that nurses do 
not always receive discipline for errors made, but the same number of RNs did not provide 
their perceptions. This may be due to no involvement with errors which required discipline, 
do not know the discipline procedure or did not want to disclose information.  
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Question 3.1.31 (The manager receives disciplinary action for errors made by nurses on the 
unit as patient safety is his/her responsibility) agreement was 33.9% (n=43) disagreement as 
reversed scored) with 32% (n=6) - 34% (n=37) for nurse leaders and professional nurses.  
RNs 41% (n=44) – 47% (n= 9) were aware that nurse leaders were disciplined for actions of 
professional nurses, but 21% (n=27) - 24% (n=4) did not provide their perceptions. Thus, the 
majority of RNs, 66.1% are not clear of the disciplinary process which impact on nurse 
leaders’ performance.  
Average positive agreement 34.1% for question 3.1.48 (It is an easy process to define the 
disciplinary measures applicable to nursing errors) with almost equal distribution for RNs’ 
responses for agree and disagree 34% (n=43) and 32% (n=40) neutral. This ambivalence 
was seen in professional nurses agree 32% (n=34), neutral 34% (n=36) and disagree 35% 
(n=37), while nurse leaders scored slightly higher for agree 47% (n=9), 32% (n=6) disagree 
and 21% (n=4) neutral. RNs are ambivalent in defining the process of application of 
disciplinary measures as being easy, however nurse leaders seem to be more aware of the 
process.  
There were no significant differences between these questions and the two groups of RNs 
based on the Fisher`s exact test completed.  
Section four of the questionnaire explored RNs’ responses after being involved with an error 
and could thus link this to their unique experience. For most of the questions for section four, 
the exclusions were high. However, in question 4.9 the reasons are provided in that 
professional nurses 39% (n=13) and 20% (n=1) nurse leader (from the Ambulatory Division) 
reported no experience with errors, thus did not complete the questions for involvement with 
errors.  
Question 4.1: Your involvement with nursing errors has been… (N=126)  
Received N=126 returns, with n=5 professional nurses who did not complete the question. 
Figure 4.5 below presents RNs’ involvement with errors, directly involved with errors 32% 
(n=40), with 27% (n=29) - 58% (n=11) for professional nurses and nurse leaders. However, 
professional nurses had no involvement with errors as highest score 32% (n=34) and indirect 
involvement 30% (n=32). It is interesting that 16% (n=3) of nurse leaders had no involvement 
with errors; however errors were reported on all primary work areas.  
Not wanting to disclose information was the choice of 11% (n=2) of nurse leaders and 11% 
(n= 12) professional nurses. There was significant difference between the two groups of RNs’ 
indication of error involvement and job title, p=0.046 (Fisher’s exact test). This may be due to 
professional nurses that are clinically assigned; the expectation would be that there would be 
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more involvement with errors while nurse leaders as supervisors are only aware of those 
reported.   
 
Figure  4.5: Error Involvement by Job Title 
There was no significant difference between nurses` years of experience and error 
involvement; p=0.52 (Fisher’s exact test); working with the assumption that with increased 
years of experience it is more likely that a nurse would become involved in an error.  
RN involved with errors by nationality is summarized below in table 4.15. The nationality with 
the highest frequency for direct error involvement was 63% (n=5) Indian nurses, 50% (n=8) 
Middle Eastern nurses, 40% (n=3) Saudi nurses and other nationalities ranged from 23% 
(n=2) - 30% (n=12). There was no significant difference between nationality and error 
involvement; p=0.287 (Fisher`s exact test). Western and Saudi nurses were willing to share 
information, however all other nationalities had RNs   6% (n=1) - 43% (n=5) who were not 
willing to disclose their involvement with errors.  
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Table  4.15: RN involvement with Errors by Nationality 
Demographics: 
Nationality 
Directly 
involved with 
errors 
Indirectly 
involved with 
errors 
No 
involvement 
with errors 
Do not want to 
disclose information 
Saudi n=3 n=2 n=2 n=0 
Western n=4 n=5 n=4 n=0 
Middle Eastern n=8 n=5 n=2 n=1 
South African n=5 n=7 n=6 n=4 
Indian n=5 n=1 n=1 n=1 
Malaysian n=2 n=1 n=1 n=3 
Filipino n=12 n=13 n=21 n=5 
Singaporean n=0 n=0 n=0 n=0 
Two-sided Fisher's exact test: p = 0.2866 
Table 4.16 below presents a summary of RNs’ involvement with errors by Nursing Specialty. 
The nursing speciality with the highest frequency for direct error involvement was the 
Paediatrics Division 54% (n=7) and Critical Care 42% (n=10), with the other divisions ranging 
from 15% (n=2) - 30% (n=9). The Ambulatory Division had the highest response for no 
involvement with errors 46 % (n=6) followed by the Adult Division 37% (n=11). The other 
divisions ranged from 20% (n=3) - 28% (n=7).  
There was no significant difference between error involvement and nursing specialty,              
p=0.4312 (Fisher`s exact test). Error rates with severe outcomes were highest in the 
intensive care units, operating rooms and emergency departments compared to other 
specialties (Kaushal et al., 2008:1260).  
Table  4.16: RN involvement with errors by Nursing Specialty 
Demographics: 
Specialty 
Directly 
involved with 
errors 
Indirectly 
involved with 
errors 
No 
Involvement 
with errors 
Do not want to 
disclose information 
Adult Division n=9 n=9 n=11 n=1 
Mat/Child Division n=6 n=7 n=4 n=3 
Critical Care 
Division n=10 n=5 n=6 n=3 
Procedure Areas 
Division n=5 n9 n=7 n=4 
Pediatrics Division n=7 n=3 n=3 n=0 
Ambulatory Care 
Division n=2 n=2 n=6 n=3 
Two-sided Fisher's exact test: p = 0.4312 
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Question 4.2: If involved with errors, indicate in what capacity (Indicate all that apply) 
(N=98)  
Received N= 98 returns, with 33 exclusions, n=2 nurse leaders and n=31 professional nurses 
who did not complete the question. Table 4.17 below presents a summary of the capacity in 
which RNs have been involved with errors. Professional nurses   3% (n=4) - 4% (n=6) who 
indicated the capacity of nurse manager or clinical nurse coordinator would be delegated 
these responsibilities of the job title when nurse manger/ clinical nurse coordinator are on 
vacation.  
Table  4.17: Capacity in Errors Occurring 
Job Title Professional Nurses  Nurse Leaders   
Manager n=4 n=4 
Clinical Nurse Coordinator n=6 n=1 
Charge Nurse n=43 n=0 
Nurse making the error n=31 n=0 
Colleague n=30 n=0 
Friend n=4 n=4 
Preceptor n=5 n=2 
Nurse completing check with colleague n=17 n=0 
Audit Process n=4 n=4 
Case Review/ Investigative Process of a 
Peer 
n=10 n=9 
Two sided Fisher's exact test p < 0.001 
 
The highest response for professional nurses was in the capacity of a charge nurse 28% 
(n=43); with nurses making the error 20% (n=31) and colleagues 19 % (n=30) following. 
Nurse leaders identified highest response as Case Review/ Investigative Process of a Peer 
38% (n=9), with manager, friend and audit process equal in following response 17% (n=4). 
There was highly significant difference between capacity of error involvement and the two 
groups of RNs; p < 0.001 (Fisher`s exact test).  
Denham (2007:114) identifies the sharp and blunt ends of healthcare delivery, where sharp 
ends are the direct contact with patients and present the highest risk. However, blunt ends 
are the system processes and outcomes which are needed to decrease the sharp end risks. 
Thus, the above presents the focus of accountabilities which have experienced errors from 
these perspectives.  
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Question 4.3: Indicate the examples of error (s) you were involved with (Indicate all 
that apply) (N=108) 
Received N=108 returns with 23 exclusions, n=2 nurse leaders and n=21 professional nurses 
who did not complete the question. RNs identified 195 examples of errors involved in which 
were similar to question 2.5 examples of errors reported, with nurse leaders 24% (n=46) and 
professional nurses 76% (n=149).  
There was no significant difference between the error examples involved in professional 
nurses’ and nurse leaders’ positions, p=0.066 (Fisher's exact test); nationality, p=0.32 (Chi-
square test) and nursing specialty, p=0.71 (Chi-square test). Table 4.16 above demonstrates 
the examples of errors which were reported in nursing specialties based on the six practice 
areas of the nursing units within the organisation. 
Question 4.4: The error/s was classified as … (Indicate all that apply) (N=96)  
Received N=96 returns with n=35 exclusions, n=3 nurse leaders and n=32 professional 
nurses who did not complete the question. Figure 4.6 below presents the errors involved in 
by job title which were classified according to the Pennsylvania Harm Score (2004). RNs 
reported experience with a total of N=139 errors; 76% (n=106) professional nurses and 24% 
(n=33) nurse leaders.  
The errors which were not classified were 12% (n=16) experienced mostly by professional 
nurses. Errors which were classified no harm, did not reach the patient were experienced by 
17% (n=11) - 24% (n=50) of RNs, with classification errors/ no harm, reached the patient 
15% (n=32) - 18% (n= 12) as the next highest response for RNs.  
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Figure  4.6: Error Classification vs Job Title 
Sentinel event classification was experienced by 1% (n=2) - 5% (n=3) of RNs, which were 
reported in the Adult Division 1% (n=2); Maternal/Child Division 1% (n=2) and Paediatrics 1% 
(n=1). No experience with Error/ death classification was reported, which is in contrast to 
question 2.4 which included this classification in the examples of errors reported; however 
these RNs may have chosen not to complete this question and are counted in the 
exclusions. There was no significant difference between the error classification in which 
involved in and professional nurses’ and nurse leaders’ positions; p= 0.084 (Fisher's exact 
test).  
Question 4.5: Do you think that the error/s was (were) managed fairly? (N=107) 
Received N=107 returns with 24 exclusions; with n=3 nurse leaders and n=21 professional 
nurses who did not complete this question. The frequency of RNs responses to error being 
managed fairly is displayed in figure 4.7 below. The majority of RNs 62% (n=66) agreed that 
errors had been managed fairly, with a distribution of 57% (n=52) professional nurses and 
88% (n=14) nurse leaders. However, 38% (n=41) of RNs disagreed (n=9) or did not know / 
were unsure (n=32) about receiving fair management of the error.  
Professional nurses had the lowest score for agreement, but responses were higher than 
nurse leaders for disagreement 34% (n=31) and did not know / were unsure 9% (n=8). There 
was significance difference between the two groups of RNs, p= 0.0407 (Fisher’s exact test).   
Reasons supplied for views of RNs identified the investigative process needs to be applied 
which reviews all contributing factors.  
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Figure  4.7: Error Management by Job Title 
Thus the majority of nurse leaders agreed fair management was received, but only half of 
professional nurses agreed with this perception. Denham (2007: 114) stated that “the just 
culture principle is fairness to the workers who make errors and effective in reducing risks” 
and describes five rights of the healthcare provider when human errors occur. These include 
treatment that is just and support by manager and peers to prevent the abandonment of the 
healthcare provider as they work through the error occurrence. Leape et al. (2009: 425) 
identifies five components which are needed to improve the safety of healthcare organisation 
which include transparency.  
Question 4.6: The nurse (s) who had made the errors/s received fair treatment (N=110)  
Received N=110 returns with 21 exclusions; n=2 nurse leaders and n=19 professional nurses 
who did not complete this question. The frequency of RNs’ responses to the nurse who made 
the error being managed fairly is displayed in figure 4.8 below.  
The majority of RNs 60 % (n= 66) agreed that the nurse who made the error received fair 
treatment. Nurse leaders agreement 82% (n=14), with 6% (n=1) disagreement and 12% 
(n=2) do not know/unsure. However, professional nurses agreement response was 52% 
(n=48); with 37% (n= 34) do not know/unsure and 12% (n= 11) in disagreement. There was 
no significant difference between the two groups of RNs and their response to question 4.6, 
p=0.065 (Fisher`s exact test).  
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Figure  4.8: Fair Treatment received by RN  
Reasons for responses which added weight to this question were the application of the same 
process to all staff in a similar manner, the need to be treated with respect and confidentiality 
maintained, investigations should include a review of all contributing factors and plans to 
address the deficiencies, committees should trust nurses, not be individually focused as they 
sometimes feel "We should create a victim for the error and send them home" was one RN’s 
response.  
The results demonstrate nurse leaders’ awareness of the application of the error 
management process, however there is a gap for professional nurses, thus the need to 
explore education on error management.  An additional need is the application of concepts 
which cannot be adequately quantified like fair, which may be interpreted in a different 
manner by each RN. However, RNs as stated above would like to see the application of 
processes uniformly throughout the organisation. Chard (2010:142) reports a strong link 
between a judgmental nurse management response and the RNs defensive approach in 
practice. Respondents in the study affirmed a supportive managerial response in error 
management.   
Question 4.7: Indicate the outcome of the error/s for the nurse, clinical nurse 
coordinator /manager and comment as applicable (N=112)   
Received N=112 returns with n=19 professional nurse exclusions as they did not complete 
this question. A total of n= 327 outcomes of errors were identified by RNs; 22% (n= 72) nurse 
leaders and 78% (n=255) by professional nurses. The outcomes were categorized into 
educational needs, disciplinary actions and severe outcomes. There was no significant 
difference between nurse leaders and professional nurses’ responses to error outcomes, 
p=0.2188 (Fisher`s exact test).  
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Outcomes for the nurses who make errors have been reported in studies to range from no 
change, performance review, identifying education skills and abilities which are lacking, and 
disciplinary actions within organisations; independent nursing boards / other government 
agency investigations; suspension, termination and legal suits against nurse and/or the 
organisation (Marx, 2001: 1- 25; Benner et al., 2002: 510; Scott et al., 2009:328).   
Figure 4.9 below demonstrates that an equal number of professional nurses and nurse 
leaders 19% (n=14) - 20% (n= 51) have identified the need for education and competence to 
be a factor which influences errors and the need to improve on this measure. Professional 
nurses 5% (n=13) identified that they do not know the outcome of errors which may be due to 
the confidential approach of addressing error outcomes.  
RNs in nursing specialties who received developmental plans was the Adult Nursing Division 
the highest 18% (n=14), and the Ambulatory and Procedure Nursing Division the lowest 6% 
(n=2). RNs across all nursing divisions identified being placed on a developmental plan; 
ranging   12% (n=9) Critical Care Nursing Division to 17% (n=6) Paediatrics Nursing Division. 
Procedure Nursing Division was highest 25% (n=15) Maternal/Child 16% (n=9) the lowest, 
with the range between for other nursing divisions that identified individual nurses needs for 
education and competency.   
 
Figure  4.9:  Educational Outcomes  
RNs had experience with developmental plans Malaysian 38% (n=1); Middle Eastern 19% 
(n=11); Western 17% (n=4); Filipino 13% (n=18); Saudi 12% (n=3); Indian 10% (n=2) and 
lowest was South African 9% (n=4).  Education and Competence review was Malaysian 23% 
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(n=6) the highest and all other nationalities ranging from 17 % (n=4), Western to 21% (n=9) 
South African and Indian 21% (n=4).  
Employee performance in the organisation is reviewed by the nurse manager who decides 
the most appropriate disciplinary action applicable, which may be in consultation with the 
immediate supervisor. Only written disciplinary action is sent as part of the nurses` 
performance documents to the Human Resources Department. The disciplinary approach 
includes the  nurse manager receiving discipline due to professional nurses` actions which 
resulted in an error, with some professional nurses  3% (n=4)  aware of this application. 
Based on the job description, nurse managers hold ultimate accountability for the nursing 
unit which include outcomes for patients and nursing care provided. A significant positive 
relationship was found between the average positive responses in section 3.1 with the 
outcome of an error to be disciplined by the manager; p=0.022. 
Figure 4.10 below presents the disciplinary outcomes of errors with the progression from 
counselling, the highest response 32 % (professional nurses n=50 nurse leaders n=12); to a 
final written warning 5% (professional nurses n=4; nurse leaders n=3) being the approach 
applied throughout the organisation.  
 
Figure  4.10: Disciplinary Outcomes 
Both nurse leaders and professional nurses reported counselling as the most frequently 
applied disciplinary outcome, followed by  verbal warning  28% (n=44) and nurse leaders 
26% (n=12); first written warning 14% (n=21) professional nurses 17% (n=8) nurse leaders; 
second written warning 8% (n=12) professional nurses and 2%  (n=1) nurse leaders; and 
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final written warning 5% (n=7) and nurse leaders 4%  (n=2). Only professional nurses 
reported 6% third written warning as an outcome of making an error.  
Thus, professional nurses experienced/were aware of a total of n=143 disciplinary outcomes, 
and nurse managers n=38.  
The nurse manager also receives discipline for the input & outcomes in the nursing unit 
which are the accountability of the nurse manager on a twenty four hour basis. RNs 
professional nurses 3% (n=4) and 6% (n=3) nurse leaders had experienced/were aware that 
there was discipline applicable to nurse manager.  
Figure 4.11 below presents the severe outcomes of errors which RNs experienced. 
Professional nurses had experience with equal numbers of suspension, demotion and 
dismissal 13% (n=1); 25% (n=2) termination and other 38% (n=3) scored higher responses. 
Nurse leaders had an equal frequency for suspension and dismissal 17% (n=1); termination 
33% (n=2) and “other” 33% (n=2) which were all higher than professional nurses` responses.  
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Figure  4.11: Severe Error Outcomes 
A demotion within the organisation would be a job description change from RN to an 
unlicensed nurse. A licensed practical nurse is not an option as this position does not exist in 
the organisation. Suspension is applicable for a length of time with dismissal which is the 
nurses’ choice to resign and termination an action of the organisation to terminate the 
nurses’ contract.   
A total of 3% (n=9) severe outcomes were reported for errors within the Critical Care Division 
reporting 1% (n=1) dismissal, 1% (n=1) suspension and 3% (n=2) termination.  
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Other terminations were 1% (n=1) in Paediatrics and Adult divisions; 2% (n=1) suspension in 
Procedures Division, 1% (n=1) demotion in Adult Division and 5% (n=1) in Maternal/Child 
Division. All the severe outcomes of errors were reported by expatriate staff, with Middle 
Eastern RNs who reported one dismissal and suspension, 2% (n=1) and 5% (n=3) 
terminations and Saudi RNs had none.  
Question 4.7.15: (Do not know) was identified by 5% (n=13) of professional nurses only who 
recognized that they were not aware of the outcomes of the errors in which involved. 
Question 4.7.16   (Other: Please indicate) was identified by 1% (n=2)  - 3% (n=3) of RNs; 
with RNs identifying that disciplinary outcome is dependent on the number of occurrences of 
the same error, near miss due to another department involved, not applicable and  the review 
of an internal policy and procedure.  
Question 4.8: After the error had been reported and managed, the nurse involved 
expressed that he/she felt… (Indicate all that apply) (N=117)  
Received N=117 returns, with n=14 professional nurses excluded as did not complete this 
question. Table 4.2.5.6.5 below presents a summary of RNs’ expression after the error was 
reported and managed.  
RNs responding from their experience with errors confirmed the perception of feeling good 
about reporting the error (Q4.8.1) 35% (n= 42) and good that patient could receive the care 
needed (Q4.8.2) 27% (n=32) which was an equal distribution for all nursing divisions and 
across all nationalities with 24 % (n=4) Indians highest and Middle Eastern 3% (n=1).   
However, only 21% (n= 24) RNs felt better and could receive support (Q4.8.3) and 19% (n= 
22) felt supported and could work through the event (Q 4.8.6). Procedures Nursing Division 
was the most supported 14% (n=8); Ambulatory 13% (n=3) and Maternal/Child 13 % (n=6) 
which were very poorly rated. Malaysian RNs were highest responders 11% (n=2) and South 
Africans RNs lowest 5% (n=4).  
Trust for colleagues and senior staff was identified as lacking as seen in responses 14% 
(n=8) trusted colleagues, will continue to report errors (Q4.8.10) and 21% (n=12) trusted 
senior staff and will continue to report errors (Q4.8.13.). Saudi 7% (n=1) and South African 
5% (n=2) were highest responders for these two questions with Indian and Malaysian RNs 
n=0. Trust for peers and nurse leaders have been identified as an important component of 
the work environment. Denham (2007: 114) sites the definition of trust by Covey & Merrill 
(2006): “trust is vital in any system and is considered a confidence composed of competency 
and integrity”.  
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Therefore, peers’ and leaders’ response to an error can affect the level of trust which the 
nurse places in them to treat them in a just and fair manner. Trust affects productivity, quality 
and inversely cost, thus promoting a trusting environment at the point of care is vital for 
safety and care delivery (Denham, 2007:115). Denham (2007:107) identified the acronym 
TRUST which identified the five rights of the second victim, as the treatment of erring by 
healthcare providers which is traditionally a shame and blame approach, which includes 
abandonment and thus violates the trust placed in the organisation to care for them. 
RNs 16% (n=19) felt devastated for having made the error (Q4.8.4), with a fair distribution for 
all nursing divisions except n=0 for Ambulatory Division. Seeing oneself as a poor nurse, 
unable to trust self with patient care (Q4.8.8) as expressed by 4% (n=3) within the Adult and 
Maternal/Child divisions.  
These results are supported by Sirriyeh et al. (2010:51) who concluded that “psychological 
repercussions may include negative states of shame, self-doubt, anxiety and guilt”; with the 
potential for balanced “positive outcomes of increased assertiveness, confidence and 
improved colleague relationships reported” but identify the need for further exploration of 
coping in the short and long term;  support structures available or outcomes beyond the 
immediate event and the development of tools which would meet this need. This further need 
is seen by the number of respondents who did not reply to these comments, only 16% (n=19) 
were willing to share these types of experiences. 
RNs who were relieved at no longer keeping a secret of the error (Q4.8.5) was expressed by 
8% (n=9) distributed within all divisions except for Pediatrics and Ambulatory.  Chard (2010: 
139 -142) investigating emotional responses of nurses concluded that positive perceived 
senior staff responses, accepting error responsibility and seeking social support resulted in 
constructive changes in nursing practice, while negative perceived senior staff responses 
and error escape avoidance predicted defensive changes. Scot et al. (2009: 326-330) 
identified six phases of recovery for a second victim.   
Table 4.18 below presents the frequency of RNs’ identified need for education and training in 
error management (Q4.8.11) was identified in 21% (n=24) RNs. 
Maternal/Child Nursing Division 15% (n=7) and Paediatrics Nursing Division 14% (n=3) the 
highest nursing divisions agreement and Ambulatory nursing division with no identified need, 
n=0. Understanding and agreeing with the application of the disciplinary process (Q4.8.12) 
was expressed by 27% (n=32) RNs; Ambulatory Nursing Division 17% (n=4) and Adult 
Nursing Division 16% (n=7) as the highest agreement.   
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Table  4.18: Registered Nurses Expressions 
RN Expression with Error Outcomes 
Frequency Nurse 
Leaders (N=19) 
Frequency 
Professional Nurses 
(N=98) 
Outcome 
Total 
Good about reporting the error n=5 n=36 n=41 
Good, patient received the care needed  n=2 n=30 n=32 
Better and could receive support n=2 n=22 n=24 
Devastated that could have made this 
error  
n=6 n=13 n=19 
Relieved that no longer keeping a secret  n=2 n=7 n=9 
Supported and could work through the 
event  
n=2 n=20 n=22 
Not supported and blamed  n=5 n=7 n=12 
Bad nurse, not able to trust self with 
patient care 
n=0 n=3 n=3 
Not treated fairly n=1 n=7 n=8 
Trusted colleagues, will continue to 
report errors  
n=2 n=6 n=8 
Needed to receive education and training  n=8 n=16 n=24 
Understood and agreed with the 
disciplinary process  
n=5 n=27 n=32 
Trusted senior staff and will continue to 
report errors  
n=2 n=10 n=12 
Do not know  n=3 n=19 n=22 
Other  n=1 n=2 n=3 
 
Not knowing how nurses feel and what their needs would be (Q4.8.14) was expressed by 
20% (n=23).  This is a fair number of nurses who do not know about the numerous aspects 
explored about error reporting and error management.  Other categories (Q4.8.15) 3% (n=4) 
which were identified as not applicable.  
Question 4.9: Share your experiences with errors and comment on error management 
in the hospital (N=38) 
Received N=38 comments; 13% (n=5) nurse leaders and 87% (n=33) professional nurses. 
Professional nurses 39% (n=13) and 20% (n=1) nurse leader (from the Ambulatory Division) 
reported no experience with errors, some with reasons given as “low census in the unit 
makes it very difficult to have errors”; “no major errors happened before except that 
communication barrier that leads to misinterpretation” “Luckily I was never involved, so I do 
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not know. I did not witness any and I cannot comment on rumors.” However, this identifies in 
some aspect that RNs consider only major errors need to be reported.  
Comments from RNs, 63% (n=24) involved with errors were assigned to categories using the 
Just Culture approach of system versus individual approach of error reporting and 
management.  
Question 4.9: Error Reporting Process Category 
The error reporting process was identified and known to RNs, 88% (n=5 nurse leaders and 
n=16 professional nurses). The RNs gave both positive and negative comments about 
reporting errors with the process of error reporting was said to be clear, however feedback 
on the number, type and outcomes need to be provided to the nursing units on a quarterly 
basis. Feedback and communication about errors reported serve to acknowledge the 
importance of error reporting, link the nurse manager and direct care nurses in partnering to 
review system factors, and plan for improvements using outcomes data (Potylycki et al., 
2006: 375; Mick et al., 2007: 501, Montgomery, 2007: 15 ; Leape et al., 2009: 425).   
Question 4.9: Fear of Reporting Category 
Fear in error reporting has been  identified in numerous studies (Mayo & Duncan 2004:214; 
Chiang & Pepper, 2006:398; Scot et al., 2009: 329; Sirriyeh et al., 2010:51;  Alsafi et al., 
2011:146) and is impacted by the response of nurse leaders, managers and peers to errors 
reported. Fear of reporting is influenced by the systems of the organisation which either 
support a reporting culture through non-punitive error reporting or shame or blame 
individuals for errors made.  
RNs 33% (nurse leaders n=1, professional nurses n=7) identified fear of reporting and the 
outcomes of the errors as reasons for not reporting errors. Some of the comments were:   
• “I think reporting of errors is a healthy practice although that some of the staff still feel 
that they will be blamed and maybe it is better if they are not reporting the incident 
and covering for each other” 
• “Staff however continue to need encouragement to use the on-line system (SRS) as 
they fear they will be punished for reporting the incident will improve systems within 
the hospitals”  
• “Don`t believe that the whole error reporting system is aiming to predict errors and 
trying to improve patients care. Believe that it is only for show” 
•  “Mostly errors that get reported are errors of colleagues which are not self-reported 
cases.  Necessary support is given depending on situation or circumstances under 
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which errors occurred e.g. if errors occurred out of negligence little support is granted, 
but vice versa more support is granted” 
• “There is also lip service to a "culture of safety" of course it’s the official line the 
hospital claims, yet you hear on a daily basis "I am going to write on SRS on you".  
This is never addressed by my unit or other units from middle management and I 
have never seen upper management correct this.  There is also difficulty with cultures 
as cover ups happen between nurses of the same culture, while those same nurses 
seek out errors of nurses from other cultures. The nurse who makes mistakes are 
less likely to report errors in fear of tit for tat” 
Question 4.9: Collegial response to Error Category 
Collegial (peer) response to error has been found in studies to impact nurses’ attitudes to 
error reporting (Chiang & Pepper, 2006:398; Potylycki et al., 2006:375) how they cope with 
the error occurrence and their recovery (Mayo & Duncan, 2004:214; Leape et al., 2009: 425; 
Scot et al., 2009:327,330; Chard, 2010:139).  Peers have been identified as an important 
support available to nurses and this is confirmed in this study as well, see question 2, with 
resource staff available.  
Professional nurses 20% (n=4) identified the contribution of collegial response and 
misunderstanding in communication as contributing factors which affects errors on the 
nursing units.  
• Communication between new nurse and preceptor led to an error. Negative response 
from preceptor “I misheard when she told me just to give half of the syringe and I 
gave it all. I told her I had given it all and she was so angry and shouting at me. So 
we informed our charge nurse and the head nurse, and entered into the system. I 
signed disciplinary action and I gave an in-service for all the staff “ 
• “Also misunderstood the question if it`s not your own language add to error, no harm” 
• Responsibility to Peers/Colleagues: “If there is errors seen or witnessed go to the 
nurse concerned and verify and then follow the proper channels of authority” 
• “Then presentation for the unit demanded of nurse based on the case review. A 
humiliating and unnecessary exercise for the nurse who was mortified enough by the 
experience of having made an error in the first place. So much for non-punitive 
action!” 
Question 4.9:  Contributing Factors Category 
The contributing factors to errors are important as these identify the system or latent factors 
which may not be seen at the time of occurrence but on investigation. Thus, work 
environment factors, interdisciplinary interactions and open communication are suggested to 
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be improved to reduce risks for errors. However, nurses need to provide feedback on system 
efficiency and effectiveness through error reporting to identify system factors and prevent 
recurrence of similar errors (Mayo & Duncan, 2004: 215; Moody et al., 2006: 204). 
Professional nurses; 20% (n=4) through their examples identified other departments and 
systems contributing to nursing errors and the classification of near miss as an area for 
improvement. These included pharmacy dispensing errors, equipment availability, 
introduction of information technology system delays; and changes in procedures which 
require updated policies and procedures with one RN’s response being: “The way the 
hospital classifies near misses and errors means that the majority of errors falls on the 
nurses` shoulder, i.e. pharmacy does not put the correct amount and the nurse catches it. 
This is a near miss, but I see it as an error as two people did not do their job properly; the 
technician drawing up the medication and the pharmacist checking the medication”.   
Question 4.9:  Education Category 
Education in error reporting and management is needed as nurses need to be trained in error 
identification, reporting processes and management. Then nurses need to be open to 
discuss and learn from errors as they occur (Marx, 2001:3; Mayo & Duncan, 2004:215; 
Hobgood et al., 2005:144; Alahmadi, 2009: 20; Leape et al., 2009:425). 
One professional nurse commented on a verbal insult which led to termination of the RN as 
an error, identifying the need for education in error identification. Professional nurses, 35% 
(n=9) and nurse leaders, 50% (n=2) identified educational needs which would improve error 
reporting, management and outcomes.  
• “In-service education on errors would be beneficial to all nurses on the units, not only 
managers and nurses who are involved. Through my experience as CNC, staff 
education and reassurance in regards to the hospital reason of reporting system and 
the rules and regulations that related to the process if investigation and the 
disciplinary actions is highly required and recommended. From errors we will learn 
and patient safety is our Goal. Need to remove anonymity” 
• “All errors need investigation, clarification and identification for causes and should be 
looked into with positive solutions, education and review nursing practice and 
procedure in order to be free from errors, not only to the concerned nurse but all 
nurses in the unit” 
Question 4.9:  Investigative Processes Category 
The investigative process of errors is a system approach to errors and should include the 
multidisciplinary team especially risk managers to review contributing factors. However, this 
is impacted by the nurse manager approach to error management (Moody et al., 2006:204; 
Scot et al., 2009: 328). Nurse Managers would benefit from applying a decision tree 
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(Reason, 1997) or algorithm (Marx, 2008) to assist the investigative process and decision 
making on outcomes (Mayo & Cronin, 2008: 428). 
Professional nurses, 75% (n=15) and nurse leaders, 50% (n=2) identified the need for clarity 
in the investigative processes; with RNs advocating the use of just culture for analyzing the 
cause of the error; investigations to be completed in professional manner and not discussed 
outside the nursing unit and staff input as described by one RN “Also, there is no request 
from staff for input as to why the error occurred or how it could have been prevented.  That 
would mean we are looking at the system not just the individual”. 
Question 4.9:  Outcomes of Errors Category 
Error outcomes are feared by health care professionals as these may be linked to loss of 
professional trust in self and others, inability to overcome the error occurrence and long term 
consequences (Mayo & Duncan, 2004:216; Chard, 2010:140). Thus, organisations are urged 
to develop programs which would promote non-punitive error reporting, open communication 
in errors occurrences, support for the second victim with no abandonment and a just and fair 
approach to addressing human behaviour (Marx, 2001:3; Mayer & Cronin, 2008: 429; Leape 
et al., 2009:425; Scot et al., 2009:328). 
Professional nurses 35 % (n=9) shared the outcome of the errors in which they were 
involved, which were both positive and negative. Some of the comments were  
1. “A colleague who had a medication error was given a disciplinary first warning and 
before that discussed with Clinical Nurse Coordinator and the Head nurse” 
2. “The error reported helped the unit to find ways of preventing it from happening again 
and the management always stands with the nurses to support and encourage the 
reporting. In some cases errors are treated not fairly as some will do some errors with 
major (sentinel) outcomes for the patient`s life but not sent home and others are sent 
home having been involved in minor errors without harm being done to the patient. 
So biases and favouritism would not be excluded at the end”. 
3. “This totally changed nurse`s attitude towards reporting errors as the whole 
experience was devastating for her on top of being humiliating and undermining. The 
nurse was able to see that practice could always be improved and engaged the other 
staff in preventing similar occurrences for themselves in spite of her own humiliation 
and their knowledge of her error. She has said she will never report anything again”.    
These comments confirm question 3.1.28 and question 3.1.48 on disciplinary application 
which is not a clear process; however the confidentiality aspects of decisions may not be 
known to all professional nurses in the unit. Thus, there is a need for education on the 
processes and limitations for nurse leaders.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
 
4.2.6 Objective to explore the factors impacting on the management of nursing 
errors 
This objective was to explore the factors impacting on the management of nursing errors. 
This was accomplished with a review of the factors identified from literature and those which 
may be applicable from the cultural perspective were added to the Likert scale with three 
categories of agree, neutral and disagree. Question 3.2.1 – question 3.2.13 are summarized 
according to the categories identified above. All questions were negatively worded, thus were 
not reversed scored to obtain the average positive response. 
4.2.6.1 Error reporting and feedback  
The questions which explored factors which affect error reporting and feedback are 
presented below in table 4.19. Three factors were explored for this topic understanding the 
process for errors reporting and management, documentation required and feedback 
processes. Exclusions were only for professional nurses ranging from n=7 - n=8 who did not 
respond to these questions. The Fisher`s exact test indicated that there was no significant 
difference between the two groups of RNs’ responses.  
RNs understand the process (Q3.2.1) 72% (n=88, reversed scored) and the documents used 
(Q3.2.3) 73% (n=91, reversed scored) for error reporting and management. RNs are not 
aware of the feedback process on errors reported (Q3.2.5) or the process if not effective, 
41% (n=31) agreement. There is still room for improvement in understanding the processes 
and documents used as 28% (n=35) - 27% (n=33) of RNs disagreed or did not provide their 
responses.   
Table  4.19: Error Reporting Factors 
Likert Scale  
Question 3.2.1=I do 
not understand the 
process for error 
reporting and 
management (N=123) 
Question  3.2.3=I 
do not know 
where to find the 
documents for 
error reporting 
and management 
(N=124) 
Question  3.2.5= 
Feedback about error/s 
being reported is not 
given to staff (N=123) 
Agree n=8 n=13 n=31 
Neutral  n=27 n=20 n=41 
Disagree  n=88 n=91 n=51 
Average Positive 
Response  72% 73% 41% 
 
Nurse leaders had identical scores for question 3.2.1 and question 3.2.3 reported a high 
neutral response for nurse leaders 84% (n=16) and no disagreement as reversed scored. 
Professional nurses 8% (n=8) in agreement (Q3.2.1) and 12% (n=13) for question 3.2.3 
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which identify a minimal number of RNs who do not understand the error reporting and 
management process and know where documents can be found.  
4.2.6.2 Error management  
Questions which explored factors which affect error management are summarized in table 
4.20 below. Factors explored included the effect of knowing the outcomes of error 
investigation, the time for investigation, understanding the disciplinary process applicable 
and the role of the nurse manager. There was no significant difference between the two 
groups of RNs based on Fisher`s exact completed. Exclusions were only for professional 
nurses n=7 for all questions as they did not respond to these questions. 
RNs’ response to question 3.2.2 (The delay in knowing the result of an error investigation 
leads to anxiety) had 74% (n=92) agreement, with 21% (n=26) remained neutral and 5% 
(n=6) disagreed and thus considered the length of waiting time not to increase anxiety levels. 
Both professional nurses 76% (n=80) and nurse leaders 63% (n=12) scored high for 
agreement. 
Table  4.20: Factors affecting Error Management 
Likert  
Scale  
Q 3.2.2=The delay 
in knowing the 
result of an error 
investigation 
leads to anxiety 
(N=124) 
Q 3.2.4 = The 
time taken to 
investigate an 
error is too long 
(N=124) 
Q 3.2.8 =I do not 
understand how a 
nurse received 
disciplinary action 
for an error made 
(N=124) 
Q3.2.9 = 
Disciplinary action 
for an error is given 
based on whether 
the manager likes 
me or not (N=124) 
Agree n=92 n=39 n=15 n=16 
Neutral  n=26 n=61 n=44 n=34 
Disagree  n=6 n=24 n=65 n=74 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
74% 19% 52% 60% 
 
RNs response to question 3.2.4 (The time taken to investigate an error is too long, reversed 
scored) had 19% (n=39) agreement, with a high neutral response 49% (n= 61) and 
disagreement 31% (n=39). Nurse leaders’ responses were in agreement 42% (n=8); 
disagree 37% (n=7) and neutral 21% which is an ambivalent response. Professional nurses’ 
responses were agree 16% (n=20), a high neutral 50% (n=53) and disagree 30% (n=32).   
Question 3.2.8 (I do not understand how a nurse received disciplinary action for an error 
made) average positive response 52% (n=65), with 44% neutral (n=44) and disagreement 
12% (n=15). Thus, only half of RNs understand the disciplinary process, with 37% (n=39) - 
68% (n=13) of RNs choosing to remain neutral from both groups of RNs. Question 3.2.9 
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(Disciplinary action for an error is given based on whether the manager likes me or not) 
average positive response of 60%, disagreement 15% (n=16) - 32% (n=6), and  27% (n=28) 
- 68% (n=13) neutral for both groups of RNs.  This confirms that 58% (n=61) of professional 
nurses feel that individual performance is a basis for discipline as opposed to the advocated 
just culture approach to guide the application of discipline (Marx, 2001:5).  
4.2.6.3 Education factors  
The factors explored which may impact nursing errors and identify educational gaps are 
summarized below in table 4.21. The factors explored were technology competence, 
language barriers and cultural restrictions.  There was no significant difference between the 
two groups of RNs based on Fisher exact test completed. Exclusions were professional 
nurses n=7 for all questions and n=1 for nurse leaders as they did not respond to these 
questions.  
Table  4.21: Educational Factors 
Likert 
Scale 
 
Question 3.2.7 = I do 
not know how to use 
a computer and this 
makes me unwilling 
to report errors 
(N=124) 
Question 3.2.10 = The 
language barrier with the 
patients makes it difficult 
to disclose and apologize 
for errors (N=124) 
Question 3.2.11 = I do 
not understand the 
cultural restrictions 
which apply to the 
patients in my unit 
(N=123) 
Agree n=5 n=48 n=9 
Neutral n=18 n=42 n=28 
Disagree n=101 n=34 n=86 
Average 
Positive 
Response 
81% 27% 70% 
 
RNs’ average positive response for question 3.2.7 (I do not know how to use a computer and 
this makes me unwilling to report errors); 81% (n=101, reversed scored) agreed that have 
computer skills but 19% (n=23) RNs identify the need to develop these skills.  
RNs’ average positive response for question 3.2.10 (The language barrier with the patients 
makes it difficult to disclose and apologize for errors) 27% (n=34) agreement; 34% (n=42) 
neutral response and 39% (n= 48) in disagreement. An average number of RNs identified 
language as a barrier, however there was a high neutral response which indicates either not 
known or did not want to disclose information.  
RNs’ average positive response for question 3.2.11 (I do not understand the cultural 
restrictions which apply to the patients in my unit) 70% (n=86); neutral response 23% (n=28) 
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and agreement was 7% (n=9). Thus, a minimal number of RNs have identified a need for 
education on the cultural restrictions which apply to patients.  
4.2.6.4 Work environment 
Factors explored for the unit work environment factors which may impact nursing errors are 
presented below in table 4.22. The factors explored were unit dynamics which make it easy 
to make errors and the increased risk of errors with the number of overtime shifts worked. 
There was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs based on the Fisher 
exact test completed.  Exclusions were professional nurses n=7 for all questions as they did 
not respond to these questions.  
Table  4.2: Work Environment Factors 
Likert 
Scale 
Question 3.2.12 = 
My unit is very busy and this 
makes it easy to make errors 
(N=124) 
Question 3.2.13 = 
The nursing staff work many 
overtime shifts and this makes it 
easy to make errors (N=124) 
Agree n=27 n=36 
Neutral n=41 n=42 
Disagree n=56 n=46 
Average Positive 
Response  
45% 37% 
The average RN positive response question 3.2.12 (My unit is very busy and this makes it 
easy to make errors) 45% (n=27), with 33% (n= 41) neutral and 22% (n= 27) in 
disagreement. The RNs’ response continued to have a high neutral response, however 
almost half of RNs identified the need to review tasks on the nursing units to assess the work 
environment to decrease error risks. The average RN positive response for question 3.2.13 
(The nursing staff work many overtime shifts and this makes it easy to make errors) 37% 
(n=46), 34% (n=42) neutral and disagreement 29% (n=36).  More than one third of RNs 
identified the increased risk to make errors due to overtime shifts; however the neutral results 
continue to be high.  
4.2.6.5 Correlation of factors  
Regression analysis was completed to review for any correlation of factors with the RNs’ 
responses to the questions of section 3.1 and section 3.2. Table 4.23 below presents a 
summary of results which are presented in the discussions above as they are applicable to 
different questions.  
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Table  4.23: Summary of Regression Analysis Significant Results 
Predictor Coefficient SE Coefficient T P 
Q1.3.3 
(Middle Eastern Nationality) 
-0.3210 0.1574 -2.04 0.044 
Q1.7.1  
(Adult Nursing Division) 
-0.2788 0.1309 -2.13 0.036 
S = 0.315589   R-Sq = 37.9%   R-Sq (adj.) = 17.5% 
Q2.4.8 -0.27082 0.09638 -2.81 0.006 
Q2.6.9 0.4122 0.1909 2.16 0.033 
S = 0.343932   R-Sq = 31.1%   R-Sq (adj.) = 12.5% 
Q3.2.1. 0.07607 0.02155 3.53 0.001 
Q3.2.3 0.04574 0.02029 2.25 0.026 
Q3.2.5 0.06631 0.01429 4.64 0.000 
Q3.2.9 0.05030 0.01603 3.14 0.002 
Q3.2.10. 0.03329 0.01459 2.28 0.025 
S = 0.226243   R-Sq = 64.8%   R-Sq (adj.) = 60.5% 
4.3.7 -0.5486 0.2351 -2.33 0.024 
4.7.10 0.5499 0.2326 2.36 0.022 
S = 0.284038   R-Sq = 70.1%   R-Sq (adj.) = 29.6% 
 
Table 4.23 presents a summary of the significant regression analysis results  
Section 1: The results suggest that an average positive response correlated with Middle 
Eastern nationality; p=0.044 and the Adult Nursing Division; p=0.036. This indicates that 
these respondents were on average slightly more negative in their response than the other 
respondents. 
Section 2: The above analysis shows that there is a very weak correlation with the average 
positive response identified in section 3.1 and section 2. Significantly negatively associated 
was “Error of omission” (Q2.4.8) as type of error that has occurred. Furthermore, positively 
associated with the average positive response was the resource staff available: Chief of 
Nursing (Q 2.6.9). 
Section 3.2: The “average positive response” of the individual respondents was used in 
linear regression as the response variable and the respondents’ answers on section 3.2 as 
prediction variables. The above results imply that Q3.2.1, Q3.2.3, Q3.2.5, Q3.2.9, Q3.2.10, 
and Q3.2.13, are significantly related with the average positive response. This suggests that 
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a positive score on patient safety is associated with understanding the process for error 
reporting and management (Q3.2.1 & Q3.2.3), receiving feedback about errors made 
question three ;two and five  an objective error management by the manager (Q3.2.9), and 
negatively associated with a language barrier (Q3.2.10) and working overtime shifts 
(Q3.2.13). 
Section 4: As in section 2, the average positive response is negatively associated with the 
error of omission (Q4.3.7) in which the respondents were involved. Furthermore, a significant 
positive relation is found between the average positive response and the outcome of an error 
to be disciplined by the manager (Q 4.7.10). 
4.3 SUMMARY   
This chapter has presented the results obtained through a questionnaire administered to 
RNs, i.e. professional nurses and nurse leaders. The data results were sufficient to provide 
the responses of registered nurses errors, managed in a tertiary hospital in Saudi Arabia and 
was successful in addressing the four goals set for the study and the research question.    
Chapter five will complete a discussion of the results, the application of the results in 
achieving the aims and objectives of the study and recommendations based on the findings.   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS   
5.1 INTRODUCTION    
The  previous chapters presented the research results and discussed the analysis and 
interpretation thereof. This chapter will present a summary of the study findings through a 
discussion of the objectives;  discuss the limitations, present recommendations and conclude 
the study.  
5.2 DISCUSSION  
Chapter one presented the objectives of the study which were:  
1. Identify the nursing related errors occurring  
2. Determine the current process of reporting nursing errors  
3. Describe the management of nursing errors  
4. Explore the factors impacting on the management of nursing errors  
These four objectives will be discussed in detail using the results of the study to determine 
conclusions and recommendations for future studies.  
5.2.1 Objective one was to identify the nursing related errors occurring within the 
organisation  
The approach of healthcare towards errors has changed since the publications of the IOM 
report (Kohn et al., 2000); numerous initiatives promoting awareness and prevention; 
reporting and management of errors that have been implemented. To gain an understanding 
of the changes in healthcare, it was important to identify the scope of nursing errors which 
occur within King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre (General Organisation) – 
Jeddah (KFSH&RC-J).  
5.2.1.1 Harm score classification  
KFSH&RC-J classified errors according to the Pennsylvania University Harm Score (2004) 
presented in chapter four. The majority of RNs (84%) identified experience with nursing 
errors as seen in table 4.3. These errors were all levels of harm score classifications, 
experienced in all divisions of nursing; experienced by RNs with various nursing years of 
experience and by both groups of RNs, i.e. professional nurses and nurse leaders.  
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Table 4.4 demonstrates that there was a significant difference between the nurse leaders 
and professional nurses’ classification of errors according to the harm score; p=0.03 (Fisher 
exact test). The results demonstrate that the two groups of RNs either report different errors 
or classify the same errors differently. The most severe error outcomes, i.e. classification 6: 
error, death occurred in the Critical Care Division of Nursing and was reported by 
experienced professional nurses, with post basic nursing qualifications.  
The inability to define errors by classification and identify when nursing errors need to be 
reported is supported by studies as one of the difficult challenges of error reporting, as 
discussed in chapter one (Marx, 2001: 3; PSA, 2008; Chard, 2010:140). 
Classification 1: No Error includes the concept of near misses or “almost events” which are 
not errors but are reported for feedback on the effectiveness of risk management and 
improvement to systems (PSA, 2004). However, figure 4.1 indicates that the majority of RNs 
(76%) identify a near miss as an error, which is incorrect according to the harm score; but 
correctly agree that a near miss needs to be reported (85%). The lack of knowledge for near 
miss management was across both groups of RNs, and identifies an educational need for 
both groups of RNs.  
5.2.1.2 Examples of types of errors reported  
Benner et al. (2002: 509-520) classified a taxonomy of errors to gain an understanding of the 
errors which had occurred, which ranged in eight categories and were classified as serious.  
RNs reported various examples of errors (N=200) in the nursing units, as seen in table 4.5, 
with professional nurses identifying medication errors and nurse leaders’ incorrect 
identification as the most frequently occurring errors. Professional nurses identified more 
errors reported than nurse leaders which may be a gap in reporting errors to nurse leaders. 
Saudi Arabia has a very diverse nursing workforce as seen in table 3.1: Professional Nurses 
(Staff Nurse 1 & 2) Sampling Frame, March 2001, chapter three. Cultural errors were added 
in order to explore if any errors of this nature had been experienced by RNs. Cultural errors 
were identified by professional nurses which were minimal (7%) but does not exclude this as 
an area for education for these nurses. Communication errors would also be important for 
these RNs as table 4.2 identified that the majority of RNs spoke a first language other than 
English or Arabic which were the official languages for the employees and patients. 
Professional nurses identified 15% communication errors; however, there was no significant 
difference between language and error reporting on regression analysis.  
Errors in the “other “category included n=9 RNs with no experience with errors; and 
additional examples of errors reported. The different error examples provided were severe 
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and seemed to include multiple factors, which were not easily identified by RNs to belong to 
classifications provided, e.g. baby roomed in with wrong mother is an identification error.  
This supports the need for education to gain competence to classify and identify errors.  
The Adult Nursing Division reported the most errors (32%) followed by the Critical Care 
Division (23%) with the Ambulatory Division reporting the least errors (7%). The Adult 
Division was found to be the most negative in responses to error reporting and management, 
which may be due to the increased number of errors reported.  
5.2.1.3 Resource staff  
Mayer and Cronin (2008:428) state that “a true culture of safety can only be achieved 
through the larger organisational (leadership) commitment to communicate and demonstrate 
the desire to have a safety culture by simultaneously nurturing and perpetuating cultures that 
value learning, reporting and fairness”.  Thus, RNs’ perception of the availability of resource 
staff was explored to gain an understanding of support provided at the point of care with 
challenges in error reporting and management.  
Table 4.6 presents the results of resource staff identified as available to professional nurses 
and nurse leaders in the clinical setting as they report errors which have occurred in their 
nursing units. The results show a highly significant difference between the two groups of RNs 
in their identification of peers and direct supervisors as being available to them; p<0.0001 
(Chi-square test).  
Thus, for professional nurses the roles of charge nurses (82%), unit colleagues (75%); 
clinical nurse coordinator (62%) and the nurse manager (61%) are important resources to 
encourage a practice of error identification, reporting and management at the point of care. In 
contrast, the nurse leaders identified direct supervisor (74%) and the nursing quality 
department (63%) and colleagues on another unit (53%) who may be their peers as being 
their resources available.  
Nurse leaders identified one resource department, nursing quality as important to the 
process of error reporting which is important in changing the work environment, allocation of 
resources to be available to liaise for error reporting, experts available for clarification of 
processes and offer guidance in error management.  
An important finding on regression analysis ( p=0.03) was that of the Chief of Nursing, the 
highest level of nursing accountability in the organisation was identified as a resource by 
both groups of RNs which were positively associated with the average positive response. 
This confirms the findings of studies which indentified the influence of organisational 
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leadership to be key to changing the culture of safety in the organisation. Mayer and Cronin 
(2008:429) state “the greatest responsibility and therefore accountability for a just culture 
resides with the organisational leaders, thus a just culture can only exist if these leaders 
understand the value thereof”. 
Objective one of the study which was to identify the nursing related errors occurring within 
the organisation was accomplished and identified the strengths and weaknesses which can 
be used to recommend changes in error reporting. In summary, RNs were able to identify 
errors which had been reported and classified in their nursing units. However, there is a need 
for education on identification of errors, near misses and classification of errors. Nurse 
leaders and professional nurses classify errors differently, so need to develop an education 
program which assists both leaders and bed side nurses to effectively apply the same 
classifications.  
A weakness identified is an under reporting of errors, which may be attributed to RNs’ fear of 
being blamed for the outcomes and nurse leaders not being aware of all errors.  This is 
confirmed in results of objective two, table 4.7: Rationale for error reporting.  
5.2.2 Objective two of the study was to determine the current process of reporting 
nursing errors in the organisation  
Error reporting has been introduced by many organisations as a risk assessment tool to 
decrease potential risks and as a result of healthcare errors. Marx (2001:3) states that for 
data to be used to analyse the outcomes of errors, there needs to be a willingness to report 
these events; however few healthcare providers are willing to provide this feedback on 
organisational systems when faced with blame, disciplinary and legal actions.  
It was confirmed on review completed by the researcher with the Quality Management 
Department (QMD) responsible for risk management that KFSH&RC-J has a defined process 
for error reporting utilizing a computerised system, i.e. a Safety Reporting System (SRS).  
5.2.2.1 Error reporting  
Error reporting can be mandatory or voluntary; however healthcare organisations continue to 
be challenged with under reporting of errors due to the management and outcomes of the 
errors reported (Marx, 2001:4; Wilson et al., 2008:364; Alahmadi, 2010:20-21; Almutary & 
Lewis, 2012:125). Table 4.7: Rationale for error reporting shows the majority of RNs (87.6%) 
were able to identify when an error had occurred and needed to be reported which strength 
of the reporting process was being well established and known by both professional nurses 
and nurse leaders.  
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However, a weakness is the implementation and adherence to the process of error reporting, 
with an equal number of RNs agreeing and disagreeing (50%) to always reporting errors 
when they occur.  The reporting of errors is in question as figure 4.2 which shows the 
majority of RNs (53%) who do not think that all the errors which occurred in their units were 
reported. The reasons for not reporting was identified as shame and blame culture, fear of 
the error outcome and the reaction of colleagues (team). This supports the research problem 
which states that RNs will not report errors as they occur due to the individualistic approach 
of management of the errors.  
The majority of RNs recognized the benefits of error reporting to reduce risks in the 
workplace (89.9%), benefits the patient and their families (79.7%) and the reporting process 
was easy to apply (76.6%) as seen in table 4.7: Rationale for error reporting. However, 
although RNs agree with these benefits, adhering to the process and reporting errors as they 
occur have barriers which prevent compliance as discussed above.   
5.2.2.2 The role of nurse leaders 
Denham (2007:117) and the American Nurses Credentialing Centre, Magnet Recognition 
Program (2008) recognize nurse managers as transformational leaders who are visible, 
accessible and advocate on behalf of the nurses at the bedside for safety in the work 
environment. Various aspects identified from this group of RNs’ responses identified the 
need for a review of leadership development in various aspects of their job functions. There 
are gaps in the knowledge of nurse leaders and the expectations of the role of nurse 
managers which is seen in that the nurse leader group have results which indicate 
knowledge to be transformational leaders in error reporting and patient safety need to be 
addressed for performance of job function.  
The nurse leaders face a bigger challenge in this concept as there were nurse leaders who 
were not able to identify whether errors were reported or not (26.3%) as seen summarized in 
table 4.7: Rationale for error reporting. The role of the nurse leaders in error reporting and 
management has been identified in studies to be important to improving the work 
environment and how errors are viewed (Mayer & Cronin, 2007: 428; Scott et al., 2009: 330; 
Piper, 2012: 32). 
5.2.2.3 Feedback and communication  
Marx (2001:25) advocates that organisation leaders assess the disciplinary policies as to 
whether they are “supportive or detrimental to system safety effectors, with a need to 
balance the interests of communication with those of deterrence”. The process of feedback 
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and communication to the nursing units identified weaknesses in the error reporting and 
management process of the organisation.  
Table 4.8: Feedback and communication demonstrates that only half of RNs (52%.8) are 
informed of the number of errors which occur in their units, however error feedback is 
discussed in the unit with the goal of improving the environment for patients and staff (74%). 
There are no clear expectations of the use of the error feedback which needs to be defined in 
the process. Mayer and Cronin (2008: 429) are of the opinion that “competing priorities and 
vague performance expectations can contribute to at risk behaviour”.  
The use of error reports is not viewed in a positive manner, as the majority of RNs feel that 
these reports are kept in their confidential files during the investigative process (51.6%) and 
on a permanent basis (57.5%). This is interpreted as evidence to be used to shame and 
blame RNs for the error made and this affects performance. However, more than half of 
nurse leaders agreed to this practice of keeping error reports in nurses’ confidential files, 
which is in agreement with an individual approach, while the majority of professional nurses 
disagreed with this practice, see table 4.8: Feedback and communication. 
There were significant differences between professional nurses and nurse leaders in these 
responses; p=0.022 (Fisher`s exact test). Thus, this may be interpreted as falsely positive for 
professional nurses or not feeling safe reporting their honest perception with these questions. 
The divergence of responses identifies a need to review the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the error reporting system and reporting process as there is a lack of clarity for expectations 
on feedback and communication of errors.  
Objective two:  of the study which was to determine the current process of reporting nursing 
errors in the organisation was accomplished and identified the strengths and weaknesses 
which can be used to recommend changes in error reporting and the feedback processes.  
5.2.3 Objective three of the study was to describe the management of nursing errors  
This objective was approached through the exploration of the various categories advocated 
by the Just Culture approach (Marx, 2001) and supported by Reason`s (2000) approach of 
individual versus system error management. The results will be discussed according to the 
following categories:   
5.2.3.1 The Non-Punitive Approach  
5.2.3.2 Organisational Systems and Processes  
5.2.3.3 Work Environment Factors  
5.2.3.4 Educational Preparation 
5.2.3.5 Patient and Nurse Disclosure of Errors  
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5.2.3.6 Patient and Nurse Error Outcomes  
5.2.3.1 Non-punitive approach  
Marx (2001: 4) states that “a punitive work environment which views healthcare provider’s 
errors as carelessness results in most organisations not being aware of the extent of their 
errors. This approach causes healthcare providers to only report what cannot be concealed 
i.e. severe errors. Thus a non-punitive work environment is the elimination of punitive error 
reporting systems which make it safe for employees to report errors as they occur “.  
Table 4.9 presents the rationale for the non-punitive approach to error reporting and 
management, which demonstrates that RNs’ results exploring the non-punitive approach of 
the organisation were scored very low, 31%-51%. This result identifies the need to introduce 
the concept of non-punitive and just culture principles within the organisation.  
The majority of RNs (50.8%) reported being aware of a no blame policy which makes error 
reporting easier, however there is no policy in the organisation confirmed on review with the 
Quality Management Department. What is available is the concept of error reporting not 
being punished.  
The higher respondents were professional nurses (53%) in agreement, while an equal 
distribution of nurse leaders agreed and disagreed. This identifies the need for clarification of 
the application of non-punitive and/or no blame and the application in addressing RN 
performance or behaviour when discipline is needed. The concept of “blame free” in which 
any conduct reported would be accepted with no retribution is not acceptable in healthcare, 
but there is a need to balance learning from errors with the need to apply disciplinary 
measures (Marx, 2001: 3).  
The majority of RNs (58% - 67%) identified that there is no definition of non-punitive which 
can be interpreted by RNs as no-one knowing about the error, applicable only to the 
reporting of the error and not the investigative process. There was a significant difference 
between nurse leaders and professional nurses’ perceptions that non-punitive is clearly 
defined and no one will know of the error demonstrated a higher agreement response for 
nurse leaders, which is in contrast to what is advocated for error management, p= 0.035 ( 
Fisher’s exact test).  
Errors when they occur are used as learning experiences to prevent future occurrences. This 
identifies a weakness of the error reporting process but may also indicate a conflict in the 
nurse leader’s role of how much is shared of the error process, i.e. the experience to be 
shared but the outcomes for the RN are kept confidential.  
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The low response of the non-punitive approach supports the research problem that 50% of 
RNs fear reporting errors as they may be blamed for the outcomes of the errors. This was 
supported by the high number (70%) of both groups of RNs who felt that errors are held 
against the nurse who makes the error or did not share their opinions. When viewed with the 
high positive response on documentation kept in files in the feedback responses, this is a 
weakness in the work environment. Trust and transparency is not seen in this work 
environment and this may continue to perpetrate the behaviour of not reporting errors above 
as RNs fear the outcomes (Denham, 2007:116) 
A strength identified was the majority (68%) of RNs reported being supported during the error 
reporting and management process. Reporting structures of the Nursing Affairs Department, 
implementation of the shared decision-making structures (shared governance) and 
professional development for nurse leaders to become more transformational through the 
Magnet Recognition Program (ANCC, 2008) may be responsible for these results.  
However, 30% of RNs in all nursing divisions except for Ambulatory and Paediatrics affirmed 
being blamed and not supported when an error was made by a nurse and not treated fairly 
during the error management process. The RNs of Saudi nationality felt least supported, 
blamed for errors and not treated fairly followed by RNs of Middle Eastern nationality, see 
figure 4.4. This may be due to being more secure in the work environment, new graduates, 
experience, but there was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs based on 
the Fisher`s exact test completed. 
There was a significant difference between nurse leaders and professional nurses’ 
perceptions on RNs questioning practice when something does not seem right, p=0.04 
(Fisher’s exact test). Half of the professional nurses (56%) felt that they were able to 
advocate in this manner on behalf of the patient; however nurse leaders’ (74%) responses 
identify this as a lack in the RNs role in clinical practice.  
Factors which may be a part of this significance may be the diverse workforce, different 
countries of nursing education which all need to be assessed on hire; cultural approaches in 
dealing with challenging or potential conflict situations; fear of outcomes when challenging 
more senior staff/ multidisciplinary team, gender biases in Saudi Arabia which has a 
paternalistic approach; performance linked to continued employment based on an annual 
contract and to explore the understanding of autonomy in clinical practice for RNs in the 
nursing units as this may be one of the differences in critical thinking (Van Rooyen et al., 
2010: 5-7). There is neither a nursing practice act nor professional association which would 
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safeguard the rights of the RNs who would be the “second victim” as defined by Wu (2000: 
358).  
5.2.3.2 Organisational systems and processes  
Mayer and Cronin (2008: 427) describe an organisational system as “an aggregation of 
elements which may be human and/or machine which are organized to accomplish system 
goals and objectives”. Healthcare organisations have recognized the need to improve patient 
safety and to incorporate the concepts of a culture of safety into the strategic initiatives 
(Mayer & Cronin, 2008: 428).   
Table 4.10: Rationale for organisation systems and processes demonstrates a range of 
results which were both positive and negative. The strengths of the organisational systems 
and processes were identified by the majority of RNs (70.3%) as an effective process for 
error reporting and management which is unilaterally applied throughout the organisation 
(88.3%) for reporting of errors; organisational initiatives to prevent errors (76.2%) and a 
defined process of how disciplinary measures are applied when nursing errors occur (63%); 
identified by both professional nurses and nurse leaders.  
However, a substantial number of nurse leaders (43%) did not understand the application of 
disciplinary measures for nursing errors which is a challenging aspect for managing RN 
performance. The majority of RNs (54%) were of the opinion that nurses were treated 
differently from other healthcare providers, which supports the research question of fear of 
being shamed and blamed for errors preventing nurses reporting of errors. Nurses are 
identified as being the “safety nets of the organisation or the last defence for the patients”, 
with increased risks for errors to occur than other healthcare providers (Rogers et al., 
2008:118). Thus, with the increased exposure and opportunity for errors, this may be the 
perceptions of nurses. However, based on comments provided in question 4.9, RNs have 
identified that other departments contribute to the errors but nurses are held accountable as 
they identify / catch the errors.  
This was supported by the ambivalent responses of differentiating between a system or 
individual approach to error management, which showed that less than half of RNs (48.8%) 
were able to identify a system approach and an individual approach (40.5%) during error 
investigations. However,  more than half of the RNs (60.6%) reported being aware of the 
investigative processes for error reporting and management, which was seen to be in doubt 
as almost half of RNs (58.7%) were not aware of the role of a multidisciplinary team in the 
investigation of errors.  
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Thus, the weakness of the systems and processes of the organisation are knowledge and 
application of the investigative processes, the implementation of an approach of a system 
with a balance to address nurse performance as needed.  
5.2.3.3 Work environment factors 
Marx (2001:3) states that “it is through the lessons of our everyday errors that we can re-
design our work environment to be less error prone and more error tolerant”. The work 
environment can contribute positively or negatively to RNs reporting and management of 
errors on the nursing unit as seen in table 4.11. The strengths of the work environment were 
identified as nurses who make errors first meet with the manager to discuss the 
circumstances leading to the error (77.6%). This confirms that in the majority of cases an 
investigation into the error occurs and nurses are not blamed without a review of contributing 
factors.  
The majority of RNs (68.5%) are encouraged by unit colleagues to report errors and support 
is received by senior nursing staff in the unit when nurses do report errors (67.2%). These 
factors confirm that nursing units have a supportive environment in the reporting phase of 
errors and objective one outcome of resources staff available in the nursing units. However, 
there may be nursing units which need improvement in these measures of colleague and 
senior staff support, as a substantial number of RNs disagreed or did not share perceptions.  
The weaknesses identified in the work environment were an increased risk for errors with the 
majority of RNs (77%) identifying that the nursing units need improvements in decreasing 
risks for errors, with nurse leaders (63%) providing results with a higher response in this 
need, compared to professional nurses (44%). This is an important outcome for the 
organisational assessment of a culture of safety. Risk management is the accountability of 
the leaders and thus the need to include nurses’ feedback in the assessment of 
organisational systems and processes. Respondents identified under reporting of errors, 
non-punitive response to errors, staffing and teamwork across hospital units were potential 
areas for improvement (Alahmadi, 2010: 20-21). 
Teamwork across hospital units was identified as one area for improvements in safety culture 
review of hospitals in Saudi Arabia (Alahmadi, 2010: 20-21) This is important to the work 
environment as less than half of RNs (43%) feel free to report the negative behaviour of their 
nursing colleagues. The results show that though peers will encourage the reporting of 
errors, they will not hold each other accountable for practice.  
Therefore, peer review which is an important aspect of reinforcement of best practices and 
identifying areas for improvement is viewed in a negative light. RNs are not willing to take on 
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accountability for peer performance and thus do not recognize the need for improvement in 
practice and care delivery is dependent on a team and not an individual approach.  
Marx (2001:25) explains that the willingness to report errors made by peers is the second 
step in a move towards a reporting culture, even with the risk of being ostracized.  
This view was confirmed by one RN`s comment “There is also lip service to a "culture of 
safety" of course it’s the official line the hospital claims, yet you hear on a daily basis "I am 
going to write on SRS on you".  This is never addressed by my unit or other units from middle 
management and I have never seen upper management correct this. There is also difficulty 
with cultures as cover ups happen between nurses of the same culture, while those same 
nurses seek out errors of nurses from other cultures. The nurse who makes mistakes is less 
likely to report errors in fear of tit for tat”. 
There was a significant difference between professional nurses and nurse leaders to be 
willing to report negative behaviour of colleagues with majority of nurse leaders in 
agreement, while majority of professional nurses were in disagreement, p=0.049 (Fisher`s 
exact test). This may be due to the job functions and responsibilities of these two groups of 
RNs. Nurse leaders will not be reporting a peer but a subordinate when he/she reports an 
error in the nursing unit as colleagues who are peers are outside of the nursing units for 
which they are responsible. Professional nurses will continue to work with the RN colleague 
who was reported which increases the risk of negative feedback in the nursing unit especially 
if reporting errors which peers may not have reported (Marx, 2001: 25). 
Another work environment factor is providing support to patients and the families when an 
error is made by a nurse.  However, there has been a change in the approach from shame 
and blame of healthcare providers to identifying the patient as the first victim and the nurse 
who made the error as the “second victim”, who also needs support in the management of 
the error (Wu, 2000:726).  
RNs’ results show that it is not easy to support the nurse and the patient when an error is 
made; identified as a challenge for nurse leaders and professional nurses with a very low 
positive result (27%). The ability to provide support to both the patient and the nurses was 
identified as lacking and the high a neutral response (42%) may indicate that this concept is 
not known to some of the respondents.  
Skills and ability of the nurse leaders need to provide this additional support. Who supports 
nurse leaders who may also be disciplined? Scott et al. (2009: 330) concluded that 
“participants identified the type of peer and institutional support they received and desired 
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and believed that nurse managers and peers can be trained to provide immediate and 
targeted support. However there is a need for an institutional surveillance and support 
strategies for second victims”. 
5.2.3.4 Education preparation   
Marx (2001:25-26) identifies the need to introduce a culture of learning as part of the just 
culture approach of an organisation, where errors when they occur are used to evaluate the 
systems with the aim of decreasing risks and repeat occurrences. Education and training in 
error reporting and management are important in informing healthcare providers of the aim of 
the systems and processes of the organisation (Marx, 2001:4).   
RNs results as seen in table 4.12: Rationale for education preparation demonstrates a high 
positive response for four of the five questions which explored RNs responses on education. 
The results show that RNs generally recognize the need for and have received education 
with regard to the concepts of error classification, error reporting and management, the 
difference between an error and negligence and errors when they occur are used as learning 
opportunities to prevent future occurrences of errors.   
Error classification as a responsibility of the nursing quality staff members received an 
average response from RNs (53.95%). This demonstrated that though RNs acknowledged 
their need to be able to classify errors, they are also aware of assistance which can be 
provided by experts, i.e. nursing staff assigned to the nursing quality coordinator roles.  
However, this may also add to confusion as to whose responsibility is it to classify errors 
when they occur, which reinforces the need for a multi-disciplinary review of errors when they 
occur to gain the perspective from all involved departments.    
Though a high number of RNs (73%) agreed with receiving education on the error reporting 
and management, there is still a lack for a substantial number of RNs (27%) who need to be 
aware of the processes applicable.  
The ability to differentiate between an error and negligence was scored high by the majority 
of RNs (72%), however when contrasted to having received education on error reporting and 
management the nurse leaders (47%) identified an inability to complete this function. Thus 
the classification of errors with this distinction is a gap in the education program. 
There was a significant difference between professional nurses and nurse leaders in being 
able to identify the difference between an error and negligence, p=0.03 (Fisher`s exact test). 
Professional nurses considered this distinction an easy task, while nurse leaders disagreed 
with this assessment. Thus, the nurse leader who will be involved in the process of defining 
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this with the multidisciplinary investigation process of an error may have the more honest 
perception of this need.  
Negligence is defined as “the failure to exercise the skill, care and learning expected of a 
reasonably prudent healthcare provider” (Marx, 2001:6). This is an important distinction when 
disciplinary measures are applied for error management, thus an important area for nurse 
leader educational plan. 
Errors when they occur are used as learning opportunities to prevent repeated occurrences 
which were rated high by the majority of RNs (83%). However though nurse leaders 
perceived this to be the approach on the nursing units, 19% of professional nurses did not 
experience this approach. This approach to learning from errors is advocated to decrease 
the shame and blame view and to increase compliance of error reporting (reporting culture) 
and build a learning culture (Marx, 2001:25-26; Mayer & Cronin, 2008: 430).   
5.2.3.5 Patient and nurse disclosure of errors 
Disclosure in errors has become an important component of the error reporting and 
management process which is influenced by multiple factors such as information technology 
readily available, a well-informed patient population, patient rights, accreditation and 
monitoring bodies, compliance standards and legal ramifications of outcomes (Marx, 2001:3; 
Mayer & Cronin: 2008: 428) 
Table 4.13 presents the results of RNs responses on error disclosure which demonstrate a 
weakness in the approach to error management as there are no defined disclosure practices 
for the organisation. The results show that RNs (23%) considered informing patient and 
families about errors was not the practice of nurses, rated the lowest in disclosure practices.  
Nurse leaders were ambivalent in their responses which may have been a reluctance to 
share sensitive information of the organisation or not being aware of a defined process. 
Groups of RNs also considered the responsibility of disclosing errors to a patient and families 
the responsibility of the physician; majority of RNs positive response (53%) with a higher 
response from nurse leaders. 
This shows that RNs may not be aware of disclosure to patients if this is a responsibility of 
the medical team; however some of the RNs viewed disclosure of errors as a combined 
responsibility with the physicians. As errors normally are due to multiple factors, the 
approach of the team (nurse and physician) would be the approach to pursue in disclosure 
practices. 
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Nurses apologize to the patient and family for errors as they fear the consequences, saw the 
majority of RNs (43%)  not providing their perceptions; with 34.9% RNs in agreement, with 
majority of nurse leaders in agreement with this practice; while the majority of professional 
nurses remained neutral. These results show that RNs may fear outcomes, but as most RNs 
were not willing to share these perceptions one can draw adequate conclusions.  
Education in disclosure practices or the ability to disclose errors to patients, which includes 
taking accountability for actions and apologizing to the patient was seen to be lacking; the 
majority of RNs (64%) in disagreement or did not know. This could be a challenge with the 
language barrier and the use of interpreter in the work environment setting.  
The nurse who made the error discusses the outcome with colleagues saw the majority of 
RNs (65%) in disagreement or did not know of this practice.  The result is in contrast to the 
perceptions of RNs discussed above with high consensus to using errors as learning 
experiences. Thus the conclusions drawn are that there may be limitations to disclosure of 
confidential information for the RN who made the error, performance issues and disciplinary 
outcomes or due to the errors not occurring in isolation the unit may be aware of occurrence 
in real time, nurses do not disclose when errors occur and only share the reported errors on 
SRS, which can be viewed by nurse leaders, but does give an option for anonymity.  
There were no significant differences between the two groups of RNs for perceptions on 
disclosure practices within the organisation based on Fisher`s exact test completed.  
Thus the results show that there is a need to address disclosure of errors for both groups of 
RNs in the organisation as this is a gap.  
The unique environment of Saudi Arabia is an additional challenge to consider. As discussed 
in chapter two there are nursing structures in their infancy or have not been defined which 
raises the need on how to accomplish these practices in this environment. The poor nursing 
image which views the medical profession as superior and the language barrier may be 
additional stressors added to the burden of the error.  
The cultural impact in Saudi Arabia which is the approach of a paternalistic access to 
information to safeguard female patients may not be viewed the same as other countries. 
Thus RNs may be challenged in the providing care to the patient and family within the 
cultural norms of disclosing information only to one male relative who is responsible. The 
language barriers and use of interpreters may not result in a resolution to disclosure of errors 
as may be apologizing through an interpreter who may not share all information provided 
(Van Rooyen et al., 2010:5).   
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5.2.3.6 Patient and nurse error outcomes  
Marx (2001:3) highlights Leape`s (1999) feedback that “we punish people who make 
mistakes” which results in the healthcare professional only reporting the outcomes which 
cannot be concealed, i.e. severe error outcomes. Patients have been identified as the first 
victim of an error and the healthcare provider who made the error as the “second victim” 
(Scott et al., 2009: 325).  
Table 4.14 presents the results of RNs’ responses on patient and nurse error outcomes, with 
low average positive responses (18.3% - 56.7%). It is acceptable to hold the nurse 
accountable for her actions and give disciplinary action when an error is made saw the 
majority of RNs in agreement (56.7%), but nurse leaders had a higher response. However, a 
substantial number of RNs (43%) were not able to identify the accountability of professional 
nurses and nurse leaders for care delivery and error management.  
Mayer and Cronin (2008:429) are of the opinion that disciplinary action is only warranted in 
cases of repeated at risk behaviour following warning to correct the behaviour, and advocate 
the use of Reason`s (1997) decision tree to determine culpability or the Just Culture 
Algorithm developed by Marx (2008). This component of repeated error occurrences by the 
same healthcare provider which warrants discipline application was not explored.  
The patient outcome of an error does influence the level or severity of the disciplinary action 
received by the nurse was the thinking of the majority of RNs (48%) but the level of influence 
cannot be concluded as some RNs did not provide their perceptions. The harm score is 
used.   
Thus, if explored the outcome of a patient which is injured because of a nursing error, the 
nurse who made the error is sent home.  
The majority of RNs (45%) are of the opinion that a nurse will not be sent home if she is 
involved in a severe error outcome for the patient. However, a substantial number of RNs 
disagreed or did not give their perceptions. Professional nurses had higher scores than nurse 
leaders, though there was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs. This is a 
concern for clinical nurses who may have a loss of employment as an error outcome, thus 
the severity of errors is a factor in nurse performance.  
Comments from RNs: “Sometime this process is not fairly applied as for some severe errors 
a nurse is not sent home, but for a less severe error may be sent home”. Thus the 
application of disciplinary outcomes which are severe, i.e. sent home professional nurses do 
not understand the decision making process to arrival at these outcomes. Being sent home is 
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a unique aspect to Saudi Arabia, which is a termination of contract. Annual contract renewal 
is dependent on performance, thus nurses are aware of the risks to them personally in the 
loss of employment. This is a key driver for nurses to view outcomes in the sense of family 
commitments etc. and the reasons they are in Saudi Arabia.  
An additional challenge in patient care delivery is the care of Very Important Persons (VIP) 
patients. The organisation receives a number of VIP patients with a unique acuity and care 
delivery adjustments. The majority of RNs (50.4%) were of the opinion that a nurse will not 
be sent home if an error is made while caring for a VIP. However, there were RNs who did 
not provide their perceptions which may be due to no experience with providing nursing care 
for a VIP patient.  
Nurse leaders had a higher agreement to this question than professional nurses which may 
indicate experience with this negative outcome or apprehension in the outcome of errors 
involving VIP patients from the leadership perspective of responsibility. As explained in 
chapter two, the role of the nurse manager is twenty four hour accountability for patient care 
delivery. Thus nurse managers are held accountable for outcomes on the nursing units for 
which they have assigned responsibility.  
This includes risk assessment and error prevention, thus nurse managers receive 
disciplinary action when warranted and this may be based on professional nurses’ 
performance of error outcomes. The majority of RNs (66.1%) were not clear of the 
disciplinary process which may impact on the nurse leader’s performance. Understanding the 
application of the disciplinary process for nursing errors was not clear to both professional 
nurses and nurse leaders (34.1%), thus there is a need to explore the components which are 
understood and which are not by both groups of RNs.  
This challenge was supported by the question exploring whether nurses who made errors 
are always disciplined, which showed an ambivalent response from RNs, in agreement, 
disagreement and no perceptions shared.  
There was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs for the questions 
exploring opinions on patient and nurse outcomes based on Fisher`s exact test completed. 
The results show that there is a need to review the principles of discipline applied by the 
organisation when a nurse makes an error and how this is supported by a culture of learning 
as advocate by the just culture approach (Marx, 2001:3).  
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5.2.3.7 Errors experienced  
Section four of the questionnaire explored RNs responses after being involved with an error 
to gain a deeper understanding of nurse outcomes with errors, and could thus provide 
feedback from the unique experience within the organisation.  
5.2.3.7.1 Error involvement: Job title 
RNs directly involved with nursing errors (32%), which was highest for nurse leaders (58%) 
than professional nurses (27%). Thus for professional nurses this would be in the role of 
nurse making the error, nurse completing a check or the charge nurse. Professional nurses 
were indirectly involved with nursing errors (30.8%) and no error involvement (32.38%), thus 
for the majority of professional nurses reported from error experience not as nurses who 
experienced the emotional outcomes of errors.  
The nurse leaders would have higher incidence of direct involvement as would need to be 
aware of all errors on the nursing unit, however in contrast a number of nurse leaders 
(15.79%) reported no involvement with errors, but errors were reported on all units. Thus this 
is a gap in nurse leader’s awareness of errors occurring in nursing units.   
Not wanting to disclose information on error involvement was a choice for some RNs (11%) 
which included both groups of RNs. This option was placed on the questionnaire based on 
feedback from the pilot study and the sensitive nature of the topic but may also be due to 
fear of outcomes.  
There was significant difference between professional nurses’ and nurse leaders’ indication 
of error involvement and job title, p= 0.046 (Fisher`s exact test).  
The expectation of results was that professional nurses would experience more errors in 
having direct contact with patients, thus higher risk and nurse leaders are mostly aware of 
errors reported so would those who have less experience, but these results indicate a 
difference.  
5.2.3.7.2 Error involvement: Nationality 
Table 4.15 presents the results of error involvement by nationality, which shows that Indian 
RNs (63%) had the highest frequency, followed by Middle Eastern RNs (50%) and Saudi 
RNs (40%). Other nationalities were in a lower range than these results. Western and Saudi 
nurses were willing to share information, but all other nationalities have RNs who were not 
willing to disclose information, see table 4.15. 
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There was no significant difference between error involvement and RN nationality based on 
the Fisher`s exact test completed.  
5.2.3.7.3 Error involvement: Nursing specialty 
Table 4.16 presents the results of RN involvement with errors by nursing speciality. The 
Paediatrics Nursing Division results were highest for involved with errors (54%), followed by 
Critical Care Nursing Division (42%), with other nursing divisions with a lesser range in 
percentage.  The Ambulatory Nursing Division had the highest response for no involvement 
with errors (46%), followed by the Adult Nursing Division (37%).  
However, regression analysis results showed that the Adult Nursing Division to be more 
negative than other nursing divisions for error reporting and management; p=0.036, see table 
4.23.  
5.2.3.7.4 Capacity in which involved with errors  
The RNs involved in errors may be in different job functions or titles based on assigned 
tasks, functions and job descriptions. Thus the need to indicate in which capacity the RNs 
experienced the errors was important, as this may provide differing views of the experience 
of error management. A high number of RNS were excluded for this question as they did not 
complete the question (N=98/131). However, in the comments, question 4.9, n=14 RNs 
identified “no involvement with errors due to low nursing unit census, no major errors only 
miscommunication, never involved and cannot comment on rumours”. This does account for 
a RN response rate of 85% for this question.  
Table 4.17 presents the results which show that the charge nurse (28%); nurse making the 
error (20%) and colleague (19%) were the roles which professional nurses identified when 
involved in an error, however nurse leaders identified case review/ investigative process 
(38%) as the highest result. There was significant difference between the two groups of RNs, 
p <0.001 (Fisher`s exact test). The results show that RNs assumed different job 
functions/roles when involved in error reporting and management and could thus provide 
valid feedback on the perceptions of nursing errors experiences.  
5.2.3.7.5 Examples of errors experienced  
RNs reported errors involved with examples which were similar to question 2.5 examples. 
RNs indentified N=195 examples of errors involved in, the majority were in the role of 
professional nurses (76%).  This is in contrast to error involvement by job title above with 
nurse leaders indicating more errors. Thus one can conclude that professional nurses do not 
report all errors as they occur.  The number and type of errors involved with reported by RNs 
was confirmed in table 4.5 which displays similar examples of errors reported. 
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5.2.3.7.6 Error classification: Harm score  
Figure 4.6 presents the classification of errors experienced by RNs according to the PSA 
(2004). The results show that the majority of RNs experienced Classification 2: Error/No 
harm, did not reach the patient (44%), C Classification 3: Error/No harm, reached the patient 
(32%). Errors with harm, classification of no sentinel event (7%) and sentinel event (4%) and 
no classification (12%) were experienced by a minimal number of RNs.  
Sentinel events were experienced by RNs in the Adult, Maternal /Child and Paediatrics 
nursing divisions. The Adult Division of Nursing negative results on regression analysis may 
be attributed to this number of severe errors outcomes as a contributing factor.  
5.2.3.7.7 Fair management of the error  
Mayer and Cronin (2008: 429) define fairness as “human actions which are judged fairly and 
viewed first within the complexity of the system factors” which may impact on the actions. 
There was a significant difference between the two groups of RNs and the perception of fair 
management of the error; p=0.0407 (Fisher`s exact test).  
The majority of RNs (66%) agreed that nursing errors experienced were managed fairly, with 
nurse leaders highly agreeing (88%) and professional nurses just above half of RNs (57%). 
Thus, nurse leaders who manage the errors view their actions as fair, however only half of 
the RNs at the point of care and who experience the errors agree with this perception.  
However, a substantial number of professional nurses did not know if errors were treated 
fairly (34%) and a minimal number disagreed (6%). A minimal number of nurse leaders 
equally disagreed and did not know (6%) if errors were treated fairly. A reason given by RN 
for views on fair management of nursing errors was the need for the investigative process to 
include a review of all contributing factors. This is supported by questions which explored the 
knowledge of investigative process, which identified a need for further education.  
The nurse who made the error received fair treatment saw similar results as the fair 
treatment of an error, however there was no significance between the two groups of RNs, 
p=0.065 (Fisher`s exact test).  
Figure 4.8 presents the frequency results of fair treatment received by the nurse who made 
the error, and the results show that majority of RNs (60%) agreed that the nurse had 
received fair treatment. However, nurse leaders highly agreed (82%), while approximately 
half of professional nurses agreed (52%), with 37% did not know and 12% in disagreement. 
RNs provided comments which are identified in chapter four.  
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These results on fair management of errors and nurses highlight the role of the nurse leaders 
and the need to be consistent in the approach to the management of errors.  
Thus when viewed with question of nurse managers objectiveness in error management 
(Objective Four; Error Management) there was significant association to a positive score on 
patient safety, see objective four below.   
5.2.3.7.8 The outcomes of the error/s for the nurse, clinical nurse coordinator, nurse 
manager.  
Views on disciplinary actions by Marx (2001) and Mayer & Cronin (2008) are provided above.  
RNs identified a total of n=327 outcomes of errors, with the majority (78%) identified by 
professional nurses and nurse leaders (22%).  The outcomes for RNs were categorized into 
educational needs, disciplinary actions and severe outcomes.  
There was no significant difference between the two groups of RNs and the identified error 
outcomes, p=0.2188 (Fisher`s exact test).  
5.2.3.7.8.1 Educational outcomes of errors  
Figure 4.9 presents the results of RNs who identified no changes or educational outcomes 
for errors involved in, with a minimal number of professional nurses only (7%) identified did 
not know outcomes nor had no changes for the nurse. The majority of RNs (39%) identified 
education and/or competence review as the error outcome, which was equally distributed for 
both groups of RNs. The nursing speciality with the majority of RNs (25%) which identified 
this outcome was the Procedure Nursing Division.  
Developmental plan which is defined to address nurse performance in areas identified for 
improvement was indicated as an outcome by 28% RNs with the majority of RNs (17%) in 
the Adult Nursing Division indicating this error outcome. 
5.2.3.7.8.2 Disciplinary outcomes of errors  
Figure 4.10 presents disciplinary outcomes for nursing errors, which ranged from counselling 
to final written warning. The majority of RNs (64%), equal distribution for nurse leaders and 
professional nurses identified counselling as the error outcome for the nurse. The RNs 
response showed a decrease in frequency as the disciplinary severity increased.  
Professional nurses (6%) only reported a third written warning as an outcomes for errors.  
These outcomes demonstrate that the majority of RNs seem to be aware of the potential for 
errors once counselling received; there is a progression of discipline applied for report error 
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occurrences for the same nurses an almost equal number of RNs received a final written 
warning and a third written warning.  
According to the Employee Relations Manual (ERM, KFSH&RC-J), there is a difference 
between the degrees of severity for these two disciplinary measures. A third written warning 
is followed by one of the more severe outcomes of an error discussed below, while a final 
written warning may progress to a repeated offender being terminated. It is interesting that 
professional nurses are aware of final written warnings and none of the nurse leaders have 
this outcome.  
5.2.3.7.8.3 Severe disciplinary errors outcomes  
Figure 4.11 presents the severe disciplinary outcomes for nursing errors, with the majority of 
RNs (76%) identified “other” outcomes than listed which were number of occurrences, near 
miss including multidisciplinary involvement, not applicable and policy review.  
Professional nurses had equal distribution of frequency (13%) for suspension; demotion and 
dismissal, however nurse leaders’ frequency responses were higher for all outcomes, see 
figure 4.11.  Termination were identified by professional nurses (25%) but higher scored by 
nurse leaders (33%).  
The critical care division reported the majority of severe outcomes for nursing errors (n=9).  
The work environment of the critical care nursing units is recognized as being stressful, with 
increased opportunity for errors which may result in morbidity and mortality if errors reach the 
patient (Tang et al., 2007:457)  
RNs of Middle Eastern nationality experienced the highest number of severe outcomes for 
nursing errors (n=5) which included suspension, dismissal and termination. The RNs in this 
nationality group were identified in the linear regression results to be more negative to error 
reporting and management than the rest of the respondents, p= 0.044. 
5.2.3.7.9 After the error had been reported, the nursed involved expressed what she felt:  
Table 4.18 presents the RNs expressions of how they felt after the error was managed, with 
significant difference between the two groups of RNs and their expressed feelings after an 
error, p= 0.12 (Chi-Square test).  A fair number of RNs (20%) expressed not knowing about 
the feelings of the nurses after an error was experienced and not applicable was identified in 
the category of other (3%).  
The majority of RNs expressed positive feelings with the outcomes of their experience of 
reporting and the management of the error. The majority of RNs (35%) identified feeling good 
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about reporting the error, with higher numbers of professional nurses (36%) than nurse 
leaders (26%). The results were equally distributed in nursing divisions and across all 
nationalities.  
An equal number of RNs (27%) identified feeling good, the patient received the care needed 
and understood and agreed with the disciplinary process; with the ambulatory and adult 
nursing divisions with the highest agreement. The number of professional nurses was higher 
than nurse leaders. An equal number of RNs (21%) expressed feeling better and could 
receive support and needed to receive education and training, with the number of 
professional nurses higher than nurse managers. The Maternal/Child and Paediatrics nursing 
divisions were the highest responders. RNs (8%) expressed feeling relieved that no longer 
keeping a secret, which was distributed within all nursing divisions except for Paediatrics and 
Ambulatory.  
A higher number of nurse leaders (26%) than professional nurses (7%) expressed feeling not 
supported and blamed. This identifies that nurse leaders who are responsible for providing 
the supportive environment to staff express this outcome.  
This may be due to nurse leaders also receiving discipline or recognize that there is a lack in 
providing a supportive environment without assigning blame. 
In contrast, professional nurses (20%) were a higher number than nurse leaders (11%) who 
expressed that were supported and could work through the error event and professional 
nurses (7%) and nurse leaders (5%) expressed feeling not treated fairly.  These results 
support the research problem of fearing outcomes for errors and thus will not report these 
occurrences.  
Trust for senior leadership (12%) and colleagues (14%) were seen to be lacking as a minimal 
number of RNs expressed trust and will continue to report errors. Saudi and Indian RNs were 
the higher responders for trust in the team, while South African and Filipino RNs were lower 
responders.  
Professional nurses only (n=3) expressed being a bad nurse, not able to trust self with 
patient care; while both professional nurses (13%) and nurse leaders (32%) expressed 
feeling devastated that could have made this error. The results show a very high response 
for error outcomes for nurse leaders who are not assigned to clinical practice. There is a 
need to clarify is these would be professional nurses expressions to the nurse mangers or 
personal error experience.   
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RNs from both groups have identified both positive and negative experiences in error 
management and outcomes which identify a need to improve the response of colleagues and 
nurse leaders when errors are made and the change to supportive work environment.  
5.2.3.7.10 Comments shared about experiences with errors and error management  
RNs shared comments which confirmed findings of the study and are described in chapter 
four.  
5.2.4 Objective four of the study was to explore the factors impacting on the 
management of nursing errors.  
There are numerous factors which can impact on the reporting and management of nursing 
errors. The factors discussed below are demographical/biological factors and section 3.2 of 
the questionnaire. 
5.2.4.1 Demographical/biographical factors 
Demographical factors of the sample which were found to be significant were:  
5.2.4.1.1 Gender 
There were significantly more male than female nurse leaders, p= 0.0031 (chi-square test). 
This is significant in a culture which is perceived to be paternalistic and the preference for 
males in communication with the multidisciplinary team. However, this can be a contributing 
factor to error reporting and management as female nurses may not be comfortable in 
reporting errors made. Response to errors may differ between male and female leaders, with 
females being more approachable and males more aggressive as seen in the paternalistic 
approach of the health environment in Saudi Arabia (Van Rooyen et al., 2010:5). 
Gender restrictions may negatively impact the management of errors with not wanting 
confusion between performance and cultural restrictions. Safeguards may be the addition of 
another leader to the discussion, but this may negatively impact counselling as seen as two 
leaders in discussion with one nurse.  
Regression analysis was completed to identify a correlation between section 3.1, section 3.2 
questions average positive response and the participants’ biographical data. The results 
presented in table 4.23 show that there were significant differences for two factors which 
were nationality and nursing specialty. 
5.2.4.1.2 Nationality 
Middle Eastern Nationality was found to be significant, p=0.044 in that there were more 
negative in the average positive responses than the other respondents. Middle Eastern RNs 
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were identified to have more experience with severe error outcomes of suspension, dismissal 
and termination and this may have impacted on these perceptions.  
5.2.4.1.3 Nursing speciality 
The Adult Division of Nursing was found to be significant, p=0.036. The Adult Nursing 
Division reported the most errors experienced, thus as may not have severe outcomes but 
may have more experience with errors and thus a work environment of increased risk.  
5.2.4.2 Defined factors in Section 3.2  
5.2.4.2.1 Error reporting and feedback  
Table 4.19 presents the results of the error reporting and feedback factors which showed that 
the majority of RNs confirmed understanding the process of error reporting (72%) and the 
use of documentation required (73%), but there is room for improvement as a substantial 
number of RNs still do not understand the error reporting process. However, the majority of 
RNs (59%) identified a gap in the feedback process with regard to errors reported.  
Linear regression results found that a positive average score is associated with 
understanding the process of error reporting and management (p=0.001); knowing the 
documentation process for error reporting and management (p=0.026) and receiving 
feedback about errors (p<0.001).  
5.2.4.2.2 Error management  
Table 4.20 presents the results which show the majority of RNs (74%) agreed that the delay 
in knowing the results of an error investigation leads to anxiety. Thus the supportive 
environment for RNs is important to assist in this, decrease the risk for more errors from an 
anxious or insecure nurse. 
The majority of RNs (49%) were not able to conclude if the time taken to investigate an error 
is too long; with a substantial number in agreement (31.4%). RN understanding of the 
disciplinary process was seen to be a factor in error management with half of the RNs (52%) 
expressing understanding, while 48% in disagreement or did not know. The majority of RNs 
(60%) were of the opinion that disciplinary action given is not based on manager liking of the 
nurse or not; however a substantial number of professional nurses (13%) agreed with this 
perception. 
Thus there is a need for an understanding of the disciplinary processes for all RNs. A 
positive score on patient safety is associated with an objective error management approach 
by the nurse manager, as shown by linear regression, p=0.002. 
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This perception by professional nurses may be due to a lack of consistency with the 
application of disciplinary measures, which shows that RNs are of the opinion that nurses are 
treated differently to other healthcare providers. Consistency in approach to discipline is 
advocated by Marx (2001:10) which would assist in nurses understanding of the application 
of the process, implementation and outcomes or review on feedback. Nurse Managers may 
not understand the application of discipline as seen in objective three, thus were unclear on 
understanding of process.   
5.2.4.2.3 Educational factors  
South African RNs employed in Saudi Arabia identified factors which included computer 
literacy, language and cultural factors as challenges in their work environment (Van Rooyen 
et al., 2010:7). 
Table 4.21 presents the results on education factors explored which show that the majority of 
RNs (81%) were computer literate and thus had no barrier to using the error reporting system 
so not challenged by this factor. However, RNs (19%) did identify this factor as a challenge 
and this impacted on their ability to report errors.  
The language as a barrier with the patients makes it difficult to disclose and apologize for 
errors was identified as a challenge by a minimal number of RNs (27%), however there was 
a high neutral response and RNs may be aware of the assistance which is available to them 
in the form of colleagues who speak Arabic and interpreters, thus are able to meet this need. 
Linear regression results demonstrated a significant negative association with the average 
positive results of patient safety, p= 0.025.  
The majority of RNs (70%) were not challenged by the cultural restrictions applicable to the 
patients on the nursing unit, which may be due to the education and training which has been 
introduced in the understanding of the needs of the Arabic patient in the Crescent of Care 
Model (Lovering, 2008). However a substantial number of RNs did not provide their 
perception which may indicate a need for some nurses.  
5.2.4.2.4 The work environment  
Table 4.22 presents the results of work environment factors which may impact on error 
management. The results show that the majority of RNs (45%) did not see the nursing unit 
as very busy which makes it easy to make errors. However, a substantial number of RNs did 
identify this as a factor for their nursing units (22%).  
The majority of RNs (37%) agreed that the nursing staff work many overtime shifts and this 
makes it easy to make errors, however there were almost equal numbers who did not 
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provide perceptions or disagreed. Nurse leaders’ results showed RNs (42%) agreed and 
(37%) disagreement. This demonstrates that there are some nurse leaders who are satisfied 
with the number of staff to complete nursing tasks, however there are nurse leaders who 
have concerns with the number of shifts worked by RNs to meet the needs of the patients 
and still provide safe healthcare. Studies have shown that increased number of shifts and the 
length of shifts do predispose nurses to a higher risk for errors (Aiken et al., 2008: 229; Kelly 
et al., 2011: 228). 
5.2.4.2.5 Linear regression results of factors (Section 3.2)  
Table 4.23 presents the significant linear regression results, which imply that question 3.2.1, 
3.2.3, 3.2.5, 3.2.9, 3.2.10, and 3.2.13 are significantly related with the average positive 
response. This suggests that a positive score on the patient safety is associated with 
understanding the process for error reporting and management (3.2.1 & 3.2.3), receiving 
feedback about made errors (3.2.5), an objective error management by the manager (3.2.9), 
and negatively associated with a language barrier (3.2.10) and working overtime shifts 
(3.2.13). 
The above discussion demonstrates that some components of a just culture are evident in 
the reporting and management of nursing errors. However, the organisation still has work to 
do to accomplish full implementation of a just culture.  
5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
Limitations of a study are defined as “restrictions in a study that may decrease the credibility 
and generalizability of the findings. Methodological limitations can limit the credibility of the 
findings and restrict the population to which the findings can be generalized. Methodological 
limitations result from factors such as an unrepresentative sample, weak design, single 
setting, limited control over treatment implemented, instruments with limited reliability and 
validity, limited control over data collection and improper use of statistical analysis” ( Burns & 
Grove, 2007: 37-38). 
The following were regarded as limitations within this study:  
5.3.1 The research environment 
A limitation of the study was only one healthcare organisation was used as the location of the 
study, which was a tertiary institution with a reputation for well developed systems and 
processes within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the study outcomes cannot be 
generalized to the general population of registered nurses in Saudi Arabia. Generalization is 
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defined as the extent of the implications of the research findings from the sample to a larger 
population (Burns & Grove, 2007: 37). 
The research setting was King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center (General 
Organisation) – Jeddah (KFSH&RC-J); a 350 bed capacity which provides tertiary care to the 
patient population in the western region of Saudi Arabia and has specialties in cardiology, 
paediatrics, oncology and neuroscience. 
5.3.2 The instrument  
The instrument used was self report, i.e. a questionnaire which included open- and closed- 
ended questions. The limitations of questionnaires are identified as “response rates which 
are generally lower than that of other self reports; if the response rate is below 50%, the 
representativeness of the sample is seriously in question. The respondents generally fail to 
mark responses to all questions, especially if form is long. The incomplete nature of data can 
threaten the validity of the instrument” (Burns & Grove, 2007: 382) 
5.3.2.1  Self reporting  
The questionnaire was a self-report on a sensitive topic thus the self reporting style of the 
questionnaire though safer for participant in approach may not have been ideal in gaining 
honest feedback. This may affect the conclusions drawn from the results. Neither would a 
qualitative approach have been ideal because of the sensitivity of the study therefore, the 
best option was to engage in self reporting without fear.  
5.3.2.2  Length  
The questionnaire was more than eight pages long; this may have led to the number of RNs 
who did not complete the entire question, as seen in the last section (four) of the results; see 
chapter four. However, all questions had more than 50% response rate on returns as seen in 
chapter four.  
5.3.2.3  Layout  
The layout of the questionnaire may have led to some confusion as some questions may 
have seemed to be similar. The questionnaire could have accomplished more with clarity of 
some of the questions.   
5.3.3 Response rate of participants  
The returns rate for nurse leaders was  below 50% which according to Burns and Grove 
(2007: 382) is a problem with questionnaires in comparison to other self reporting methods 
and does question the representativeness of the sample. However, to compensate for this 
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lack, the nurse leaders group of RNs was created of the nurse managers and clinical nurse 
coordinators, but was still below 50% response rate. 
5.4 STUDY CONCLUSIONS  
Describe the conclusions derived from the study, including goals and objectives reached, 
research questions answered/ hypothesis accepted or rejected 
The just culture approach to keeping patients safe from medical errors is designed to 
promote a safety culture within healthcare organisations as errors continue to occur. Errors 
cannot be addressed and prevented unless the extent of the problem is known (Botwinick et 
al., 2006:1). 
The research problem was that registered nurses feared error outcomes of being shamed 
and blamed and thus would not report errors. The conclusions are discussed based on the 
goals of the study; the research problem identified and the conceptual framework. The 
conceptual framework in chapter two presented the importance of the accountabilities for the 
three roles within the organisation to partner together to achieve patient care with minimal 
error risk as errors will continue to occur, i.e. executives, nurse managers and professional 
nurses (direct care).  
5.4.1 The decision for just culture implementation 
The implementation of the just culture principles are an organisational leadership decision 
and require these leaders to set the mission, vision and values of a safety culture within 
healthcare. Kohn et al. (2000: 6-14) and Marx (2001: 25-27) recommend that executive 
support and understanding of the systems, processes, work decision and relationships 
required to implement and sustain a safety culture present with excellent patient and staff 
outcomes. 
Volgelmeier, Scott-Cawiezell and Miller (2010) studied the influence of just culture training on 
leadership`s perceptions of their patient safety culture and how this aligned with direct care 
staff views. The study included 52/63 healthcare organisations to collaborate in a statewide 
approach “Missouri Just Culture Collaborative”. Additionally, four regulatory boards, including 
the state board of nursing schools and association participated in study.   
The aim of the study was to assist leaders to identify and manage systems and human 
issues that led to errors in organisations which included providing expert training to all 
leaders. The emphasis of the training is shared accountability between leaders and direct 
care staff. The intensity of engagement of staff with priority for executives, and greatest 
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engagement included on-site training for direct care staff, which was the choice for 17/52 
organisations.  
Leaders from the participating organisations completed a questionnaire which provided 
feedback on three measures, i.e. error reporting, leadership response and feedback to error, 
measuring the changes of post training. Findings showed differences between the least and 
most engaged leaders, with the most engaged organisation leaders’ scores being closer to 
direct care nurses` responses than the least engaged organisations. These leaders were 
also able to realistically identify the barriers to a safely culture, with recognition of fear and 
the effect on error reporting. These results suggest that the more engaged leaders may have 
gained a better understanding of the true challenges for direct care staff, opposed to less 
engaged leaders who were not facing the true problem of safety culture challenges. 
(Volgelmeier et al., 2010: 293).   
The study results identified that there are benefits to implementing the just culture approach 
to error reporting and management within KFSH&RC-J organisation. This approach may 
address the gaps identified through this study discussed below and improve error reporting 
to evaluate the extent of the problem for the organisation and lead to a decreased risk for 
patients. The implementation of the just culture approach to error reporting and management 
is recommended.  
5.4.2 Safety champion, nurse executive 
The study results showed the importance of the commitment of the nurse executive to safety 
as seen in the results of high significance for the chief and assistant chief as resources 
available to the nursing units. This was reinforced on regression analysis, with the Chief, 
Nursing Affairs the highest nurse leader in the organisation being identified by both middle 
managers and direct care RNs as being available as a resource in error reporting and 
management. Studies support this view of the nurse executive as a champion for safety 
(Botwinick et al., 2006:1). 
Volgelmeier et al., (2010:293) reported increased opportunity for open communication 
between leaders and direct care staff, which resulted in improvements seen in closing the 
perception gap between leaders and direct care staff on safety culture, seen in minimizing a 
culture of blame where system factors are addressed, open communication of error events 
led to an shared understanding of the true challenges for safety culture in the organisation. 
It is recommended that the nurse executive continues to role model the transformational 
characteristics of accessible, visible and supportive leader to middle managers and direct 
care RNs (ANCC, 2008).  
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5.4.3 Evaluation of the systems and processes for error reporting and management  
The study has shown that the organisation has an effective reporting system, but there is 
reluctance to report errors due to a knowledge deficient in identification of errors, fear of the 
outcome, being shamed and blamed, reaction of the manger, reaction of peers and not 
knowing the policy of non-punitive error reporting. This has led to a problem of under 
reporting of errors in nursing. These perceptions of the RNs support the research problem 
that RNs will not report errors as they fear the outcomes, thus this question is accepted.  
Goal one of the study has demonstrated a gap in identifying the nursing related errors which 
occur in the units which are affected by under reporting. Goal two was to identify the current 
process of error reporting in nursing. These two goals are connected as impact each other 
and thus are discussed together. 
The full implementations of the Just Culture principles within the organisation which will 
address the gaps discussed below are recommended.  
5.4.4 Education programs in error reporting, classification; disclosure and 
management   
The study found that the organisation does not provide continuous education programmes 
geared towards awareness of safety and prevention of risks. This includes error reporting, 
error management, performance expectation, disclosure of errors and support of the second 
victim. The recommendation would be to introduce the Just Culture approach which would 
include education and training and should be available for all employees especially direct 
care providers.  
Volgelmeier et al. (2010: 293) reported improvements in the healthcare facilities which chose 
the fully engaged approach to just culture education. The education was provided on-site and 
evaluation of the organisation systems and processes as needed. Education was provided to 
all employees not limited to leaders only.  
5.4.5 Error classification, identification and reporting  
A just culture promotes a reporting culture, which promotes a non-punitive environment to 
assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the systems and processes of the organisation. 
RNs identified the strengths of the error reporting process which was easy to use and an on-
line system. The first step to error prevention is to identify the extent of the problem, thus to 
promote a reporting culture (Marx, 2001:3).  
Nurse Managers are responsible to improve the systems and processes at nursing unit level 
and advocate on behalf of the professional nurses as needed, see conceptual framework, 
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chapter two. This study found that there was significant difference between professional 
nurse and nurse leader’s classification of errors according to the harm score. Either RNs 
classify the same errors differently or report different errors. This study found that RNs report 
errors of all classifications based on a harm score and not only the most severe as 
suggested by literature (Marx, 2001:4).   
Professional nurses mostly report Classification 3: Error/No Harm, reached the patient, while 
leaders report all classifications. Studies have been mixed in their reporting of errors of 
various classifications. Hobgood et al., (2005) used a modified Delphi process to classify 
medical errors common to the emergency department. Classified case errors were divided 
into three categories to create taxonomy of errors; utilizing expert panellists; 95% of who 
completed the rounds. The panellists were able to agree on classifications with none 
classified as no error and the cognitive errors required the most review sessions. Hobgood et 
al. (2005: 144) concluded that the classification of errors is a challenge, but is possible.  
This study found that RNs were able to identify an error and when to report, but were unable 
to differentiate between an error and a near miss, with significant difference between nurse 
leaders and direct care nurses. Chard (2010: 143) found that RNs were able to distinguish 
between a near miss (almost events) and that these were reported in a preoperative setting. 
This is the first step to error prevention, and needs to be prioritized for professional nurse 
education. 
However, Almutary and Lewis (2012: 122-123) found that knowledge deficiency did not 
impact on error reporting and proposed that MAE are not accurately reported in Saud Arabia. 
This study is in agreement as an equal number of RNs agreed and disagreed that errors are 
always reported. In agreement with Almutary and Lewis (2012: 123) this study found that 
nurses recognize the benefits to reporting, reduces risks in the workplace and the on-line 
reporting process was easy.  
Barriers identified by this study preventing error reporting were a shame and blame culture, 
fear of the error outcome and the reaction of peers. These findings are supported by 
Almutary and Lewis (2012: 125) in concerns for the error outcomes and being shamed and 
blamed by nurse managers. However, the third barrier identified differed, which was fear of 
the reaction of peers in the nursing unit and there were no significant differences for level of 
education affecting frequency of error reporting, which was in agreement with Mayo and 
Duncan (2004: 216).  
The factors identified from this study which impacted on error reporting and management 
were outcomes and disclosure of errors; the Adult Nursing Division was slightly more 
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negative than other respondents, but did experience the most errors; gender may impact 
error reporting and management as had a significantly higher number of male nurse leaders; 
leadership approach influences error reporting, management and outcomes and the 
application of disciplinary measures are not clearly understood and this can lead to confusion 
for professional nurses, as well as nurse leaders in the application process. 
Therefore it is recommended that RNs receive education on error classification, identification 
and the purpose of near miss reporting. 
Chapter one presented the challenges of error identification and no agreement on the 
definitions of errors. Thus, a future research topic for study may be to identify taxonomy of 
errors for Saudi Arabia. This may be of benefit to exclude the assumptions that errors may 
be different due to the cultural influences or may be the same as elsewhere in the world.  
5.4.6 Non-punitive error reporting  
The study identified the on-line error reporting system was strength in being effective, easy to 
use and applicable throughout the hospital. There are safety initiatives being introduced 
throughout the organisation which are known to all levels of RNs. However, underreporting of 
errors was a problem.  
RNs feared the outcomes of errors and thus there is under reporting of errors. This supports 
the research problem that RNs will not report errors as they fear the outcomes, thus this 
question is accepted. Studies have shown that under reporting will continue to be a problem 
if the culture of the nursing unit and organisation does not change from a individual focus, i.e. 
shame, blame and abandonment with discipline used as a punishment tool to a balanced 
approach of just, open and fair culture (Mayo & Duncan 2004: 215-216; Almutary & Lewis, 
2012:126).  
The areas for improvement demonstrated by low scores were lack of understanding of non-
punitive approach to error reporting, errors are not used as learning to prevent reoccurrence, 
confusion about a no blame policy being applicable in the organisation, which may suggest 
that RNs are not willing to be held accountable for their behaviours, fear, shame, blame for 
outcomes of errors and errors are held against the nurse who reports. 
A study by Almutary and Lewis (2012) in Saudi Arabia, reported on RNs willingness to report 
Medication Adverse Events (MAE) using a convenient  sample of RNs N=62, which was  
reduced to 39/62 as the other RNs experienced no barriers to reporting. The RNS believed 
that they should report MAE as they occur, but identified the barriers to reporting were 
concerns about outcomes of reporting and legal action and four aspects related to the nurse 
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administration contributed to RN unwillingness to report MAE. Regression analysis showed 
that higher education was associated with fewer MAE and associated with greater frequency 
of reporting MAEs. However, the small sample size limited the data analysis plan and thus 
results are viewed with caution (Almutary & Lewis; 2012: 121-125).  
Alahmadi (2010: 20-21) assessed the safety culture of 13 hospitals in Saudi Arabia, with a 
47% response rate (1224/2580) support the findings of this study in  identifying 
underreporting of errors, improvements needed in a non-punitive approach to error reporting 
and the role of the manager in promoting a reporting culture.  
In contrast, Chiang and Pepper (2006: 396-398) studied the barriers to MAEs reporting, with 
a sample of 597/807 nurses in one hospital in Taiwan. Chiang and Pepper (2006:395) 
identified the availability of the quality management department as an expert providing 
assistance in MAE reporting, while this study found high significance for resource staff who 
were charge nurses, colleagues, clinical nurse coordinator and nurse manager available for 
professional nurses. Nurse leaders identified their immediate supervisor and the nursing 
quality department as their resources. These resources were identified for both errors 
reported and errors experienced.  
The two top barriers to error reported identified by Chiang and Pepper (2006: 396) were fear 
and administrative barriers, while Mayo and Duncan (2004: 214) identified fear of nurse 
manager and co-worker reaction and error not serious enough for reporting as top barriers. 
But the majority of nurses did not fear disciplinary action (loss of job) due to making and 
error, which are similar to the findings of this study. Additional factors identified for this study 
were language barriers, the Middle Eastern nationality and the Adult Nursing Division RNs 
were more negative in their perceptions to error reporting and management.  
Mayo and Duncan (2004:214) identified that only 45.6% of drug errors are reported to the 
nurse manager, using the incident report. This study is different in that the reporting system 
is computerised and nurse managers received automatic follow up or notification but there is 
still a gap in nurse manager awareness of all errors which occurred on the unit due to under 
reporting.  
Under reporting is prevalent and is due to fear, shame and blame and error consequences 
similar to the above two studies. Volgelmeier et al. (2010: 293) recommend bridging the 
safety perception gap between a nurse leader’s awareness of errors and professional nurses 
through combined education sessions for professional nurses and nurse leaders to 
encourage partnerships in error prevention and change management.    
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The study results identified a lack of understanding of the non-punitive approach to error 
reporting. A policy for the non-punitive approach to error reporting needs to be defined for the 
organisation. This will assist RNs in their understanding of how this approach is applicable in 
error reporting. A non-punitive approach is needed to address the underreporting of errors, 
for both nurse leaders and direct care nurses. 
5.4.7 Supportive work environment 
A supportive (healthy) work environment has been identified in chapter two by Schmalenberg 
and Kramer (2008). Safety is a shared accountability between the nurse manager and the 
professional nurse and thus this partnership is seen in the combined effects of reporting by 
professional nurse and nurse manager who advocates improving systems and processes as 
needed.  
The work environment for reporting was seen to be supportive with resources available to 
encourage reporting; there were highly significant differences between the nurse leaders and 
the professional nurses. This showed that both groups of RN have a supportive environment 
in terms of resources, expertise and guidance to report and manage errors.  
RNs identified receiving support during the reporting and management of an error which may 
be due to the introduction of empowerment structures, e.g. unit councils which are part of the 
Magnet journey (ANCC, 2008).   
Studies conducted by Kelly et al. (2011: 432) and Aiken et al. (2008: 228-229) described a 
supportive environment to be organisations which are Magnet accredited, which demonstrate 
better nurse to patient ratios, less likely to experience burnout, highly satisfied with their 
nursing job and are more highly educated, investments in staff development and nurse 
managers supervisory abilities and good multidisciplinary relationships have better nurse and 
patient outcomes.  
Saudi RNs followed by Middle Eastern RNs affirmed being the least supported, blamed for 
errors and not treated fairly, but no significance was found between the different nationalities 
and error reporting or management. This may be a topic for future research, as it is difficult to 
quantify concepts such as fair, just, open communication and supported as there may be 
personal needs which are not met and thus not supported.  
Future studies of whether RNs of various nationalities interpret the concepts in error 
reporting and management differently or the same are recommended.  
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It is recommended that the organisation introduces the just culture concepts of fair, open and 
just approach to nursing errors. There is a need to build trust and transparency to improve 
the approach to error reporting. As a high number of the RNs were nurse leaders, this may 
be an executive led initiative to promote a supportive, trusting and transparent environment 
for nurse leaders, as well as leadership developmental programmes to assist nurse leaders 
in meeting the needs of the professional nurses.  
5.4.8 Nursing units with highest risks for errors  
The most errors were reported in the Adult and Critical Care Nursing units. Studies have 
shown that these units are at greater risk for errors (Tang et al., 2007:447-457).  In this 
study, the Critical Care Nursing units also experienced the most severe outcomes of 
disciplinary action for errors.  
Anooseheh, Ahmadi, Faghihzadeh and Vaismoradi (2008:292) found that due to stressors 
experienced in the high risk environment of the Intensive Care Unit, Cardiac Intensive Care 
unit and Haemodialysis units a qualified competent manager is needed for each of these 
units.  
Results of the Adult Nursing Division were also more negative in their perceptions of error 
reporting and management. The study results showed nurses were working more overtime 
shifts which increased the potential for errors on some nursing units.  
This raises the question if results were due to more errors being reported and thus a more 
realistic picture of errors in the organisation or do these units face more challenges in patient 
acuity, staff shortage, and management and peer reactions to errors and need support and 
improvements. Studies report that the quality of care is affected by workload, length of on-
duty hours and overtime shifts which increase the risks for errors (Aiken et al., 2008:228-229; 
Anoosh et al., 2008:294).  
This study results demonstrated both groups of RNs, agreed that the organisation is 
addressing patient and employee safety through initiatives which are known to employees 
but RNs, mostly nurse leaders identified the need to improve the unit level risk for errors. 
This is an important outcome for executive leadership to further investigate. This is a shared 
perspective with the professional nurses which indicate a truer reflection of the risks and 
potential risks within the work environment.  
Recommended are future studies to measure the impact of introducing just culture principles 
within these nursing units. 
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5.4.9 Peer feedback and response to errors  
The study results show that peer review in the form of reporting a colleague`s negative 
behaviour was lacking as professional nurses were not willing to report colleagues which was 
in agreement with study by Chiang and Pepper (2006:397). Chiang and Pepper (2006:395-
396) explored the perceived barriers to MAE reporting and the relationship between the 
barriers and culturally relevant factors. Findings support those of this study which found that 
a reporting and learning culture are dependent on the nurse manager and collegial/peer 
support provided, not only during the reporting of an error but also during the phases of 
coping with having made an error.  
Chiang and Pepper (2006: 393) found significant correlations between perceived barriers to 
reporting; power hierarchy and face saving, which may be a future research topic for the 
Saudi Arabian multicultural environment. Peer feedback may be the norm in western 
individualistic cultures, however in collectivist cultures it may not be an acceptable norm as 
the group dynamic needs to be preserved and saving face may add another dimension to 
this concept (Chiang & Pepper, 2006: 393).  
Studies are in agreement that these two factors affect error reporting negatively or positively 
dependent on the reaction of managers and peers to errors when they occur (Mayo & 
Duncan, 2004:214). Education and training for all employees in the just culture principles is 
recommended. The policy review of an organisation safety plan should include transparency 
statements which advocate the stand of the organisation leaders to support a culture of 
learning and trust (Leape et al., 2009:425). Managers’ recommendations are included under 
leadership development.  
Further research is suggested to explore the barriers to giving and receiving peer feedback in 
a multicultural work environment.  
5.4.10 RN autonomy 
The study reported a significant difference between nurse leaders and professional nurses in 
their perceptions of RNs questioning practice when something does not seem right. It was 
interesting that the majority of professional nurses perceived that they advocated on behalf of 
their patients, but nurse leaders disagreed. This highlights the differing perceptions of sharp 
and blunt end approaches and as the nurse leaders are not in direct care, there is a need to 
understand the differing perceptions.  
Benner et al. (2002:509) in a study of nursing errors to define a taxonomy of individual, 
practice and system errors in nursing highlighted the role of the nurse as an autonomous 
practitioner, managing care of numerous patients, the role includes detection, intervention a 
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in missed care to reduce adverse events from errors. Thus nurses need to be competent, 
receive the necessary training, experience and specialize to make safe, reliable applicable 
care delivery decisions.  Thus, the study of the “nurse’s role in preventing, detecting and 
making errors would yield valuable data for others” to learn from. Benner et al. (2002:509) 
define “practice responsibility” for nurses which links the individual and the systems approach 
together and identify the central role and functions of the nurse.   
Recommended for future research and included could be a review of multiple factors which 
are: gender discrimination, autonomous practice in a multicultural workforce, if varying levels 
/countries of training of nursing education impact autonomous practice and do all these RNs 
interpret the concepts of patient advocacy and autonomous practice the same?  
5.4.11 Error investigation (system approach)  
The study findings identified RNs lack of understanding of the investigative process which is 
convened when an error is investigated and the role of the multidisciplinary team in the 
investigation process.  Multidisciplinary communication and contributing factors from other 
departments to errors have been identified as two of the system factors which need to be 
considered when errors are made.  
Elnour et al. (2008: 183) completed a study in the United Arab Emirates to evaluate the 
collaborative approach to implementing error reporting using a computerised medication 
safety tool. The approach was to introduce education and training and monitor compliance 
with the number of medication errors reported, using pre and post tests.  
The system was seen to be more efficient, and the collaborative approach improved the 
communication and understanding of challenges for the different disciplines as pharmacy 
provided the education to nursing staff.  
It is recommended that education be included as part of the just culture implementation plan 
to inform nurses about the investigative process and that transparency be promoted through 
unit level discussions on the errors experienced in the nursing units.  
5.4.12 Managing staff behaviour: Disciplinary process versus just culture approach  
The study results showed that RNs affirmed that there is a defined process to apply 
disciplinary measures for nursing errors, but felt that nurses were treated differently to other 
healthcare providers; not treated fairly or supported was the response of some of the RNs.  
However, the nurse leaders indicated a lack of clear decision making in the application of 
disciplinary measures for nursing errors. This is based on the assumption that severe 
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outcomes for patients, cause severe discipline where applicable. Thus, the nurse leaders 
would benefit from the conceptual framework application of balancing the system review and 
nurse behaviour. Punishment in the form of discipline has been seen to have more negative 
outcomes for the RN and does not result in improved nursing practice (Wolf et al., 2000:289). 
Nurse leaders would benefit from education and training on the just culture application of the 
decision tree (Reason, 1998) and /or Just Culture Algorithm (2008). This would provide the 
guidance in consistently, justly and fairly applying the same processes to nursing errors and 
focused on managing behaviour not performance, i.e. identify the need for consolation, 
counselling and discipline i.e. Just Culture ( Mayer & Cronin, 2008: 428-429).  
A review of the policies currently applicable and if they are detrimental to error reporting or if 
they support a culture of learning and changes be made which would meet the needs of the 
organisation, employees, patients and families in safe care delivery and the decrease of 
errors in healthcare delivery (Marx, 2001: 25-26).  
Implementation of Just Culture approach to managing staff performance and behaviour as 
described in chapter 2, Conceptual framework will assist in providing a decision tree which 
assist with error classification, identifying nurse behaviour, educational needs and the 
organisational changes which need to be implemented. This approach would assist in 
decreased risk, improved compliance and supportive environment as seen in study by 
Volgelmeier et al. (2010: 293).   
5.4.13 Leadership development  
The study identified a need to provide nurse leaders with the skills to become 
transformational leaders, who are able to provide a supportive environment for professional 
nurses to report errors, have them managed in a just and fair manager, transparent about 
their errors and are able to share these experiences with colleagues and promote a learning 
culture.  
Studies have shown that when the nurse managers are supportive, error reporting increases, 
but when fear of the manager reaction is the response with concern of the outcomes and 
disciplinary or legal action, professional nurses will not report errors. Anoosh et al. (2008: 
294) in a study conducted in Iran concluded that a culture of safety is the nurse managers’ 
responsibility and is accountable to ensure staffing, resources, a supportive work 
environment and professional development of nursing staff to ensure competence and 
patient safety. The Magnet program (ANCC, 2008) advocates that the transformational 
leader be developed and thus learn the skills of motivating, coaching and sharing the vision 
of the nursing units to improve staff and patient outcomes.  
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Studies have shown that nurse managers are important to the process of error reporting and 
management and strongly influence the outcomes for the professional nurse (Mayo & 
Duncan, 2004:214; Chiang & Pepper, 2006:396-398; Moody et al., 2006:204; Chard, 
2010:143; Almutary & Lewis, 2012:125).  
The Magnet Program (ANCC, 2008) has defined outcomes and expectations for 
transformational leaders and recommends that this may be the model used for 
implementation of the leadership developmental plan. 
 Transformational leadership competence is advised, thus need to develop programmes 
aimed at nurse leaders to manage and support nurses in error reporting and management. 
There is a need for an in depth understanding of the systems and processes of the 
organisation; the application of the Just Culture principles including the management of staff 
performance and behaviours; how to create a supportive work environment: partnership and 
empowerment of professional nurses and how to support nurses who have made errors. 
There is also a need to clarification of the role and responsibilities of the nurse manager in 
error reporting and management. This may include a leadership developmental programme 
to include these concepts and how to support nurses who have become second victims due 
to errors.  
Leadership development as transformational as will be needed to develop the safety culture 
of the work environment is recommended. 
5.4.14 Support of the second victim 
The study results showed that RNs reported being blamed and not supported when 
experienced an error and were not treated fairly. The majority of RNs also felt that nurses 
were treated differently from other healthcare providers. However, a limitation of this question 
was the assumption that this was meant in the negative sense. Value would have been 
added to the responses if clarification of a positive or negative response was solicited.  
Second victim had been identified as the nurse (healthcare provider) who makes an error 
(Wu, 2000: 762).  Scot et al. (2009) interviewed 31 second victims and defined the six stages 
experienced when an error is made and the needs of the nurse during these stages.  
Chard (2010) explored the coping strategies of RN on the preoperative units, and the results 
support the findings of this study, which found that the nurses’ coping strategies and staying 
in nursing after making an error are dependent on the support received in the work 
environment and the support and approach to dealing with the error from the manager. 
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Chard (2010: 135 - 143) reports a limitation of sample size of 39% (but had assumed a 
response rate of 27%, so mailed 700 surveys, returns 272).  
Literature advocates the need for healthcare organisations to develop programmes which 
would support the second victim as errors may have long term outcomes for the healthcare 
provider who makes and error.  
As the study has identified this lack, it is recommended that the executive leadership review 
the need for implementation of the organisation wide programme to support second victims.  
Future research study would recommend a qualitative approach to exploring the nurses’ 
experiences that have identified not receiving support and what this would look like; this may 
assist the executive in developing a programme for specific needs of the multicultural 
workforce.   
5.4.15 Emotional support program  
The study has demonstrated that there is a gap in providing support to the second victims 
who make errors. The organisation needs to recognize that there is a need to provide 
support for all healthcare providers who make errors and develop a programme to meet this 
need. Programmes which provide toolkits which can be adopted by other organisations are 
available, e.g. John Hopkins has piloted a programme at the hospital which was found to be 
effective.  
Training for front line staff, colleagues, middle managers and executives was completed 
which made all staff recognize that each play an important part in supporting the second 
victim, which would include the six stages needed to be cared for and not abandoned.  
This should also be made available for all employees and presentations should be part of the 
orientation and annual education updates. This will increase staff awareness as studies have 
shown some staff suffers long term when an error has been made; especially if the outcome 
for the patient is has been severe (Scot et al., 2009: 329).  
An additional stressor may be the multicultural workforce and coping in a foreign country, 
thus managers and peers may need to be educated in recognizing symptoms of not coping 
and the programme may include unique additions for this environment                                               
(Van Rooyen et al.,2010:5-6).  
5.4.16 Disclosure practices (adverse events, JCIA, patients) 
Results of this study show there are no defined disclosure policies in the organisation, and 
the conceptual framework indentifies this as a right for the patient and family. RNs do not 
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consider error disclosure to the patient and family which is the nurse`s responsibility, while 
nurse leaders were ambivalent.  RNs did not provide sufficient feedback to draw conclusions 
from apology to patients due to fear and RNs have not received education in disclosure 
practices.  
However, there are debates on disclosure as to responsibility, liabilities, no education and 
unique cultural challenges in Saudi Arabia, e.g. language barrier. Thus a recommendation 
would be for the organisation to develop and implement an error disclosure plan which would 
include education on how to disclose errors, define responsibilities for the job functions and 
support for patients and employees.  
Future research topics: Defining medical error disclosure policies in a multicultural, 
paternalistic decision making society; disclosing medical errors in a multicultural workforce; 
ethical dilemmas in medical error disclosure in Saudi Arabia.  
The study demonstrated that there is no defined process for error disclosure and staff does 
not know how this is done. Disclosure may determine how the patient and family respond to 
an error, and this may be dependent on the severity of the outcomes for the patient. 
However, healthcare providers have an ethical and moral obligation to disclose errors to the 
patient and family. But, healthcare providers have barriers to disclosing errors, the most 
important being the legal outcomes especially for physicians (Herbert et al., 2001: 511; 
Mazor Simon, Yood, Martinson, Gunter, Reed & Gurwitz, 2004: 416-417). .  
A process for error disclosure is developed by the organisation leaders which would guide 
the multidisciplinary team in disclosure to patients and families. This will assist in guiding 
staff when there is a need to inform patients about error outcomes. This process should 
include support experts, e.g. Arabic speaking social workers, educators, quality coordinators 
to assist staff during the process until they are more confident at communicating these 
outcomes to patients.  
5.4.17 Policies  
The study has shown the need to review the following policies:  
5.4.17.1  Error reporting and management policies  
The study has shown that both groups of nurses were confused about the non-punitive policy 
and need to have education and training in these processes. 
5.4.17.2  Just Culture Performance Management Policy 
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A review of the policies currently applicable and if they are detrimental to error reporting or if 
they support a culture of learning and changes be made which would meet the needs of the 
organisation, employees, patients and families in safe care delivery and the decrease of 
errors in healthcare delivery (Marx, 2001: 19-27)  
Implementation of Just Culture approach to managing staff performance and behaviour as 
described in chapter 2, assist in providing a decision tree which assist with error 
classification, identifying nurse behaviour, educational needs and the organisational changes 
which need to be implemented.  
5.4.17.3  Disclosure Policy  
The study identified there is no disclosure policy to guide staff in the process and no 
assistance available to healthcare providers. The definition of a policy for error disclosure, 
together with a process described above will assist employees in accomplishing a difficult 
task in healthcare, i.e. admitting an error has been made, acknowledging the error and 
disclosing to the patient, regardless of the outcomes.  
5.4.17.4  Second Victim 
The study has identified that no policy exists in the organisation to define the rights of the 
second victim and to provide a guide managers in care of the second victim. Recommend is 
the development of a Second Victim Care policy which would be implemented alongside the 
second victim programme to provide support and education.  
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS  
Describe the recommendations, based on the findings of the study for future study or work  
5.5.1 Recommendations for the organisation  
Recommended is the implementation of the Just Culture programme which would provide 
the missing links in error reporting, management and prevention. This will also assist in 
providing a decision algorithm which will assist with error classification, identifying nurse 
behaviour, education needs and the organisational changes which need to be implemented. 
This would result in decreased risk, improved compliance and supportive environment.  
The organisational disciplinary processes, application and monitoring and outcomes for 
nurses are revisited to check for compliance with just culture principles to improve the culture 
of safety for the organisation. The promotion of a balanced approach to managing staff 
behaviour, thereby removing fear, shame and blame expectations for errors which occur is 
recommended.  
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A culture of learning: Educational programme which would include the identified gaps of error 
reporting, disclosure and management. This would include addressing the factors of 
language, culture and computer literacy.  
An educational plan which would focus on specific needs of professional nurses and nurse 
leaders needs which will include the following topics: Application of disciplinary measures, 
peer review, shared governance structures to empower accountability for practice, 
autonomy, harm scoring types of errors, e.g. near misses, errors and negligence; emotional 
support / supportive skills / coping skills, monitoring of compliance, as well as feedback 
mechanism which is very important.  
The empowerment of professional nurses who fulfil the role of a safety net with an increased 
focus on skills and education, end user feedback to evaluate the effectiveness of systems 
and processes and multidisciplinary collaboration are recommended. 
A supportive environment exists in the nursing units who have resource staff available in the 
error reporting and management process. The recommendations would be to use the 
support staff more in encouraging an environment of reporting and the allocation of 
resources to assist nursing units with errors reporting, e.g. quality experts.  
A leadership development programme to include the just culture principles, learning culture, 
reporting culture and how to support nurses who become second victims due to errors is 
recommended.  
Organisational leadership: The role of the chief of nursing was significant to changing the 
work environment and perceptions of safety culture. Thus the role model behaviour of a 
transformational leader who continue to advocate, be visible and accessible bed side nurses 
and implementation of structures and processes which empower nurses at the bed side are 
recommended (ANCC, 2008).  
5.5.2 Recommendations for national nursing structures to be established  
The Nursing Practice Act has not been defined for Saudi Arabia and would recommend that 
this is prioritized as this may assist in the definition of autonomous practice, clarifying 
accountabilities and responsibilities of RNs. There is no nursing council, the Saudi 
Commission for Healthcare Specialities (SCHS) registers all healthcare providers and 
requires nurses to register but there is no defined process to hold nurses accountable at the 
national level.  
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A Saudi Nursing Association has been established but is relatively unknown to nurses and 
the scope of the association is not known. Thus many nurses question the role of support as 
a nursing council would stand for patients and the association for nurses.  
5.5.3 National level error reporting 
More studies are now being conducted and published about healthcare safety in Saudi 
Arabia, and there would be a benefit in sharing experiences and strategies which have 
resulted in better outcomes for patients and staff. Executive leadership have a responsibility 
to decimate information at a national level, but a challenge is no mandatory error reporting 
and as hospitals at different levels of quality provision. 
Recommended is a National Saudi Voluntary Error reporting database to be established 
which would benefit not just Saudi Arabia but the Middle Eastern region, as would establish a 
cohort for comparison in similar healthcare settings.  
5.5.4 Recommendations for future studies  
This study was limited to one organisation in Saudi Arabia and thus cannot be generalized. 
Recommended future studies which would focus on the unique aspects which were found to 
be significant, e.g. the impact of national diversity on nursing errors, the role of the nurse 
leader on nursing errors reporting and management.  
5.6 CONCLUSION  
Error management in nursing amongst registered nurses working in a tertiary hospital in 
Saudi Arabia has been explored through this study with the four goals which were to identify 
the nursing related errors occurring, determine the current process of reporting nursing 
errors, describe the management of nursing errors and explore the factors impacting on the 
management of nursing errors achieved.  
The approach to error management for RNs is complex as depicted in the conceptual 
framework, chapter two. Multiple factors composed of healthcare providers, systems, 
processes and organisational culture play important roles and influence error reporting, error 
management and influence the outcomes.  
A discussion of the results, conclusions of the findings, limitations recognized and 
recommendations for the organisation, nursing community and Saudi Arabia (MOH); and 
future studies have been presented.  
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